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Abstract
The work presented in this thesis is focused around the security of the Learning with Errors
(LWE) problem, as well as applications of homomorphic encryption schemes.
In Chapter 1, we provide an overview of the topics discussed in this thesis: lattice-based
cryptography, secure computation, cryptanalysis, and standardisation.
In Chapter 2, we introduce necessary background concepts. Specifically, we outline some
notions related to lattice-based cryptography and cryptanalysis.
In Chapter 3, we consider trade-offs in “Batch Bounded Distance Decoding”. We consider
guess-and-verify decoding (g-v decoding), a porting of the decoding attack on LWE into
the case of small and/or sparse secret vectors. This results in a combinatorial trade-off,
where components of the secret vector are guessed before batches of BDD instances are
solved in a smaller dimension. This attack technique has similarities with the hybrid lattice-
reduction and meet-in-the-middle (hybrid-decoding) attack, and we compare and contrast
these two techniques throughout. We conclude that, under certain assumptions, our g-v
decoding technique outperforms a variant of the hybrid-decoding attack.
In Chapter 4, we analyse submissions to the NIST standardisation process for post-quantum
cryptographic algorithms. Specifically, we consider all parameter sets submitted to the first
round, for every lattice-based scheme, as well as the cost models used for lattice reduction.
We estimate the security of every parameter set, under every cost model, considering both
the uSVP and dual attacks (where appropriate). This allows for individual schemes to be
compared more easily. As a result of this analysis, we observe that cost models for the BKZ
algorithm are not order preserving. That is, if scheme A is “more secure” than scheme B
under cost model 1, the same is not necessarily true under cost model 2. Finally we outline
the current state of the NIST standardisation process, and provide some estimates for the
schemes which have reached the third round.
In Chapter 5, we consider homomorphic encryption-style parameter sets, and explore hybrid
attacks. Hybrid attacks are competitive in regimes where the LWE secret is small and/or
sparse, so need to be considered for parameter sets used in homomorphic encryption schemes.
We consider the effect of secret sparsity on security estimates, and consider the trade-off
between bootstrapping complexity and security.
Finally, in Chapter 6, we consider an application of homomorphic encryption: “Private
Outsourced Kriging Interpolation”. Kriging is a spatial interpolation algorithm which has
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applications in geoscience. We consider the outsourcing of this algorithm using homomorphic
encryption, and outline techniques which can be used to protect the sensitive parameters in




1.1 Lattice-based Cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.2 Secure Computation and Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.3 Cryptanalysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.4 Standardisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.5 Organisation and Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.6 Source Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2 Background and Notation 23
2.1 Mathematical Objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.2 Lattices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.3 Gram-Schmidt Orthogonalisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.4 Projections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.5 Hard Problems in Lattices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.5.1 Related Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.5.2 Small Secrets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.6 SVP Solvers, CVP Solvers, and Lattice Reduction Algorithms . . . . . . . . . 45
2.6.1 LLL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.6.2 BKZ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.7 Babai’s Nearest Plane Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.8 Cryptanalytic Heuristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.9 Solving the Learning with Errors Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.9.1 The Dual Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.9.2 The uSVP Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.9.3 The Decoding Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.9.4 Alternative Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.10 The Learning with Errors Estimator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.10.1 Input and Output . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.10.2 Implemented Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
2.11 Public-key Encryption from LWE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.12 Homomorphic Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3 Batch Bounded Distance Decoding 70
3.1 Introduction and Contribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.1.1 An Overview of Decoding Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.2 A Comparison of Success Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.3 The Hybrid-decoding Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.3.1 Common Assumptions in Analyses of the Hybrid-decoding Attack . . 81
6
CONTENTS
3.3.2 Modelling Lattice Reduction for q-ary Bases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.4 A Spectrum of Decoding Approaches for Solving Small-secret LWE . . . . . . 87
3.4.1 Small-secret Decoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.4.2 Drop-and-solve Decoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.4.3 Guess-and-verify Decoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.5 Target Parameter Sets and Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
3.5.1 NTRU Prime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
3.5.2 Round5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3.5.3 HElib . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
3.5.4 Results and Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
3.5.5 Results in the Enumeration Regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
3.5.6 Results in the Sieving Regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
3.6 Assumptions Case Study: NTRU Prime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
3.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4 Security Estimates for the NIST Standardisation Process for Post-quantum
Cryptographic Algorithms 106
4.1 Introduction and Contribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
4.1.1 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4.2 First Round Submissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4.3 Costing Lattice Reduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
4.3.1 Enumeration-based Cost Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
4.3.2 Sieving-based Cost Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
4.3.3 Cost Models Used in the Submissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
4.4 Parameter Sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
4.5 Small Secret Variants of the uSVP and Dual Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
4.5.1 uSVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
4.5.2 Dual . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
4.5.3 Multiple Hardness Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
4.5.4 Number of Samples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
4.6 First Round Security Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
4.6.1 Observation: Cost Swaps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
4.7 Second Round Submissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
4.8 The Third Round . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
4.8.1 Cost Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
4.8.2 Parameter Sets and Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
4.9 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
5 Homomorphic Encryption Standardisation 140
5.1 Introduction and Contribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
5.1.1 Bootstrapping Complexities for CKKS, BFV, and BGV . . . . . . . . 142
5.1.2 Structure and Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
5.2 Comments on Small and Sparse-secret LWE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
5.2.1 Keyspace Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
5.2.2 Secret Density . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
5.3 Algorithms for solving Small-secret LWE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
5.3.1 Hybrid-decoding Attack Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
7
CONTENTS
5.3.2 The Hybrid-dual Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
5.4 Currently Recommended Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
5.5 Investigating Sparse-secrets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
5.5.1 Using Sparse Secrets with Existing Recommended Parameter Sets . . 158
5.5.2 Sparsity vs. Performance Trade-off . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
5.5.3 Sparsity as a Proportion of Target Security: Exploration of Choices for ζ 160
5.5.4 Standardising Larger Dimensions n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
5.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
6 Privacy-preserving Kriging Interpolation 167
6.1 Introduction and Contribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
6.2 Kriging Interpolation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
6.2.1 Overview of the Kriging Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
6.2.2 The Variogram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
6.2.3 The Normal Equations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
6.2.4 Toy Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
6.3 Private Outsourced Kriging Interpolation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
6.4 Our Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
6.4.1 The Canonical Normal Equations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
6.5 Our Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
6.6 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
6.6.1 Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
6.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
7 Conclusion and Future Work 194
7.1 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
7.1.1 Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
7.1.2 Standardisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
7.1.3 Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
7.2 Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
7.2.1 Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
7.2.2 Standardisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197




1.1 An outline of the various attack techniques used to solve the Learning with
Errors problem. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.1 The vectors {b1,b2} form a basis of the lattice consisting of the blue points,
as do the vectors {b3,b4}. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.2 Two fundamental parallelepipeds, P1 and P2, of the bases B1 and B2. . . . . 33
2.3 An example of λ1(L) and λ2(L) in the lattice represented by the blue dots. . 34
2.4 Code used to generate a random q-ary lattice of dimension 220 with modulus
q = 215 and determinant q110, and perform LLL-reduction. . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.5 GSO lengths of a random q-ary lattice of dimension 220 with modulus q = 215
and determinant q110 which has been LLL-reduced using FPYLLL [FPL20]. . 48
2.6 Code used to generate the BKZ-50 reduced lattice basis considered in Figure 2.7. 51
2.7 Output GSO lengths of a random q-ary lattice of dimension 220 with modulus
q = 215 and determinant q110 which has been BKZ-β reduced for β ∈ {10, 30, 50, 70}
using FPYLLL [FPL20]. For comparison, we also include the LLL basis profile
used in Figure 2.5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.8 An example of two custom cost models to be used in the LWE Estimator. . . 61
2.9 Example call to the LWE Estimator with our example parameter set n =
256, α = 0.002, and q = 17500. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.10 Structure of the top level function estimate lwe in the LWE Estimator. Implemented
attacks are listed in green, whilst those not implemented are listed in red.
Supported secret distributions are listed below implemented attacks. Here we
assume that a ≤ 0 and b > 0. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.1 Code used to generate the required enumeration dimension which guarantees
success in the g-v decoding approach. Note that this code considers the
squared norms of the vectors ‖b∗i ‖, and thus varies slightly from Equation 2.2.
The functions gaussian heuristic() and ball log vol() are taken from the
FPLLL library [FPL20]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.2 A comparison of success conditions. Here, the GSO norms are computed using
the Geometric Series Assumption. The dashed blue line represents the expected
length of the projected target vector in the projected sublattice π⊥i (L). The
dashed black line represents the length of the shortest vector in the same
projected sublattice π>i (L) as predicted by the Gaussian Heuristic. Note that
we have used the GSA here to produce the GSO norms. This analysis can
also be carried out using a BKZ Simulator to generate the GSO norns, and we
consider both of these techniques (GSA and BKZ Simulator) throughout this
chapter. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
9
LIST OF FIGURES
3.3 Example of the initial GSO lengths for a q-ary lattice of dimension d = 180
with q = 17 constructed as in Equation 3.5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.4 Example of BKZ-60 reduction on a q-ary lattice of dimension d = 180 with
q = 17 and volume 1780 for bases constructed as in Equation (3.5), along with
the output of BKZ simulation and the heuristic from [Wun19]. . . . . . . . . 86
3.5 Example of BKZ-60 reduction on a q-ary lattice of dimension d = 180 with
q = 17 and volume 1780 for a basis constructed as in Equation 3.5, which has
been re-randomised via the application of a unimodular matrix. We also plot
the output of the BKZ simulator on a basis for the same lattice. . . . . . . . 87
4.1 Enumeration-based cost models used as part of a first round submission to
the NIST standardisation process for a lattice of dimension d = 1024 with
40 ≤ β ≤ 400. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
4.2 Sieving-based cost models, used as part of a first round submission to the NIST
standardisation process, for a lattice of dimension d = 1024 with 40 ≤ β ≤ 400. 114
4.3 Estimates of the cost of the primal attack when guessing τ secret entries for
the schemes EMBLEM (n = 611) and uRound2.KEM (n = 500). . . . . . . . 130
5.1 Example LWE (secret) keyspace sizes with n = 1024 for binary, ternary, fixed-
weight binary, and fixed-weight ternary secrets. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
5.2 Changes applied to the dual attack source code inside the LWE Estimator to
produce our hybrid-dual estimates. This replaces lines 1944-1959 in commit
428d6ea of the LWE Estimator. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
5.3 A comparison of the usvp, dual, hybrid=dual and hybrid=decoding attacks
under the BKZ cost model T (β, d) = 20.292β+16.4+log(8d), for the parameter set
n = 1024, q = 240 and σ ≈ 3.2 with a sparse ternary secret with a variety of
Hamming weights h ∈ {64, 128, 256, 512}. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
5.4 Extrapolation to n = 65536 and n = 131072 using the data from Table 5.5
for the value ζ = 1. Here, we consider the lattice reduction cost model
TBKZ(β, d) = 2
0.292β+16.4+log(8d) and extrapolate using the SageMath function
find fit. Note that the solid lines represent values covered by data points,
and the dashed lines represents extrapolation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
6.1 Code used to plot the experimental variogram of a dataset, such as the example
dataset presented in Table 6.1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
6.2 The experimental variogram for our example dataset, presented in Table 6.1,
with ∆ = 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
6.3 A linear model fitted to the experimental variogram using the Pykrige library,
for our example dataset presented in Table 6.2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
6.4 Example interpolation grid using the linear model fitted to the experimental
variogram presented in Figure 6.3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
6.5 Graphs showing the timing costs of each algorithm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
6.6 Graphs showing the timing costs of each algorithm, excluding Outsource. . . . 192
10
List of Tables
2.1 A comparison of variants of the Learning with Errors, Learning with Rounding,
and NTRU problems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.2 The root-Hermite factor for a random q-ary lattice of dimension 220 with
modulus q = 215 and determinant q110 which has been BKZ-β reduced for
β ∈ {10, 30, 50, 70}. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.3 Input parameters to the LWE Estimator, used to retrieve security estimates
for LWE parameter sets. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.4 Outputs from the LWE Estimator. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.1 A summary of attacks found in the literature: decoding, drop-and-solve-decoding,
and hybrid-decoding, as well as our guess-and-verify decoding technique. . . . 76
3.2 Complexity estimates for uSVP, dual, and various decoding techniques on our
example parameter set with n = 653, q = 4621, σ ≈
√
2
3 , and χs = B
−
100. . . . 92
3.3 Summary of results for NTRU Prime for a classical guessing (i.e. exhaustive
search) approach. Estimates marked with † correspond to standard BDD
decoding. Full results can be found in Tables 3.7, 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10. . . . . . 93
3.4 Summary of results for Round 5 for a classical guessing (i.e. exhaustive search)
approach. Estimates marked with † correspond to standard BDD decoding.
Full results can be found in Tables 3.7, 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10. . . . . . . . . . . . 94
3.5 Summary of results for Round 5 IoT for a classical guessing (i.e. exhaustive
search) approach. Estimates marked with † correspond to standard BDD
decoding. Full results can be found in Tables 3.7, 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10. . . . . . 94
3.6 Summary of results for HElib for a classical guessing (i.e. exhaustive search)
approach. Full results can be found in Tables 3.7, 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10. . . . . . 95
3.7 Estimates in the enumeration regime, where BKZ and the BDD solver are
instantiated with enumeration algorithms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
3.8 Estimates in the enumeration regime considering a “meet-in-the-middle” approach
which does not consider probabilities of failure in the meet-in-the-middle phase.
Such an approach considers a square-root speed-up in the guessing phase. . . 97
3.9 Estimates in the sieving regime, where BKZ and the BDD solver are instantiated
with sieving algorithms. Estimates marked with † correspond to standard BDD
decoding. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
3.10 Estimates in sieving regime for a “meet-in-the-middle” approach which does
not consider probabilities of failure in the meet-in-the-middle phase. Such an
approach considers a square-root speed-up in the guessing phase. . . . . . . . 99
3.11 Sets of assumptions considered in this case study. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
11
LIST OF TABLES
3.12 Enumeration-based estimates, where each section corresponds to a set of assumptions
outlined in Table 3.11. “– ” denotes a value which is not compatible with our
notation (for example, our script considers a simple sqrt speed-up in the search
space, the NTRU Prime script considers splitting the search space as in a meet-
in-the-middle approach). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
3.13 Sieving-based estimates, where each section corresponds to a set of assumptions
outlined in Table 3.11. “– ” denotes a value which is not compatible with
our notation (for example, our script considers a simple sqrt speed-up in the
search space, the NTRU Prime script considers splitting the search space as in
a meet-in-the-middle approach). Estimates marked with a † correspond to a
uSVP estimate with η, β uncoupled. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.1 An example interpretation of the five NIST security levels. . . . . . . . . . . . 108
4.2 Complete and proper lattice-based submissions to the NIST standardisation
process. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4.3 All cost models proposed as part of a submission to the first round of the NIST
standardisation procedure. The name of a model is the log (to the base 2) of
its cost. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
4.4 Parameter sets for NTRU-based schemes with secret dimension n, modulo q,
small polynomials f and g, and ring Zq[x]/(φ). The NIST column indicates
the NIST security category aimed at. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
4.5 LWE parameter sets for NTRU-based schemes, with dimension n, modulo q,
standard deviation of the error σ, and ring Zq[x]/(φ). The NIST column
indicates the NIST security category aimed at. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
4.6 Parameter sets for LWE-based schemes with secret dimension n, Module-LWE
rank k (if any), modulo q, standard deviation of the error σ. If the LWE
samples come from a Ring- or Module-LWE instance, the ring is Zq[x]/(φ). The
NIST column indicates the NIST security category aimed at. *For Titanium
no ring is explicitly chosen but the scheme relies on a family of rings where
fi ∈ {−1, 0, 1} and f0 ∈ {−1, 1}.  For R EMBLEM we list the parameters
from the reference implementation since a suitable φ could not be found for
those proposed in [SPL+17, Table 2]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
4.7 Estimates for the first round submissions EMBLEM, NewHope, NTRU Prime,
and uRound2.KEM under the 0.292β and 0.187β log(β) − 1.019β + 16.1 cost
models. Estimates are taken directly from https://estimate-all-the-lwe-
ntru-schemes.github.io/docs/. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
4.8 Security estimates for the first round variants of EMBLEM and uRound2.KEM.
Best in class are highlighted in bold, and we can see this is an example of a cost
swap: in the 0.292β model uRound2.KEM has a higher security estimate (84-
bits vs 76-bits), whereas in the 0.187β log(β)− 1.019β+ 16.1 model EMBLEM
has a higher security estimate (142-bits vs 126-bits). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
4.9 Second round lattice-based submissions to the NIST standardisation process. 132
4.10 Third round lattice-based submissions to the NIST standardisation process. . 132
12
LIST OF TABLES
4.11 All cost models proposed as part of a submission to the third round of the
NIST standardisation procedure. The name of a model is the log (to the base
2) of its cost. Cost models which were not used as part of our analysis for
the first round submissions are marked with a †. The 0.396β model considers
the 0.292β model mapped to the AT metric [Ber20]. The 0.3496β and 0.4150β
models are used in the NTRU submission under the assumption of a “local”
model of computation. The 0.2075β+log(β) model was mentioned in the round
one Frodo submission, but wasn’t used to produce estimates. . . . . . . . . . 133
4.12 Parameter sets for third round NTRU-based schemes with secret dimension n,
modulo q, small polynomials f and g, and ring Zq[x]/(φ). The NIST column
indicates the NIST security category aimed at. Each parameter set from
SNTRU Prime has been assigned two security levels in the round 3 submission,
and we always choose the lowest of the two. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
4.13 LWE parameter sets for third round NTRU-based schemes, with dimension
n, modulo q, standard deviation of the error σ, and ring Zq[x]/(φ). The
NIST column indicates the NIST security category aimed at. Each parameter
set from SNTRU Prime has been assigned two security levels in the round 3
submission, and we always choose the lowest of the two. . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
4.14 Parameter sets for third round LWE-based schemes with secret dimension n,
Module-LWE rank k (if any), modulo q, standard deviation of the error σ.
If the LWE samples come from a Ring- or Module-LWE instance, the ring is
Zq[x]/(φ). The NIST column indicates the NIST security category aimed at.
Note that, for the SABER submission, we consider the binomial secret drawn
from Bη to be uniform over the interval (−η2 ,
η
2 ). Each parameter set from
NTRU LPrime has been assigned two security levels in the round 3 submission,
and we always choose the lowest of the two. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
4.15 “Core-SVP” estimates for third round NTRU-based schemes, with dimension
n, modulo q, standard deviation of the error σ, ring Zq[x]/(φ) and with m = 2n
samples. The NIST column indicates the NIST security category aimed at. . 137
4.16 Quantum “Core-SVP” estimates for third round NTRU-based schemes, with
dimension n, modulo q, standard deviation of the error σ, ring Zq[x]/(φ), and
with m = 2n samples. The NIST column indicates the NIST security category
aimed ats. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
5.1 A summary of the bootstrapping complexities for CKKS, BGV and BFV. . . 148
5.2 Currently standardised LWE parameters at the 128-, 192- and 256-bit security
level for uniform ternary secret specified in [ACC+18, Table 1] and estimates
of their security against usvp, decoding, and dual attacks under the BKZ
cost model T (β, d) = 20.292β+16.4+log(8d), where β is the blocksize and d is the
dimension. The best performing attack for each parameter set is highlighted
in bold. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
13
LIST OF TABLES
5.3 Impact of using a sparse ternary secret of Hamming weight h = 128, using the
currently standardised LWE parameter sets at the target 128-, 192- and 256-bit
security level for uniform ternary secret specified in Table 5.2. Estimates of the
security of each parameter set against usvp and dual attacks under the BKZ
cost model T (β, d) = 20.292β+16.4+log(8d) are presented, where β is the blocksize
and d is the dimension. The best performing attack for each parameter set is
highlighted in bold. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
5.4 Bit-length log q of moduli required to provide target security level λ, for λ ∈
{128, 192, 256}, for various secret densities. We note that the LWE Estimator






. The best performing attack for each parameter set is
highlighted in bold. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
5.5 The reduction in bit-length log q of the modulus q required to retain the desired
level of security against the dual, usvp, hybrid-dual and hybrid-decoding attacks,
under our assumptions, when using a sparse ternary secret parameterised by
ζ = hλ compared to a uniform ternary secret. The lattice reduction cost
model is T (β, d) = 20.292β+16.4+log(8d), and a (conservative) estimate for both
the hybrid-dual and hybrid-decoding attacks are obtained by considering a
square-root speed-up in the search space, and ignoring any meet-in-the-middle
probabilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
5.6 Required bit-length log q of moduli required to attain target security level λ
under the usvp and dual attacks, with λ ∈ {128, 192, 256}, for dimension n =
65536, under the sieving-based cost model T (β, d) = 20.292β+16.4+log(8d). . . . 163
5.7 Maximal moduli q required to attain target security level λ = 128 for various
values of σ. In each case, we consider a ring dimension of n = 8192 and a fixed
weight ternary secret with Hamming weight h = 128. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
6.1 The toy dataset used throughout this section, as in the ordinary kriging example
used in the PyKrige library [PYK20]. The xi, yi values are coordinates of the
measurement [zi]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
6.2 Data protection offered by our private outsourced Kriging scheme. . . . . . . 184
14
List of Algorithms
1 The LLL Algorithm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2 Babai’s Nearest Plane algorithm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
15
List of Publications
This thesis is based on the following publications:
1. [ACF+17]: James Alderman, Benjamin R. Curtis, Oriol Farràs, Keith M. Martin, and
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1.1 Lattice-based Cryptography
Cryptography underpins society as we know it. From secure messaging applications to online
payments, cryptography allows us to perform many daily tasks over the internet in a secure
manner – often without the knowledge that we are even using it. Currently used cryptographic
primitives whose security relies on RSA [RSA78] or discrete logarithm problems [DH76] can
be broken by sufficiently large quantum computers using Shor’s algorithm [Sho97]. Thus
begins the search for quantum-secure cryptography, known more commonly as post-quantum
cryptography. The US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) started a
standardisation procedure in 2016 [Nat16], with the goal being to design, analyse, and
standardise a portfolio of public-key encryption schemes and digital signature algorithms.
A variety of candidate post-quantum secure algorithms have been proposed, including code-
based submissions, lattice-based submissions, isogeny-based submissions, and multivariate-
based submissions.
Of the candidate post-quantum secure algorithms submitted to this process, lattice-based
cryptographic algorithms represent a strong candidate for standardisation and have been
tested in practice [Bra16]. There are three major roadblocks to the wide-scale deployment of
lattice-based cryptosystems: usability, confidence in the underlying security assumptions, and
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standardisation. Indeed, cryptosystems must be usable, and secure, for wide-scale deployment
to be considered and, moreover, standardisation is essential for many forms of industrial or
governmental usage. In this thesis, we consider each of these aspects individually.
The hardness of lattice-based cryptographic primitives typically relies on the Learning with
Errors (LWE) problem. LWE (and its variants) has given rise to many advanced encryption
techniques such as homomorphic encryption, which has lead to a variety of additional interesting
areas of research.
1.2 Secure Computation and Applications
Whilst typical encryption techniques allow us to secure data-at-rest and data-in-transit, once
data has been encrypted we are no longer able to perform operations on this data. Fully
homomorphic encryption [Gen09] allows for computation to occur on data which remains
encrypted, giving rise to an abundance of privacy-preserving applications. One of the major
bottlenecks with fully homomorphic encryption is the efficiency of the bootstrapping step used
to refresh a noisy ciphertext. Solutions used in practice tend to avoid this expensive procedure
in favour of somewhat homomorphic encryption, which allows for a limited computation, such
as polynomial functions up to some maximal degree d, to be evaluated in a secure manner.
There are a variety of other secure computation technologies available for use in the wild
today. Garbled circuits [Yao86] allow for the private evaluation of boolean circuits, oblivious
RAM [Gol87] allows for access patterns to be protected, and secure multiparty computation
allows several parties to jointly compute a function over their private inputs. These techniques
can be combined with homomorphic encryption to yield efficient privacy-preserving solutions
to interesting problems, e.g. [CCD+19]. We are now in an era where secure computation is
being used in commercial products [Env20, Unb20, Dua20, Zam20], which gives an indication
of the practicality of these techniques.
In this thesis, we are interested in both the application, and security, of homomorphic
encryption encryption schemes. In order to provide increased efficiency, the parameter sets
used typically do not come under the umbrella of the various security reductions outlined in
the literature. These adaptations come with a concrete security loss1, and it is important
1Here we are referring to both the tightness of reductions, for example the reduction from LWR to LWE,
18
1.3 Cryptanalysis
to quantify this loss of security so that homomorphic encryption-style parameter sets can be
used with confidence.
1.3 Cryptanalysis
The security of LWE-based cryptographic constructions is measured in terms of the running
times of the best-known attacks. The LWE Estimator of Albrecht et al. [APS15, Est20] is a
common tool used for estimating the running time of a subset of these attacks on a given set of
LWE parameters (n, α, q). For other variants of the LWE, such as those used in homomorphic
encryption schemes where the secret vector is small and/or sparse, hybrid attacks are also
competitive.
All of the attacks considered in this thesis involve the usage of lattice-reduction algorithms,
which, generically, find short vectors in projected sublattices of size β, referred to as the
blocksize, in order to find a short basis of a given input lattice. To begin, we reduce the
LWE problem to a lattice problem such as the unique Shortest Vector problem (uSVP), the
Bounded Distance Decoding problem (BDD) or the Short Integer Solutions problem (SIS)














Figure 1.1: An outline of the various attack techniques used to solve the Learning with Errors
problem.
Of particular interest in this thesis are hybrid attacks, which exploit any smallness and/or
sparsity in the LWE secret. Often, it is advantageous to guess components of the LWE secret
and the chosen secret distribution.
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(or error) vector before performing lattice reduction in a smaller dimension. This creates a
trade-off between guessing correctly and the reduced cost of performing lattice reduction in a
smaller dimension. Hybrid attacks involve a myriad of trade-offs, and are notoriously difficult
to optimise. To this end, we explore a variety of these trade-offs as well as the assumptions
which are made in analyses of hybrid attacks. As part of our work, we have released open-
source code which allows for the complexity of hybrid attacks to be estimated under a variety
of assumptions2. We have also contributed to the LWE estimator, to help keep the output
estimates in line with state-of-the-art attacks.
1.4 Standardisation
There are two ongoing standardisation procedures of interest in this thesis. The first, as
discussed in Section 1.1, is the NIST standardisation process for post-quantum algorithms,
and we consider the security of all of the schemes submitted to first and third rounds of this
process.
The second standardisation procedure is the ongoing effort to standardise aspects of homomorphic
encryption, and the homomorphicencryption.org consortium are leading this effort. The
Homomorphic Encryption Security Standard (HE Standard) [ACC+18] recommends secure
parameters for use in homomorphic encryption schemes, and we discuss and analyse some of
these parameter selections in this thesis. We also consider potential future extensions to the
HE Standard, and outline several points for consideration in future work.
1.5 Organisation and Contributions
In Chapter 2 we outline all necessary background content required. This includes preliminary
notions from lattice-based cryptography and cryptanalysis. We then introduce our four
contributions in Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6.
1. In Chapter 3, we discuss the Batch Bounded Distance Decoding problem and its application
to solving the Small-secret Learning with Errors problem. We compare this technique
2This code can be found at github.com/bencrts/hybrid_attacks.
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to Howgrave-Graham’s hybrid lattice-reduction and meet-in-the-middle attack (hybrid-
decoding attack), and discuss how important assumptions are in these analyses. We
show that, under certain assumptions, our attack technique outperforms a variant of the
hybrid-decoding attack and, under other sets of assumptions, the converse is true. This
chapter corresponds to the publication Exploring trade-offs in batch bounded distance
decoding detailed in the List of Publications section of this thesis.
2. In Chapter 4 we discuss the concrete security of the submissions to the NIST post-
quantum standardisation process. We highlight the importance of lattice reduction
cost models and estimate the security of each parameter set for every scheme under all
cost models considered as part of a first round submission. This technique allows for
the security of two given schemes to be compared in a fair manner. As part of this
work, we observe that lattice-reduction cost models are not order preserving, meaning
that if scheme A is harder to break than scheme B under cost model 1, the same is
not necessarily true under cost model 2. Moreover, we provide an update regarding the
current state of the standardisation process. This chapter corresponds to the publication
Estimate all the {LWE, NTRU} schemes! detailed in the List of Publications section
of this thesis.
3. In Chapter 5 we discuss homomorphic encryption standardisation, and focus on the
security of Sparse-secret LWE parameter sets. We outline the current state of the
HE standard, and consider potential extensions to this standard, including sparse
secret distributions. We outline parameter sets which balance security and efficiency,
with a focus on the cost of the expensive bootstrapping procedure required in fully
homomorphic encryption schemes. This chapter corresponds to the publication On
the feasibility and impact of standardising sparse-secret LWE detailed in the List of
Publications section of this thesis.
4. In Chapter 6 we discuss an application of homomorphic encryption: the private outsourcing
of Kriging interpolation. Kriging is a spatial interpolation algorithm which provides
the best linear unbiased prediction (BLUP) of an observed phenomenon, by taking a
weighted average of samples within a specified neighbourhood. Kriging is widely used
in areas such as geo-statistics where, as an example, it may be used to predict the
quality of mineral deposits at an unobserved location based on previous measurements.
In our work, we tweak the underlying algorithms to allow this process to be securely
outsourced in an efficient manner. In particular, we build a construction which allows
for the Kriging process to carried out when the measurement values are encrypted via a
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homomorphic encryption scheme. This chapter corresponds to the publication Private
outsourced kriging interpolation detailed in the List of Publications section of this thesis.
1.6 Source Code
Where possible, source code used as part of this thesis has been made publicly available.
1. The code used in Chapter 2 is available here: github.com/bencrts/thesis/code/
background
2. The code used in Chapter 3 is available here: github.com/bencrts/thesis/code/
batchbdd
3. The code used in Chapter 4 is available here: github.com/estimate-all-the-lwe-
ntru-schemes/estimate-all-the-lwe-ntru-schemes.github.io and here: github.
com/bencrts/thesis/code/nist
4. The code used in Chapter 5 is available here: github.com/bencrts/thesis/code/
hestandard
5. The code used in Chapter 6 is available here: github.com/bencrts/thesis/code/
kriging
In the event that any of the above links become broken, please contact the author for a copy
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In this chapter, we introduce all relevant background mathematics required in this thesis. We
introduce the notion of a lattice and consider various properties of lattices, as well as heuristics




Euclidean space of dimension n is denoted Rn. All logarithms are to the base two, unless
otherwise stated. Column vectors are denoted by lower case bold letters, e.g b, and matrices
by upper case bold letters, e.g. B. The transpose of the matrix B is denoted by BT. The
ith component of a vector b is denoted by bi, and the (i, j)
th entry of a matrix B is denoted
by Bi,j , where all indices start from one. We write Bi for the i
th column of B. The inner
product of two vectors b1 and b2 is written as 〈b1,b2〉. We write (b1,b2) for the vector
formed by concatenating the entries of the two vectors b1 and b2. The same notation is used
for the concatenation of the vector b1 and the scalar c as (b1, c). Similarly, we denote the
concatenation of k column vectors, each of length d, into a (d×k) matrix as [b1 | b2 | · · · | bk].
We write B(τ) to represent the d×(k−τ) sub-matrix of B constructed via dropping the first τ
columns of B, i.e. B(τ) = [bτ+1 | bτ+2 | · · · | bk]. Similarly we use b(τ) to denote dropping the




i−1 with their coefficient vectors f = (f1, f2, . . . , fn). The Euclidean norm of a





Definition 2.1 (Discrete Gaussian Distribution) A discrete Gaussian distribution centred








Throughout this thesis, we typically consider discrete Gaussian distributions over the integers
to be centred at zero (i.e. µ = 0). The standard deviation of such a distribution is σ = r√
2π
,
and we denote this distribution by Dσ.
Throughout this thesis the term ring is reserved for a commutative ring R with a multiplicative
identity element 1R (we denote the additive identity element of R by 0R).
Example 2.1 For an integer q, we consider values in the set Z∩(−q/2, q/2] to be representatives
of Zq. For example, if x ∈ Z2, x can take values in the set:
Z2 = {0, 1}
and, if x ∈ Z3, x can take values in the set:
Z3 = {−1, 0, 1}.
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Definition 2.2 (Ideal) The set I 6= ∅ is an ideal of the ring R if:
1. I is a subgroup of the additive group of R, and
2. for each r ∈ R and x ∈ I we have that xr ∈ I.
Definition 2.3 (Field) A field K is a ring which also has the property that it is closed under
multiplicative inverses, i.e. the non-zero elements of K form a multiplicative group.
Example 2.2 For a ring R, an ideal generated by a single ring element f ∈ R is denoted by
(f), and this ideal is made up of elements in the set:
(f) = {fr | r ∈ R}.
Definition 2.4 (Maximal Ideal) A proper ideal I ( R of a ring R is maximal if for any
ideal J satisfying I ⊆ J , we have either J = I or J = R.
Definition 2.5 (Quotient Ring) Given a ring R and an ideal I of R, we can define the
quotient ring R/I which is formed of cosets r + I, for r ∈ R, of the additive group of I in R.
We define the addition and multiplication operations in the quotient ring R/I in the following
way:
(I + r1) + (I + r2) = I + (r1 + r2)
(I + r1)(I + r2) = (I + r1r2),
for all r1, r2 ∈ R.
We can think of a quotient ring as a set of equivalence classes under the equivalence relation:
[x] ∼ [y] if and only if x− y ∈ I.
That is, two elements x, y ∈ R/I are equivalent if and only if their difference x−y is contained
within the ideal I. We note that an ideal I in the ring R is maximal if and only if the quotient




Definition 2.6 (Ring Homomorphism) The map φ : R → S is a ring homomorphism
from the ring R to the ring S if it satisfies the three conditions:
1. φ(1R) = 1S,
2. φ(r + s) = φ(r) + φ(s), and
3. φ(rs) = φ(r)φ(s),
for all r ∈ R and s ∈ S, where 1R and 1S are the multiplicative identity elements of the rings
R and S respectively.
Throughout this thesis we are particularly interested in polynomial rings of the form Zq[X]/(f)
for some polynomial f ∈ Zq[X]. In this case, two elements g, h ∈ Zq[X]/(f) are in the same
equivalence class if and only if g−h ∈ (f), i.e. g−h = fk for some k ∈ Z[X]. Multiplication in
polynomial quotient rings works as in typical polynomial multiplication, with the additional
condition that we work modulo the quotient polynomial f . For a given ring R, we denote the
ring R/qR as Rq.
When we consider elements a ∈ Rq, we can represent a as a vector a of n coefficients in Zq.
Therefore, for two ring elements a, b ∈ Rq, we can compute the polynomial sum a + b by
considering an element-wise addition of the vectors a and b. That is:
a + b = (a1 + b1, a2 + b2, . . . , an + bn),
and a + b is the coefficient vector of a + b. For multiplication, the situation is a little
more complicated: multiplication of two ring elements, i.e. ab corresponds to matrix/vector
multiplication. That is, there exists a matrix Pa such that, for any ring element b ∈ Rq we
can compute the product c = ab via:
c = Pab.
More specifically, the matrix Pa is of the form:
Pa =

a1 a2 . . . an






n−1a)2 . . . (x
n−1a)n
 ,
where (xia)j is the j
th component of the coefficient vector of the polynomial xia.
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Example 2.3 Let Rq = Z3[X]/(x5−1). This ring can be identified with the set of polynomials
with coefficients in Z3 up to degree 4, i.e. the set:
{a1 + a2x+ a3x2 + a4x3 + a5x4 | ai ∈ Z3, 1 ≤ i ≤ 5}.
Consider the polynomial g = a1 + a2x+ a3x
2 + a4x
3 + a5x
4. We note that:













since x5 ≡ 1 mod (x5 − 1). In this case, the matrix Pg is given by:
Pg =

a1 a2 a3 a4 a5
a5 a1 a2 a3 a4
a4 a5 a1 a2 a3
a3 a4 a5 a1 a2
a2 a3 a4 a5 a1

.
Definition 2.7 (Irreducible Polynomial) Given a field K, a non-constant polynomial f ∈
K[X] is irreducible over K if it cannot be factored into two non-constant polynomials g, h ∈
K[X].
In typical examples considered in this thesis, the (non-constant) polynomial f is irreducible
in Zq[X], and we consider rings of the form Zq[X]/(f).
Example 2.4 The polynomial f = X2 + 1 is irreducible over Q since we cannot write:
X2 + 1 = (X + a)(X + b),
with a, b ∈ Q. We note that f is not irreducible over C since we can write f as:
X2 + 1 = (X + i)(X − i).
Example 2.4 motivates the discussion of an extension field.
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Definition 2.8 (Extension Field) If F,K are two fields such that F is a subfield of K,
then we refer to K as an extension field of F .
Example 2.5 Consider the field Q. Clearly ±
√
2 /∈ Q, and so the polynomial p = x2 − 2 ∈
Q[X] is irreducible over Q. Since p is irreducible over Q, the ideal (p) in Q[X] is maximal
and therefore the quotient ring R = Q[X]/(x2 − 2) is a field. Since Q is a subfield of R, we
have that R is an extension field of Q.
We also consider the notion of a module M over a ring R.
Definition 2.9 (Module) Given a ring R, an abelian group M is called an R-Module if
there exists an operation  : R×M →M such that, for all m,n ∈M and r, s ∈ R, we have:
1. r  (m+ n) = r m+ r  n,
2. (r + s)m = r m+ sm,
3. (r · s)m = r  (sm), and
4. 1R m = m,
where ·,+ denote the regular ring operations.
We will consider various cryptographic constructions built over rings and modules. In a
similar manner to the notion of a vector space Kd built considering d-tuples of field elements
from K, we can build a module by forming tuples of elements from a ring R.
Example 2.6 Consider the ring Rq = Zq[X]/(Xn + 1). We define:
M := {(x1, x2, . . . , xk) | x1, x2, . . . , xk ∈ Rq}.
The set M is an Rq-module since for s ∈ Rq and (x1, x2, . . . , xk) ∈ M we can define a
multiplication operation  : Rq ×M →M such that:
s (x1, x2, . . . , xk) = (sx1, sx2, . . . , sxk),
leading to the four conditions in Definition 2.9 being satisfied. In this example, k is referred













of all integer combinations of a set of n linearly independent vectors {b1,b2, . . . ,bn} in Rd,
where d ≥ n.
The integer n is known as the rank of the lattice, and the integer d is the dimension of the
lattice. If n = d then the lattice is known as full rank. The set of linearly independent
column vectors {b1,b2, . . . ,bn} is known as a basis of the lattice, and is typically represented
in matrix form B = [b1 | b2 | · · · | bn] ∈ Rd×n. We write L(B) to denote the lattice generated
by the columns of the matrix B. In particular, this lattice is made up of the set:
L(B) = {Bv | v ∈ Zn}.





Figure 2.1: The vectors {b1,b2} form a basis of the lattice consisting of the blue points, as
do the vectors {b3,b4}.
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∣∣∣∣∣` ∈ N, ci ∈ K, si ∈ S
}
.
That is, the span of the set S is the set of finite linear combinations of elements of S, with
coefficients drawn from the underlying field K. Given a full-rank lattice L, the Dual lattice
L∗ is the set of vectors in the span of L which have integer inner product with all lattice
points in L.
Definition 2.12 (Dual Lattice) Let L be a full rank lattice of dimension d. The dual
lattice of L is defined to be:
L∗ = {v ∈ span(L) | ∀w ∈ L, 〈v,w〉 ∈ Z}.
It can be shown that the dual lattice is a lattice.
Proposition 2.1 Let L be a lattice with basis B. The dual lattice of L(B), denoted by L(B)∗,
is a lattice with basis B(B>B)−1.
To prove this result, we show that L(B(B>B)−1) ⊆ L(B)∗ and L(B)∗ ⊆ L(B(B>B)−1). We




Proof. Set C = B(B>B)−1. Note that:
Cx = B(B>B)−1x
= B((B>B)−1x)
and therefore we have that Cx ∈ span(L(B)). Moreover, for y = Cx ∈ span(L(B)) and
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= 〈x,v〉 ∈ Z
and, therefore, we have that Cx ∈ L(B)∗ by Definition 2.12. This gives us L(C) ⊆ L∗(B).
To prove that L(B)∗ ⊆ L(C), we consider z ∈ L(B)∗ and aim to show that z ∈ L(C). Since
z ∈ L(B)∗, we have that z ∈ span(L(B)) and, for all r ∈ L(B), we have 〈z, r〉 ∈ Z by




and, since each component of Bz is an integer, we have L(B)∗ ⊆ L(C). Therefore, we have
L(B)∗ ⊆ L(C), as required. 
We will also encounter q-ary lattices when considering cryptanalytic attacks on lattice-based
cryptosystems.
Definition 2.13 (q-ary Lattice) A q-ary lattice is a lattice L which satisfies:
qZd ⊆ L ⊆ Zd,
for some integers q, d.
Example 2.7 For a matrix A ∈ Zn×mq , where q,m, n ∈ N, the lattice:
Lq(A) = {v ∈ Zm | vA = 0 mod q},
is q-ary: clearly L ⊆ Zn, and if y ∈ qZm then yA ≡ 0 mod q meaning that qZn ⊆ L.
Therefore, we have qZn ⊆ L ⊆ Zn as required.
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Definition 2.14 (Unimodular Matrix) Let U ∈ Zd×d be a matrix with all integer entries.
The matrix U is referred to as unimodular if the determinant of U is in the set {1,−1}.
Proposition 2.2 Let B1 and B2 be the matrix representations of two lattice bases. Then:
L(B1) = L(B2),
if and only if B1 = UB2 for some unimodular matrix U.





 = ad− bc,
and there are infinitely many solutions to the integer equation ad− bc = ±1. The same holds
true for all larger dimensions (by induction). For dimension d ≥ 2, a lattice has infinitely
many bases and there are a variety of proofs for this result. Informally, for full rank lattices,
this can be seen as a combination of the facts that:
1. there are infinitely many unimodular matrices of dimension d ≥ 2,
2. full rank lattices admit an invertible basis matrix (thus U1B = U2B ⇐⇒ U1 = U2),
and
3. Proposition 2.2.
Definition 2.15 (Fundamental Parallelepiped) Given a lattice basis B, we define the
set:
P(B) = {Bx | x ∈ Rn such that ∀i, 0 ≤ xi < 1}.
as the fundamental parallelepiped of the lattice basis B.
Note that the shape of this parallelepiped depends on the lattice basis B under consideration.
Two such parallelepipeds can be seen in Figure 2.2.






Figure 2.2: Two fundamental parallelepipeds, P1 and P2, of the bases B1 and B2.





∣∣∣∣x ∈ Rn such that ∀i, −12 ≤ xi < 12
}
.
as the shifted fundamental parallelepiped of the lattice basis B.















since by definition UTU = I. This is as expected, since B1 and B are bases of the same





Figure 2.3: An example of λ1(L) and λ2(L) in the lattice represented by the blue dots.
Definition 2.18 (Successive Minima) We denote by λi(L) the i
th successive minima of
the lattice L, i.e. the radius of the smallest ball, centred at the origin, containing at least i
linearly independent lattice vectors.
An example of λ1(L) and λ2(L) for a lattice L is given in Figure 2.3.
2.3 Gram-Schmidt Orthogonalisation
For a lattice basis B = [b1 | b2 | · · · | bd], we can define the corresponding Gram-Schmidt
orthogonalised (GSO) vectors B∗ = {b∗1,b∗2, . . . ,b∗d} as:
b∗1 = b1













The vector b∗i is the vector bi with contributions in the directions of {b∗1,b∗2, . . . ,b∗i−1}
removed, i.e. b∗i is the component of the vector bi which is orthogonal to the hyperplane
defined by the set of vectors {b∗1,b∗2, . . . ,b∗i−1}. This means that the vectors b∗i and b∗j , for
i 6= j, are pairwise orthogonal, i.e. 〈b∗i ,b∗j 〉 = 0.






and, as outlined earlier, can also be computed as the determinant of the Gram matrix BTB,
comprising of the coefficients µi,j , i.e. (B
TB)i,j = µi,j . We note that the vectors B
∗ =
[b∗1 | b∗2 | · · · | b∗d] in general do not form a basis of the lattice L(B), however these two bases
do span the same space i.e. span(B) = span(B∗).
When considering cryptanalytic attacks against lattice-based cryptosystems, the lengths of
the GSO vectors for a given lattice basis B are an important quantity, we which refer to as
the GSO profile.
Definition 2.19 (GSO Profile) For a lattice L of rank n, we define the GSO Profile of the
lattice basis B to be the set of GSO lengths, that is:
{‖b∗i ‖ | 1 ≤ i ≤ d}.1
2.4 Projections
Definition 2.20 (Projection) Given a vector v and a non-zero vector u, we define the





We are particularly interested in projections onto, and orthogonal to, basis vectors of a lattice
L.
1Note that the GSO profile is sometimes defined in terms of the squared GSO lengths.
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Definition 2.21 (Parallel Projection) Given a lattice with basis B we write π
‖
i,B(x), 1 ≤
i ≤ d, to denote the parallel projection of x onto the space spanned by the set of vectors












Definition 2.22 (Orthogonal Projection) Given a lattice with basis B, we write π⊥i,B(x),
1 ≤ i ≤ d, to denote the orthogonal projection of x onto the space spanned by the vectors
{b1,b2, . . . ,bi−1}, that is:









Note that π⊥1,B(x) is the identity function, i.e. π
⊥
1,B(x) = x, and π
‖
1,B(x) = 0. Moreover, since
the lattice basis is clear from context, we usually drop the basis B and write π⊥i or π
‖
i . Since
the orthogonal projection is usually the projection of interest, we sometimes write π⊥i := πi.
Example 2.8 Mapping x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn)
T ∈ Rn to the point y = (x1, x2, . . . , xn−1, 0)T
is a parallel projection onto the space spanned by the set of unit vectors {u1,u2, . . . ,un−1}.





so that y = Px. The corresponding orthogonal protection onto the space spanned by the
set of unit vectors {u1,u2, . . . ,un−1}, which takes x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn)T ∈ Rn to the point
y = (0, 0, . . . , 0, xn)





so that y = Qx.
We are particularly interested in projecting orthogonally to a subset of basis vectors for some
lattice L(B), which generates a projected sublattice:
Λi(B) = {π⊥i (x) | x ∈ L(B)},
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we note that Λi(B) is indeed a sublattice of L(B), with a basis given by:
{π⊥i (bi), π⊥i (bi+1), . . . , π⊥i (bd)}.
Note that π⊥1 (B) = L(B) as is expected. By considering the projection function outlined in
Definition 2.22, we note that we can write the Gram-Schmidt vectors as:











2.5 Hard Problems in Lattices
We are interested in several of the hard problems in lattices which underpin lattice-based
cryptography. We first consider the Shortest Vector Problem which challenges us to find the
shortest vector in a lattice.
Definition 2.23 (Shortest Vector Problem (SVP)) Given a lattice basis B, find a shortest
non-zero lattice vector in L(B), i.e. a vector x ∈ L(B) of length ‖x‖ = λ1(L(B)).
We can also define a selection of problems closely related to the shortest vector problem. The
γ-Approximate Shortest Vector Problem gives us a bound γ and asks us to find a vector whose
length is upper-bounded by γλ1(L(B)).
Definition 2.24 (γ-Approximate Shortest Vector Problem (Approx-SVP)) Given a
lattice basis B and an approximation factor γ, find a non-zero lattice vector in x ∈ L(B) of
length ‖x‖ ≤ γλ1(L(B)).
The γ-unique Shortest Vector Problem (uSVP) provides a guarantee that a shortest vector
exists, is unique (up to sign), and is significantly shorter (in particular, by a factor of γ) than
the second shortest vector λ2(L) in the lattice L.
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Definition 2.25 (γ-unique Shortest Vector Problem (uSVP)) Given a lattice basis B
guaranteed to contain a non-zero shortest vector satisfying λ2(L(B))/λ1(L(B)) = γ, find this
shortest vector.
The Bounded Distance Decoding Problem (BDD) provides us with a public lattice basis L(B),
as well as a target point t, and a parameter γ. Our goal is to find the closest lattice vector to
the given target point, under the guarantee that the target point is very close to the lattice.
Definition 2.26 (Distance Between a Point and a Lattice) We define dist(t, L(B)) to
be the distance between the target point t and the closest point to t contained within the lattice
L(B), that is:
dist(t, L(B)) = min{‖x− t‖ | x ∈ L(B)}.
Definition 2.27 (γ-Bounded Distance Decoding Problem (BDDγ)) Given the basis
of a lattice L(B), a vector t /∈ L(B), and a parameter 0 < γ such that dist(t, L(B)) < γλ1(B),
find the lattice vector v ∈ L(B) which is closest to t.
The Short Integer Solutions Problem (SIS) asks us to find a vector below a certain length,
which is in the left kernel of a given, public, matrix.
Definition 2.28 (γ-Shortest Integer Solutions Problem (SIS)) Let A ∈ Z(m×n)q be a
uniformly random matrix. Find a non-zero vector x ∈ Zmq satisfying ‖x‖ ≤ γ and xA ≡
0 mod q.
We are interested in lattice-based cryptography which is built on the hardness of two families
of problems: the NTRU problem and the Learning with Errors Problem.
Definition 2.29 (NTRU [HPS96]) Let n, q be positive integers, φ ∈ Z[x] be a monic
polynomial of degree n, and Rq = Zq[x]/(φ). Let f, g ∈ Rq, with f invertible, be small
polynomials (i.e. having small coefficients) and h = g · f−1 ∈ Rq.
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 Search-NTRU is the problem of recovering f or g given h.
 Decision-NTRU is the problem of deciding if h = g · f−1 or uniform.
Typically, the quotient polynomial is chosen as φ = Xn + 1. However, other instantiations of
the NTRU problem (such as NTRUPrime [BCLv19]) consider alternative quotient polynomials,
such as φ = Xn−X − 1. An important object is the matrix Ph as defined in Section 2.1, for
a choice of φ = Xn − 1 this matrix takes the form:
Ph =

h1 h2 . . . hn





h2 h3 . . . h1
 ,
where h1, . . . , hn are the coefficients of the degree (n − 1) polynomial h ∈ Rq. In NTRU-
based cryptographic constructions, the ring element h (and therefore the matrix Ph) is
typically made public. Representing this matrix requires storage of only n integers modulo
q, i.e. n log2(q) bits. Note that, for other choices of φ, this matrix can take a different form,
related to the structure of multiplication by xi.
We next define variants of the Learning with Errors problem. We begin by outlining the
Module Learning with Errors Problem (Module-LWE), before defining the Ring Learning
with Errors Problem (Ring-LWE) and the Learning with Errors Problem (LWE), which can
both be viewed as special cases of Module-LWE.
Definition 2.30 (Module Learning with Errors (Module-LWE) [LS15]) Let n, q, k
be positive integers such that d = n/k ∈ Z. Define the rings R = Z[X]/(Xd + 1) and
Rq = R/qR. Let χ be a probability distribution on R and s be a secret module element in R
k
q .
 We define the Module-LWE Distribution MLs,χ,q as the distribution on R
k
q ×Rq given by
choosing ai ∈ Rkq uniformly at random, choosing ei ∈ R according to χ and considering
it as an element of Rq, and outputting (ai, 〈ai, s〉+ ei) ∈ Rkq ×Rq.
 Search-Module-LWE is the problem of recovering the ring element s from a collection
{(ai, 〈ai, s〉+ ei)}mi=1 of samples drawn according to MLs,χ,q.
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 Decision-Module-LWE is the problem of distinguishing whether samples {(ai, 〈ai, s〉+ ei)}mi=1
are drawn from the Module-LWE distribution MLs,χ,q or uniformly from R
k
q ×Rq.
The distribution χ is typically a discrete Gaussian distribution over Z, as defined in Definition 2.1,
centred at zero and with width parameter αq. Here, the value α is referred to as the LWE
error rate, and we recall that a discrete Gaussian distribution with width parameter αq has
standard deviation σ = αq√
2π
.
Note that a module element v ∈ Rq corresponds to a vector of k polynomials of degree d.
Therefore, by considering the co-efficient vectors of the module elements, and recalling that
Pa is the matrix representation of multiplication by the ring element a, we can represent
a single Module-LWE sample, consisting of the k ring elements a1, a2, · · · , ak ∈ Rq, by the
system of equations:
b = [Pa1 | Pa2 | · · · | Pak ]s + e.
More explicitly, for our choice of f = Xd + 1, we have that each Paj is of the form:
Paj =

a1 a2 a3 · · · ad−2 ad−1 ad
−an a1 a2 · · · ad−3 ad−2 ad−1








−a3 −a4 −a5 · · · −ad a1 a2
−a2 −a3 −a4 · · · −ad−1 −ad a1

,
and, therefore, we have:
b =

a1,1 a1,2 . . . a1,d . . . ak,1 ak,2 . . . ak,d
























Representing the matrix A = [Pa1 | Pa2 | · · · | Pak ] requires storage of n = dk integers
modulo q, i.e. n log2(q) bits. Setting the module rank k = 1 gives rise to the Ring Learning
with Errors Problem.
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Definition 2.31 (Ring Learning with Errors (Ring-LWE) [LPR10]) Define the rings
R = Z[X]/(Xn + 1) and Rq = R/qR. Let n, q be positive integers, χ be a probability
distribution on R and s be a secret ring element in Rq.
 We define the Ring-LWE Distribution RLs,χ,q as the distribution on Rq × Rq given by
choosing ai ∈ Rq uniformly at random, choosing ei ∈ R according to χ and considering
it as an element of Rq, and outputting (ai, ais+ ei) ∈ Rq ×Rq.
 Search-Ring-LWE is the problem of recovering the ring element s from a collection
{(ai, ais+ ei)}mi=1 of samples drawn according to RLs,χ,q.
 Decision-Ring-LWE is the problem of distinguishing whether samples {(ai, ais+ ei)}mi=1
are drawn from the Ring-LWE distribution RLs,χ,q or uniformly from R
d
q ×Rq.
In our definition of Ring-LWE we have considered the quotient ring Rq = Zq[X]/(Xn + 1) as
a basis for the problem. In fact, we can define Ring-LWE with a variety of rings, although
this can lead to security issues [Pei16]. A single Ring-LWE sample consists of ais+ ei where
ai, s, ei ∈ Rq are all ring elements. As in Module-LWE, we can represent Ring-LWE samples
in matrix/vector form:
b = Pas + e.
More explicitly, for our choice of f = Xn + 1, we have:
b =

a1 a2 · · · an



















Representing the matrix Pa requires storage of n integers modulo q, i.e. n log2(q) bits. Finally,
if we consider the ring elements in Rq as vectors in Znq , and ignore the algebraic structure
induced by the ring Rq, we arrive at the Learning with Errors problem.
Definition 2.32 (Learning with Errors (LWE) [Reg05]) Let n, q be positive integers,
χ be a probability distribution on Z and s be a secret vector in Znq .
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 We denote the LWE Distribution Ls,χ,q as the distribution on Znq ×Zq given by choosing
ai ∈ Znq uniformly at random, choosing ei ∈ Z according to χ and considering it as an
element of Zq, and outputting (ai, 〈ai, s〉+ ei) ∈ Znq × Zq.
 Search-LWE is the problem of recovering the vector s from a collection {(ai, 〈ai, s〉+ ei)}mi=1
of samples drawn according to Ls,χ,q.
 Decision-LWE is the problem of distinguishing whether samples {(ai, 〈ai, s〉+ ei)}mi=1 are
drawn from the LWE distribution Ls,χ,q or uniformly from Znq × Zq.
If the components of the LWE secret follow the error distribution, then this is known as
normal-form LWE. A single LWE sample consists of 〈ai, s〉 + ei, where the n coefficients of
the vector ai are drawn uniformly at random from Zq, and the scalar ei is drawn from the error










a1,1 a1,2 · · · a1,n
a2,1 a2,2 · · · a2,n
...






















In LWE-based cryptographic constructions the matrix A and the vector b are typically made
public, whereas the secret s and the error e remain private. To represent the matrix A
requires storage of n×m integers modulo q, i.e. nm log2(q) bits.
To summarise, Module-LWE considers vectors of k polynomials over the ring Z[X]/(Xn/k+1).
Setting the module rank k = 1, and considering elements of the ring Z[X]/(Xn + 1), gives
rise to the Ring-LWE problem and, moreover, ignoring any structure induced by this ring,
we can retrieve the Learning with Errors problem over Znq . Therefore, one can represent:
 a single Module-LWE sample by k Ring-LWE samples of the appropriate dimension,
 a single Ring-LWE sample by n LWE samples, and
 a single Module-LWE sample as nk LWE samples.
Throughout this thesis, we will always view Ring-LWE and Module-LWE samples simply as
LWE samples of the appropriate dimension. Based on current knowledge, this approach is
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reasonable since there are no known approaches to solve Ring-LWE and Module-LWE which
exploits the additional algebraic structure in the ring.
2.5.1 Related Problems
There are a variety of problems closely related to the Learning with Errors problem. One
variant of interest is the Learning with Rounding Problem [BPR12], which replaces the
addition of a random error term ei with a deterministic rounding process. Informally, this
deterministic rounding process splits the space Zq into p sections, each of size approximately
q









Definition 2.33 (Learning with Rounding (LWR) [BPR12]) Let n, q, p < q be positive
integers and s be a secret vector in Znq .
 We define the LWR Distribution Ls,q,p as the distribution on Znq × Zq given by choosing
ai ∈ Znq uniformly at random and outputting (ai, b〈ai, s〉ep) ∈ Znq × Zp.
 Search-LWR is the problem of recovering the vector s from a collection {(ai, b〈ai, s〉ep)}mi=1
of samples drawn according to Ls,q,p.
 Decision-LWR is the problem of distinguishing whether samples {(ai, b〈ai, s〉ep)}mi=1 are
drawn from the LWR distribution Ls,q,p or uniformly from Znq × Zp.
We note that we can similarly define the Ring-Learning with Rounding Problem (Ring-LWR),
and the Module-Learning with Rounding Problem (Module-LWR) in a similar manner to LWR
and LWE. We can also view Learning with Rounding samples as LWE samples, where the
error term is generated according to the parameters used in the rounding process as outlined
above:
b〈ai, s〉ep = 〈ai, s〉+ ei,
for an appropriately chosen error term ei. In Table 2.1, we provide a comparison of the LWE,
Ring-LWE, Module-LWE, LWR, and NTRU problems.
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Assumption Secret Error Public Coefficients Sample
NTRU f ∈ Rq, invertible g ∈ Rq h ∈ Rq (h, g · f−1) ∈ Rq ×Rq
LWE s ∈ Znq ei ∈ Z ai ∈ Znq (ai, 〈ai, s〉+ ei) ∈ Znq × Zq
Ring-LWE s ∈ Rq ei ∈ R ai ∈ Rq (ai, ais+ ei) ∈ Rq ×Rq
Module-LWE s ∈ Rkq ei ∈ R ai ∈ Rkq (ai, 〈ai, s〉+ ei) ∈ (Rq)k ×Rq
LWR s ∈ Znq n/a ai ∈ Znq (ai, b〈ai, s〉cp) ∈ Znq × Zp
Ring-LWR s ∈ Rq n/a ai ∈ Rq (ai, baiscp) ∈ Rq ×Rp
Module-LWR s ∈ Rkq n/a ai ∈ Rkq (ai, b〈ai, s〉cp) ∈ Rkq ×Rp
Table 2.1: A comparison of variants of the Learning with Errors, Learning with Rounding,
and NTRU problems.
2.5.2 Small Secrets
In many cases, for efficiency purposes, it can be useful to restrict the secret distribution of s
from uniformly random over Znq to some other distribution with a smaller support e.g. {0, 1}n.
Several typical examples can be found in Definition 2.34, following the notation of [Alb17].
Definition 2.34 (Small Secret Distributions) Let n, q be positive integers.
 B is any probability distribution on Znq where each component is ≤ 1 in absolute value.
 B+ is the probability distribution on Znq where each component is independently sampled
uniformly at random from {0, 1}.
 B− is the probability distribution on Znq where each component is independently sampled
uniformly at random from {−1, 0, 1}.
 B+h is the probability distribution on Z
n
q where components are sampled uniformly at
random from {0, 1} with the additional guarantee that at most h components are non-
zero.
 B−h is the probability distribution on Z
n
q where components are sampled uniformly at
random from {−1, 0, 1} with the additional guarantee that exactly h components are
non-zero.
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 B−(h1,h2) is the probability distribution on Z
n
q where components are sampled uniformly
at random from {−1, 0, 1} with the additional guarantee that exactly h1 components are
equal to −1 and exactly h2 components are equal to 1.
We define the Small-secret Learning with Errors problem to be the same as in Definition 2.32
except the secret is drawn from one of the distributions defined in Definition 2.34. The
hardness of Small-secret LWE has been studied in [BLP+13] and more recently in [Mic18].
The concrete loss of security which arises from the use of small secrets has been studied
in [BGPW16, Alb17, ACD+18, Wun19, CP19]. Note that we can consider small-secrets in
the context of any of the Module-LWE/R, Ring-LWE/R, or LWE/R problems.
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The security of Learning with Errors-based cryptosystems depends on the hardness of finding
short vectors within q-ary lattices. There are two main families of algorithms used to find
short vectors. The first are sieving algorithms [AKS01, LMvdP15, BDGL16], which use
large lists of short vectors and iteratively generate new vectors by checking for shorter linear
combinations within this list, requiring the use of exponential memory. The second are
enumeration algorithms [Kan83, FP85, MW15], which perform a lattice-point search around
a given target point and only require the usage of polynomial memory. There are a variety
of estimates in the literature considering the running time of these SVP solvers, which are
surveyed in Chapter 4.
Informally, a lattice reduction algorithm takes as input a public, ‘bad’, basis B of some lattice
L and attempts to find a shorter and more orthogonal basis B′ of the same lattice. As an
example, the BKZ algorithm [SE94] does this by calling an SVP solver on projected sublattices
of dimension β at a cost of:
TBKZ(β, d) = c · TSVP(β).
Where TSVP(β) is the cost of an SVP solver in dimension β, and c denotes the number of
required calls to this SVP solver. The FPYLLL library [FPL20] contains implementations of
the lattice reduction algorithms outlined in this section, and we will use this library throughout
to provide examples.
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2.6.1 LLL
The Lenstra, Lenstra and Lovász (LLL) algorithm [LLL82] was originally designed as an
algorithm to perform polynomial factorisation. This algorithm has since been used to perform
lattice reduction and, indeed, is the first polynomial time lattice reduction algorithm. In a
lattice of dimension d, LLL finds an (approximate) shortest vector v whose length is at most
γλ1(L) where γ = 2
O(d). Let L(B) be the lattice with basis matrix [b1 | b2 | · · · | bd], GSO
vectors B∗ = {b∗1,b∗2, · · · ,b∗d}, and Gram-Schmidt coefficients µi,j .
Definition 2.35 (LLL-reduced Basis) We say that the basis B is LLL-reduced if the
following two conditions are satisfied:
1. for 1 ≤ j < i ≤ d, we have that |µi,j | ≤ 12 , and
2. for t = 1, 2, . . . , d−1, and some κ ∈ (14 , 1], each pair of vectors indexed (t, t+1) satisfies:
κ‖b∗t ‖2 ≤ ‖b∗t+1‖2 + µ2t+1,t‖bt‖2.
The first condition (size reduction) ensures that the lengths of the GSO vectors are in
descending order i.e. ‖bt‖ ≥ ‖b∗t+1‖. The second (Lovász) condition can be re-arranged
to:
(κ− µ2t+1,t)‖b∗t ‖2 ≤ ‖b∗t+1‖2,
and by the first condition we have that |µt,t+1| ≤ 12 , which gives us µ
2
t,t+1 ≤ 14 , and, since
κ ∈ (14 , 1], this leads us to (κ − µ
2
t+1,t) ∈ (0, 34 ]. This provides a bound on the difference in
length between successive Gram-Schmidt vectors, i.e. b∗t and b
∗
t+1, for 1 ≤ t ≤ d − 1. Note








and, choosing e.g. κ = 12 , we can note the relation:
‖b∗t ‖2 ≤ 4‖b∗t−1‖2.
Intuitively, LLL works in the following way: we perform size reduction, i.e. iteratively compute:
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and then we check that the Lovász condition is satisfied. If this condition is not satisfied at
e.g. index `, we swap the position of the vector b` with the previous vector b`−1 and restart
the process. We outline the LLL algorithm in Algorithm 1.
Input: A basis for the lattice L(B) and κ ∈ (14 , 1]
Result: A κ-LLL-reduced basis for the lattice L(B)
Compute the GSO vectors b∗1,b
∗
2, . . . ,b
∗
d
for i = 2 to d do
for j = i-1 to 1 do
bi ← bi − bµi,jebj
end
end
if there exists a t such that (κ− µ2t+1,t)‖b∗t ‖2 ≤ ‖b∗t+1‖2 then
Swap bt and bt+1 and restart
end
Algorithm 1: The LLL Algorithm.
We discuss heuristics related to the LLL algorithm, such as the expected shape of the output
basis, in Section 2.8.
2.6.1.1 Performing LLL in FPYLLL
We can use the FPYLLL library [FPL20] to perform LLL reduction in practice. Let us




A 215 · I110
 ,
where the components of A are chosen uniformly at random from Zq. We perform LLL-
reduction on such a lattice basis using the SageMath code in Figure 2.4, which generates an
output GSO Profile as in Figure 2.5. Clearly, by considering Algorithm 1, we expect that
the lengths of the GSO vectors will decrease as the index i increases, i.e. ‖b∗i ‖ ≥ ‖b∗i+1‖ for
1 ≤ i < d.
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from fpylll import *





for i in range(len(M.r())):
N.append((i, log(M.r()[i],2**15).n()))
for i in N:
print(i)
Figure 2.4: Code used to generate a random q-ary lattice of dimension 220 with modulus
q = 215 and determinant q110, and perform LLL-reduction.




















Figure 2.5: GSO lengths of a random q-ary lattice of dimension 220 with modulus q = 215
and determinant q110 which has been LLL-reduced using FPYLLL [FPL20].
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2.6.2 BKZ
For the majority of this thesis the lattice reduction algorithm under consideration will be the
Block Korkine Zolotarev algorithm (BKZ) [CN11]. The high level idea of BKZ is to produce
a shorter lattice basis by finding the short vectors in projected sublattices of dimension β,
referred to as the blocksize, as a subroutine. Let L(B) be the lattice with basis matrix
B = [b1 | b2 | · · · | bn], and corresponding GSO vectors B∗ = {b∗1,b∗2, · · · ,b∗n}.
Definition 2.36 (HKZ-reduced Basis) We say that the basis B is HKZ-reduced if the
following two conditions are satisfied:
1. The lattice basis is size reduced, and
2. for i ∈ {1, . . . , d} we have that bi = λ1(πi(L(B))).
Recall that the function π1(·) is the identity function, meaning that for i = 1 the second
condition states that b1 = λ1(L(B)). We write B[i,j] to denote the projected sublattice with
basis matrix:
[πi(bi) | πi(bi+1) | · · · | πi(bj)] .
Definition 2.37 (BKZ-β-reduced Basis) The lattice basis B is BKZ-β-reduced, for some
β ≥ 2, if the following two conditions are satisfied:
1. The lattice basis is size reduced, and
2. For i ∈ {1, . . . , d} we have that bi = λ1(L(B[i,min(i+β−1,d)])).
The BKZ algorithm is complex, and can be difficult to present concisely. We provide an
intuition as to how BKZ works, and point to the literature [CN11] for full details. In this
thesis use BKZ as a black-box: an algorithm which, given as input a lattice basis, provides
us with another lattice basis which satisfies certain properties. These properties can then
be used to produce running times for cryptanalytic attacks. Informally, the BKZ algorithm
executes the following set of steps:
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1. The process begins by considering the first “block” of β vectors bi,bi+1, . . . ,bi+β−1 for
i = 1. We find a new, shorter, vector bψ, which is a linear combination of the vectors
under consideration, by solving SVP in this “block”.
2. We then insert this vector bψ into the lattice basis for L(B) (in position i), and, since
we now have a set of d + 1 vectors in d-dimensional space, we use LLL to remove the
resulting linear dependency, that is, we remove the resulting “zero” vector to retrieve a
new basis B′′ for the full lattice L.
3. We increase the index i, iterating through the set i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d− β + 1}.
4. We repeat this process c times, halting when either (a) an upper bound on c is achieved,
or (b) the output basis satisfies a set of pre-defined conditions (which may include, for
example, halting when the quality of the basis is no longer improving at a predetermined
rate).
Each cycle through the index set i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d − β + 1} is referred to as a tour. We note
that the number of tours considered inside BKZ affects both the running time and the output
quality.
2.6.2.1 Performing BKZ in FPYLLL
We can use the FPYLLL library [FPL20] to perform BKZ reduction for a variety of blocksizes
β. Using the code outlined in Figure 2.6, we can generate GSO profiles for a random q-ary
matrix as in Section 2.6.1.1: i.e. with d = 220, q = 215, and m = n = 110. This code generates
basis profiles using blocksizes β ∈ {10, 30, 50, 70}, and the output can be seen in Figure 2.7.
In a similar manner to Figure 2.5, we expect the lengths of the GSO vectors to be decreasing,
i.e. ‖b∗i ‖ ≥ ‖b∗i+1‖ for 1 ≤ i < d.
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from fpylll import *
from fpylll.algorithms.bkz2 import BKZReduction as BKZ2
FPLLL.set precision(128)
A = IntegerMatrix.random(220,"qary", k=110, q=2**15)[::=1]
M = GSO.Mat(A, float type = "mpfr")
M.update gso()




for i in range(len(M.r())):
N.append((i, log(M.r()[i],2**15).n()))
for i in N:
print(i)
Figure 2.6: Code used to generate the BKZ-50 reduced lattice basis considered in Figure 2.7.
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Figure 2.7: Output GSO lengths of a random q-ary lattice of dimension 220 with modulus
q = 215 and determinant q110 which has been BKZ-β reduced for β ∈ {10, 30, 50, 70} using
FPYLLL [FPL20]. For comparison, we also include the LLL basis profile used in Figure 2.5.
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2.7 Babai’s Nearest Plane Algorithm
Babai’s Nearest Plane algorithm [Bab86] is a polynomial time algorithm which (approximately)
solves the CVP problem. That is, given a lattice L(B) with B ∈ Rd×n and target point t ∈ Rd,
Babai’s Nearest Plane algorithm outputs a vector v ∈ L(B) which satisfies:
‖v − t‖ ≤ 2
n
2 dist(t, L(B)).
We describe Babai’s Nearest Plane algorithm in Algorithm 2.
Input: A basis for the lattice L(B) and a target point t ∈ Rm
Result: A vector v which satifies‖v − t‖ ≤ 2
n
2 dist(t, L(B))
Run LLL on B with δ = 3/4. Set b = t









Algorithm 2: Babai’s Nearest Plane algorithm.
If we consider the lattice L(B) tiled by the shifted fundamental parallelepiped defined in
Definition 2.16, then, for a given target vector t, Babai’s Nearest Plane algorithm returns the
lattice point which is contained in the same fundamental region of the target vector t (here,
we assume that the parallelepiped is centred on the vector t). Although Babai’s Nearest Plane
algorithm is deterministic, in the case of decoding attacks on NTRU and LWE, we can define
a success probability with respect to the target point t [LN13], and we outline approaches for
computing this probability in Chapter 3.
2.8 Cryptanalytic Heuristics
In order to provide concrete security estimates for lattice-based cryptosystems, we use the
running times of the best attacks. To retrieve these running times, we require usage of many
heuristics. Throughout this section we outline the cryptanalytic heuristics used in this thesis.
We begin with the root-Hermite factor, a quantity which captures the quality of a lattice basis
after lattice reduction has been performed.
Definition 2.38 (Root-Hermite Factor) For a basis B of a lattice L of dimension d, the
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For bases produced by the BKZ algorithm with β ≥ 40, this value is well approximated by
δ2(β−1) = β2πe(βπ)
1/β [Che13]. As the value of β increases, the value δ decreases towards one.
Example 2.9 Consider the BKZ-reduced lattice bases in Figure 2.7. In Table 2.2, for each
value of the blocksize β, we compute the root-Hermite Factor δ and also calculate the corresponding
approximation β2πe(βπ)
1/β.
β ‖b1‖ δ β2πe(βπ)
1/β
10 5616.891 1.01574 0.98947
30 3486.508 1.01353 1.01240
50 2501.535 1.01201 1.01206
70 1944.753 1.01085 1.01084
Table 2.2: The root-Hermite factor for a random q-ary lattice of dimension 220 with modulus
q = 215 and determinant q110 which has been BKZ-β reduced for β ∈ {10, 30, 50, 70}.
The Geometric Series Assumption gives a prediction for the output shape of the Gram-
Schmidt basis vectors.
Definition 2.39 (Geometric Series Assumption [Sch03]) Let {b1,b2, . . . ,bd} be a basis,
of quality δ, of a lattice L, output by some lattice reduction algorithm. The Geometric Series
Assumption states that the lengths ‖b∗i ‖ for (1 ≤ i ≤ d) of the Gram-Schmidt vectors of this
basis are approximated by:
‖b∗i ‖ ≈ ψi−1‖b1‖,
for some 0 < ψ < 1.
We consider the formula for the volume of a lattice, as defined in Definition 2.17, in order to
54
2.8 Cryptanalytic Heuristics

























Making use of ‖b1‖ = δdVol(L)1/d, we can conclude that δ−d =
√
ψd−1. This leads to
ψ = δ−2d/(d+1). Typically, this value is approximated as ψ ≈ δ−2 and therefore we have:




We note that, for certain blocksizes β (e.g. β ≥ 40 [APS15]), the GSA appears to predict
the output shape of lattice reduction well. Wunderer [Wun19] suggests a ‘q-ary’ GSA, which
takes into consideration the case where the length of the first GSO vector is shorter than
predicted by the GSA (in this case, since the vector is already shorter than predicted by the
GSA, and lattice reduction will not increase the length of the input vectors, the GSA does
not fit well). There are also a variety of BKZ simulators [CN11, BSW18, FPL20], which
attempt to capture the concavity (i.e. non-linearity) of the final block of GSO vectors [YD17].
This non-linearity can be observed in Figure 2.7. We discuss both the ‘q-ary’ GSA and BKZ
simulators in more detail in Chapter 3.
The Gaussian Heuristic gives us a simple method of predicting how many lattice points are
within a “regular” region of a given volume. We can then use this heuristic to predict the
length of the shortest vector within a lattice.
Definition 2.40 (Gaussian Heuristic) Let L be a d-dimensional lattice. The Gaussian
Heuristic states that if K is a measurable set satisfying K ⊆ Span(L), then the number of
lattice points in K ∩ L satisfies:




2.9 Solving the Learning with Errors Problem
We can use the Gaussian Heuristic to predict the length of the shortest vector, λ1(L), in a
random lattice L. To do this we suppose that K is an n dimensional ball, centred at the
origin, with radius R = λ1(L). Clearly, this means that the set K ∩ L contains only the
shortest vector in the lattice, i.e. we have |K ∩ L| = 1, yielding Vol(K) = Vol(L). Using the


















, we can take




























































In Chapter 3 we will use Equation 2.2 to predict the length of the shortest vector in a variety
of different lattices, in order to guarantee success for a specific attack technique.
2.9 Solving the Learning with Errors Problem
Throughout this thesis, we are interested in considering techniques used to solve variants of the
Learning with Errors problem. In particular, in this section, we outline the dual, uSVP, and
decoding attacks. All three of these attacks require the usage of a lattice reduction algorithm,
typically BKZ, parametrised by a blocksize β. Variants of these attacks specialised to the
presence of a small secret are discussed in Chapter 4.
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2.9.1 The Dual Attack
The Dual (or Distinguishing) attack [MR09, Alb17] is a method of solving Decision-LWE.
Specifically, this problem distinguishes between LWE samples of the form b = As + e, as
defined in Definition 2.32, and uniformly random input. This method solves Decision-LWE via
finding short vectors in the q-ary lattice considered in the SIS problem outlined in Section 2.5:
L∗ = {x ∈ Zm | xA ≡ 0 mod q}.
Upon retrieving a short vector v ∈ L∗, we then consider the inner product 〈v,b〉. We have:
〈v,b〉 = 〈v,As + e〉 = 〈vA, s〉+ 〈v, e〉 = 〈v, e〉 mod q,
since vA ≡ 0 mod q. If b is formed of LWE samples, then the inner product 〈v, e〉 is
small [ACF+15]. If b is uniformly random modulo q, then we would expect the inner product
〈v, e〉 to also be uniformly random. This observation can be used to distinguish LWE from
random and thus solve Decision-LWE. We note that the success probability of this attack
depends on the length of the vector v, and thus the BKZ blocksize β. This can be seen by
considering the output distribution of the inner products 〈v,b〉: as the length of v grows,
this distribution becomes closer to uniformly random. In particular, the result from [LP11]
gives the distinguishing advantage as close to:
exp(−π(‖v‖α)2),




2.9.2 The uSVP Attack
The uSVP attack [Kan87, ADPS16, AGVW17] is a method of solving Search-LWE via the
γ-unique shortest vector problem (uSVP). This approach consists of embedding the LWE
error vector e into a lattice L with a uSVP structure. It is known that the recovery of this
vector via lattice reduction can be guaranteed under certain conditions [ADPS16]. In more
detail, to solve LWE via uSVP we construct the q-ary lattice:
LuSVP = {y ∈ Zm | y ≡ Ax mod q for some x ∈ Zn},
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Here t is the embedding factor which denotes the distance between b and the lattice L(A),











and, setting t = 1, we see that the lattice L(B) contains the short vector (e, 1). To
recover this short vector, we choose the BKZ blocksize β which satisfies the success condition
from [ADPS16] (and this success condition was experimentally verified in [AGVW17]). Specifically,
we choose β to satisfy the [ADPS16] success condition:√
β
d
· λ1(L) ≤ δ2β−d · Vol(L)1/d,
where d is the dimension of the lattice L(B). The overall cost of this approach, constrained




2.9.3 The Decoding Attack
The decoding attack [LP11, LN13, BG14] is a method of solving Search-LWE via the bounded
distance decoding problem (BDD). This approach consists of constructing a lattice in which
the LWE error vector e is the offset between this lattice and a known target point. Specifically,










 = As + q∗ = As mod q.
This tells us that the vector As is contained in the lattice L(B). Moreover, since As = b−e,
we have that the publicly known point b is of distance ‖e‖ from the lattice point As mod q.
Since the vector e is short, we can use a BDD solver to recover the lattice vector As mod q









2Although a choice of t = ‖e‖ makes this problem more balanced, in practice, we typically choose t = 1 for
efficiency, see [AFG13].
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where TBDD(β, d) is the cost of running the chosen BDD solver on a BKZ-β reduced lattice
of dimension d, and pBDD is the associated success probability of the BDD solver.
2.9.4 Alternative Techniques
There are many other methods to solve LWE, such as Coded-BKW [GJS15], Meet-in-the-
middle [APS15, CHHS19], and Arora-Ge [AG11, ACFP14]. A summary of these techniques
can be found in [APS15, Pla19]. For the parameter sets we are interested in, these techniques
are not competitive with the uSVP, dual, and decoding attacks, as noted in [ACD+18], and
we therefore do not consider them in this thesis.
2.10 The Learning with Errors Estimator
The Learning with Errors Estimator (LWE Estimator [APS15]) outputs concrete security
estimates for a given set of LWE parameters (n, α, q). By default, the running times of
the uSVP, decoding, and dual approaches are given as output. Estimates for several other
techniques are also available, although we will not consider them in this thesis. In this section
we outline the LWE Estimator.
2.10.1 Input and Output
There are many input and output options in the LWE Estimator. In Table 2.3 we outline
the input variables to the top level function estimate lwe, which is used to retrieve security
estimates.
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Quantity Meaning
n The LWE dimension
α The LWE error rate
q The LWE modulus
m The number of LWE samples available
secret distribution The LWE secret distribution
reduction cost model The cost model considered for BKZ
skip List of attacks not considered in the output
Table 2.3: Input parameters to the LWE Estimator, used to retrieve security estimates for
LWE parameter sets.
The two most interesting inputs are secret distribution and reduction cost model. These
enable the user to specify a specific LWE secret distribution (such as {0, 1}n or Dσ), as well
as a custom cost model for lattice reduction.
2.10.1.1 The LWE Secret Distribution: secret distribution
By default, the secret distribution used in the estimator is Dσ, where σ is the width of the
error distribution, i.e. the LWE Estimator assumes normal form LWE by default. Available
inputs are:
True : each component is chosen uniformly at random from Dσ (default)
False : each component is chosen uniformly at random from Zq
(a, b) : each component is chosen from the uniform distribution between a and b
((a, b), h) : vectors with a fixed Hamming weight h, where the non-zero components are
chosen from the uniform distribution between a and b
It should be noted that, whilst there are small-secret variants of the uSVP, dual, and decoding
attacks (outlined in Chapter 4), the LWE estimator does not trigger these variants for all
small-secret distributions. It is therefore important to consult the source code [Est20] to
determine the attack strategies being used.
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2.10.1.2 The Lattice Reduction Cost Model: reduction cost model
There are four in-built cost models for the BKZ algorithm in the LWE Estimator: sieve,
qsieve, enum, and lp. Each of those cost models corresponds to a result in the literature.
The lp model corresponds to the runtime estimation of Linder and Peikert [LP11], which is
known to be outdated, as discussed in [Alb17]. The enum model corresponds to the recent
result of [ABF+20], which represents state-of-the-art enumeration-based lattice reduction.
The sieve model corresponds to results in [BDGL16], which applies improvements in nearest-
neighbour algorithms to sieving for short vectors to retrieve a complexity of 20.292n in dimension
n, and the model used here assumes 8d calls to such an SVP oracle for a dimension d lattice.
The qsieve result corresponds to the results in [LMv14], which considers the application of
quantum search techniques to sieving, resulting in a complexity of 20.265n in dimension n, and
the estimator again assumes 8d calls for lattices of dimension d. These cost models correspond
to the following formulae:
sieve : 8d · 20.292β+16.4,
qsieve : 8d · 20.265β+16.4,
enum :
{








Note that the model enum is considered as the default option in the current variant of the
Estimator [Est20]. When retrieving security estimates, it may be desirable to use a custom
cost model. We consider how to define the cost models:
example-model-1 : TBKZ(β, d) = 2
0.292β, and
example-model-2 : TBKZ(β, d) = 4d · 20.265β+16.4,
in Figure 2.8.
example=model=1 = lambda beta, d, B: ZZ(2)**RR(0.292*beta)
example=model=2 = lambda beta, d, B: ZZ(2)**RR(0.265*beta + 16.4 + log(4*d, 2))
Figure 2.8: An example of two custom cost models to be used in the LWE Estimator.
To retrieve an estimate with the cost model TBKZ(β, d) = 2
0.292β, we call the top-level
function estimate lwe with the input reduction cost model = example-model-1. Such
3As of commit 8daf3f7, this model replaces 20.270β log(β)−1.019β+16.103+log(100).
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= estimate lwe(n, alpha, q)
Figure 2.9: Example call to the LWE Estimator with our example parameter set n = 256, α =
0.002, and q = 17500.
a functionality allows for a custom cost models to be considered when computing security
estimates. In Chapter 4, we consider further lattice reduction cost models used in the
literature.
2.10.1.3 Outputs
When the LWE Estimator outputs security estimates, it also provides optimal attack parameters.
To help illustrate the output of the LWE Estimator, we consider an example.
Example 2.10 We call the top-level function estimate lwe for the parameters n = 256, α =
0.002 and q = 17500 in Figure 2.9.
This code will return complexity estimates and optimal attack parameters for the uSVP,
decoding, and dual attacks. For the uSVP attack, the output is:
rop: ≈ 2159.5, red: ≈ 2159.5, δ0 : 1.005093, β : 278, d : 677, m:420,
for the decoding attack, the output is:
rop: ≈ 2171.2, m:438, red: ≈ 2171.2, δ0 : 1.005181, β : 271, d : 694, babai: ≈ 2157.0
babai op:2172.1, repeat:216.2, ε :≈ 2−14.0
and for the dual attack, the output is:
rop: ≈ 2180.8, m:471, red: ≈ 2180.8, δ0 : 1.004745, β : 310, repeat:2141.0, d : 727, c : 1
In Table 2.4, we explain each of the output values for the usvp, dual, and decoding attacks.
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The attack parameters k and postprocess only appear in the case that certain small-secret
distributions are used, and these attack parameters will be discussed in full detail in Chapter 4.
2.10.2 Implemented Features
There are a variety of attack techniques considered in the LWE Estimator and, as new attack
techniques surface, these techniques may or may be supported. Moreover, there may be
attack techniques which can leverage (for example) small secret distributions, which may be
implemented in the case of sparse ternary secrets, but not in the case of uniform ternary
secrets. Although the code is open source, it may not be immediately obvious when a new
attack technique has been implemented. To help with this issue, we present in Figure 2.10 a
diagram of attack techniques considered, and identify which attack techniques are considered
for which secret distributions. We comment on each of the attacks listed in Figure 2.10.
 classic uSVP refers to the uSVP attack outlined in Section 2.9.2,
 guess + uSVP refers to the small-secret variant of the uSVP attack outlined in Chapter 4,
 LP11 decoding corresponds to the decoding attack outlined in section 2.9.3, implemented
using Linder and Peikert’s Nearest Planes algorithm as the BDD solver [LP11],
 guess + LP11 decoding corresponds to the small-secret variant of the decoding attack
outlined in Chapter 3 (implemented using Linder and Peikert’s Nearest Planes algorithm
as the BDD solver [LP11]),
 LN13 decoding refers to both the decoding attack outlined in section 2.9.3 (implemented
using pruned enumeration as the BDD solver [LN13]),
 guess + LN13 decoding corresponds to the small-secret variant of this attack as outlined
in Chapter 3 (implemented using pruned enumeration as the BDD solver [LN13]),
 g-v decoding refers to the guess-and-verify decoding technique outlined in Chapter 3,
 hybrid-decoding refers to the hybrid lattice reduction and meet-in-the-middle attack [How07],
discussed in Chapters 3 and 4,
 classic dual corresponds to the dual attack as outlined in Section 2.9.1,
 SILKE refers to the techniques outlined in [Alb17], as discussed in Chapter 4, and
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 hybrid-dual corresponds to the hybrid dual and meet-in-the-middle attack [CHHS19].
2.11 Public-key Encryption from LWE
Public-key encryption [DH76, RSA78] provides a way for two parties to communicate over
an insecure channel, without the need to have agreed on a pre-shared secret. We begin this
section by informally defining the notion of a public-key encryption scheme.
Definition 2.41 (Public-key Encryption Scheme) A public-key encryption scheme is made
up of three algorithms (KGen,Enc,Dec) satisfying:
1. (sk, pk) ← KGen(1n). The key generation algorithm KGen takes as input the security
parameter, and outputs a pair of keys (pk, sk), where pk is the public key and sk is the
private key.
2. c ← Enc(pk,m). The encryption algorithm Enc takes as input the public key pk and
message m, and returns a ciphertext c.
3. m← Dec(sk, c) The decryption algorithm Dec takes as input the secret key sk a ciphertext
c, and returns a message m.
We also require correctness, which ensures that a ciphertext decrypts to the correct underlying
message.
Definition 2.42 (Correctness of Public-key Encryption) A public-key encryption scheme
is referred to as correct if for any m ∈M, we have:
Pr [Dec(sk, c) = m | (sk, pk)← KGen(1n), c← Enc(pk,m)] = 1.
Example 2.11 We present the Ring-LWE-based public-key encryption scheme outlined by
Regev [Reg05], and show how it can be used to encrypt a bit b ∈ {0, 1}. Note that the
cryptosystem parameters need to be correctly tuned in order to guarantee security. Let n,m, q
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be integers and let χ be a probability distribution4 on Zq. The secret key sk is a uniform
random vector s ∈ Znq , i.e sk = s. The public key is selected as follows: we draw several
samples (ai, 〈ai, s〉 + ei)mi=1 from the LWE distribution Ls,χ,q. To encrypt a bit b ∈ {0, 1},















i∈S b) if b = 1
.
The decryption algorithm takes as input some vector of the form (a, b), and returns 0 if
b− 〈a, s〉 is closer to 0 than to b q2c, and 1 otherwise.
2.12 Homomorphic Encryption
The search for Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) dates back to 1978 [RAD78] and was
an open question until 2009, when the problem was solved by Gentry [Gen09]. A variety
of intermediary steps were taken [Pai99, BGN05] prior to Gentry’s discovery, but none of
the schemes prior to Gentry’s work were fully homomorphic. Since then, there have been
a variety of schemes [FV12, BGV14, CGGI16] and several libraries [HEl20, Mic20, Pal20,
HEA20, TFH20, Con20], and there are numerous interesting applications [ACC+17], including
privacy-preserving machine learning [GBDL+16, BCL+18, JKLS18, CCD+19, CKR+20]. The
iDash competition [Ida19] runs each year, challenging participants to produce a privacy-
preserving solution using homomorphic encryption. As an example, Track 2 in the 2019
iDash competition was entitled Secure Genotype Imputation using Homomorphic Encryption.
Currently, a standardisation effort [BDH+17, ACC+17, ACC+18] is taking place, and companies
are beginning to commercialise homomorphic encryption techniques.
We begin this section with some definitions, following the notation of [Vai11].
Definition 2.43 (Homomorphic Encryption Scheme) A homomorphic encryption scheme
is made up of four algorithms (KGen,Enc,Dec,Eval) satisfying:
1. (pk, ek, sk)← KGen(1n). The key generation algorithm KGen takes as input the security
parameter, and outputs a tuple of keys (pk, ek, sk), where pk is the public encryption
key, ek is a public evaluation key, and sk is the private key.
4We note that Regev considers a Gaussian distribution in order to ensure security.
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2. c ← Enc(pk,m). The encryption algorithm Enc takes as input the public key pk and
message m, and returns a ciphertext c.
3. m ← Dec(sk, c). The decryption algorithm Dec takes as input the secret key sk a
ciphertext c, and returns a message m.
4. cf ← Eval(ek, f, c1, c2, . . . , ck). The evaluation algorithm Eval takes as input the public
evaluation key ek, a function f , typically represented as an algebraic circuit, and k
ciphertexts c1, c2, . . . , ck, with each ci = Enc(pk,mi), and outputs a ciphertext cf .
Definition 2.44 (C-homomorphism) Denote by C a class of functions. A homomorphic
encryption scheme (KGen,Enc,Dec,Eval) is C-homomorphic if for any function f ∈ C, we
have:
Pr[Dec (sk, (Eval(ek, f, c1, c2, . . . ck))) 6= f(m1,m2 . . . ,mk)] = negl(λ)
where (pk, ek, sk)← KGen(1λ), and ci ← Enc(pk,mi), for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
Definition 2.12 essentially outlines correctness for homomorphic encryption schemes, in terms
of a set of functions C. That is, a C-homomorphic encryption scheme is correct for all functions
f ∈ C.
Definition 2.45 (Compactness) A homomorphic encryption scheme (KGen,Enc,Dec,Eval)
is compact if there exists a polynomial s = s(λ) such that the output length of Eval(·) is at
most s-bits long.
The definition of compactness tells us two things. Firstly, that the length of a ciphertext
output by the evaluate algorithm is “not too long” (i.e. bounded by some polynomial s(λ))
and, secondly, that the length of this output is independent of both the input function f and
the number of ciphertexts c1, c2, . . . , ck.
Definition 2.46 (Fully Homomorphic Encryption Scheme) A homomorphic encryption
scheme is fully homomorphic if it is both compact and homomorphic for the class of all
arithmetic circuits over GF(q).
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That is, a fully homomorphic encryption scheme can evaluate any arithmetic circuit. As a
basic example of a homomorphic encryption scheme, we consider the RSA algorithm.
Example 2.12 The ‘Textbook RSA’ algorithm is multiplicatively homomorphic. Let p, q be
two k-bit primes, n = pq, and choose e such that gcd(e, φ(n)) = 1 (here φ is Euler’s Totient
function [OLBC10]). We choose d such that ed ≡ 1 mod φ(n), and set pk = e, sk = d.
Encryption is performed on a message m via computing the function:
Enc(e,m) = me mod n,
and decryption is performed on c via the computing the function:
Dec(d, c) = cd mod n.
We now highlight the multiplicatively homomorphic nature of this scheme. Let c1 = m
e
1 mod n
and c2 = m
e
2 mod n, we have:
c1c2 = (m
e






That is, by performing multiplication on two ciphertexts, we retrieve an encryption of the
multiplication of the underlying plaintexts, i.e we have multiplicatively homomorphic encryption.
In this thesis we cryptanalyse LWE-based homomorphic encryption-style parameter sets in
Chapters 3 and 5. Also in Chapter 5, we outline in detail three lattice-based homomorphic
encryption schemes: BGV [BGV12], BFV [FV12], and CKKS [CKKS17]. In Chapter 6, we
make use of the Paillier homomorphic encryption scheme [Pai99].
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This chapter is based on the following publication: Martin R. Albrecht, Benjamin R. Curtis
and Thomas Wunderer. Exploring Trade-offs in Batch Bounded Distance Decoding. Selected
Areas of Cryptography 2019 (pp. 467-491). Springer, volume 11959 of Lecture Notes in
Computer science, 2019. Additional details have been added in this thesis.
In this chapter, we explore trade-offs in Howgrave-Graham’s hybrid lattice-reduction and meet-
in-the-middle attack (hybrid-decoding attack) on NTRU and LWE. Specifically, we consider
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the effect of using a BDD solver with a higher probability of success on the landscape of
trade-offs.
The author of this thesis contributed towards (a) the writing of the paper, (b) the design of
the g-v decoding algorithm, (c) the implementation of the attack scripts, and (d) the running
of all experiments.
3.1 Introduction and Contribution
As defined in Chapter 2, the Bounded Distance Decoding problem (BDD) with parameter
α > 0 asks a challenger to find the closest vector in a lattice L ⊂ Rd to some given target
vector t ∈ Rd, under the guarantee that the distance between the target vector t and the
lattice Λ is at most αλ1(L). We can use algorithms which solve BDD to solve variants of the
Learning with Errors problem and, therefore, we can estimate the security of lattice-based
cryptographic primitives based on the running times of these algorithms. In this chapter,
we are particularly interested in solving the small-secret variant of the Learning with Errors
problem, as defined in Section 2.5.2, where the components si of the secret vector are drawn
from some distribution over the set {−1, 0, 1}.
Due to the shortness and/or sparsity of the secret vector s, batches of BDD instances emerge
from a combinatorial approach where several components of the target vector are guessed
before decoding. In this chapter, we explore trade-offs in solving batches of (candidate) BDD
instances, which we refer to as “Batch BDD” throughout, and apply our techniques to the
NTRU Prime [BCLv19] and Round5 [GZB+19] schemes submitted to the NIST standardisation
process [Nat16], as well as a sparse-secret parameter set previously used for the homomorphic
encryption library HElib [HEl20].
We compare our techniques to a variant of Howgrave-Graham’s hybrid meet-in-the-middle
and lattice reduction attack (hybrid-decoding attack) [How07] under a variety of different
assumptions. Specifically, we consider Howgrave-Graham’s attack when a “classical” guessing
approach is used, and also when a meet-in-the-middle guessing approach is used (under
conservative assumptions).
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3.1.1 An Overview of Decoding Attacks
In this section, we outline the relationships between four techniques to solve LWE via BDD:
1. the decoding attack,
2. the drop-and-solve decoding attack, which combines the decoding attack with zero-
forcing techniques,
3. the hybrid-decoding attack, which solves batches of candidate BDD instances using
Babai’s Nearest Plane algorithm, and
4. the g-v decoding attack, outlined in this chapter, which solves batches of candidate
BDD instances using pruned enumeration.
The purpose of this section is to explain the relationship between these four techniques via
high level descriptions. The technical details of each of these four techniques can be found
later in this chapter.
3.1.1.1 The Decoding Attack
To solve Small-secret LWE via BDD we use a variation of the decoding attack outlined in
Section 2.9.3. For a collection of LWE samples {(ai, 〈ai, s〉+ ei)}mi=1 of dimension n, we begin
by finding a basis of sufficient quality for the dimension (n+m) lattice:
{(x,Ax mod q) | x ∈ Zn},
followed by usage of a BDD solver to solve the resulting BDD instance, of which a typical
choice would be pruned enumeration [LP11, LN13].
The decoding attack can be summarised in two phases:
1. a lattice reduction phase producing a lattice basis of a sufficient quality, and
2. a decoding phase where a BDD solver is run against the reduced lattice from step 1,
using a known target vector as input.
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3.1.1.2 The Drop-and-solve Decoding Attack
We can combine the decoding attack with dimension reduction techniques by guessing (typically
as zero, and referred to as “zero-forcing” [MS01]) e.g. the first κ components of the secret
vector s. This approach begins by finding a basis of sufficient quality for the dimension
(n+m− κ) lattice:
{(y,A(κ)y mod q) | y ∈ Zn−κ},
followed, again, by usage of a BDD solver to solve the resulting dimension-reduced BDD
instance. The LWE secret can be recovered (with some probability, associated to the BDD
solver) via solving the BDD instance in the case that the guessed κ components of the
secret are all zero. This technique is referred to as the drop-and-solve decoding attack in the
literature, and follows the mantra of dimension reduction outlined in [MS01, Alb17, ACD+18].
The drop-and-solve decoding attack can be summarised in three phases:
1. a zero-forcing phase which selects a zero-forcing dimension κ ≤ n, and generates the
resulting (n+m− κ) dimension lattice basis to be reduced,
2. a lattice reduction phase producing a lattice basis of a sufficient quality, and
3. a decoding phase where a BDD solver is run against the reduced lattice from step 1,
using a known target vector as input.
3.1.1.3 The Hybrid-decoding Attack
The hybrid-decoding attack [How07, BGPW16, GvW17, Wun19] admits batches of BDD
instances which emerge from guessing some components of the target vector (s, e), as above,
combined with an algebraic observation which allows several points to be decoded against the
same lattice. This approach begins by finding a basis of sufficient quality for the dimension
(n+m− τ) lattice:
{(y,A(τ)y mod q) | y ∈ Zn−τ},
followed by multiple calls to a decoding algorithm (Babai’s Nearest Plane algorithm), the cost
of which is polynomial in the lattice dimension. This makes Babai’s algorithm an appropriate
choice of BDD solver to be employed in the hybrid-decoding attack, since the adversary has
to call the BDD solver many times: once for each guess.
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The hybrid-decoding attack can be summarised in three phases:
1. a dimension reduction phase which selects a guessing dimension τ ≤ n, and generates
the resulting (n+m− τ) dimension lattice basis to be reduced,
2. a lattice reduction phase producing a lattice basis of a sufficient quality, and
3. a guess-and-verify phase where guesses are verified by running Babai’s Nearest Plane
against the reduced lattice basis from step 1, and a target vector derived from the
particular guess under consideration.
Therefore, unlike the decoding and drop-and-solve decoding techniques, the hybrid-decoding
attack permits multiple decodings per lattice reduction step. That is, in phase three we are
solving batches of (candidate) BDD instances: one for each guess. This guess-and-verify step
is usually considered to be realised using a meet-in-the-middle (mitm) approach.
3.1.1.4 The Guess-and-verify Decoding Attack
The uSVP approach outlined in Section 2.9.2 and the hybrid-decoding approach can be
considered as the endpoints of a continuum of strategies for solving Batch-BDD. The final
enumeration is either (essentially) as expensive as the initial lattice reduction algorithm (as in
uSVP) or optimised to be as cheap as possible, in order to decode a large number of points (as
in the hybrid-decoding attack). In this chapter, we will explore this continuum of strategies
for solving Small-secret LWE instances.
Specifically, we present a guess-and-verify decoding approach (g-v decoding) which, like the
hybrid-decoding attack, makes use of a guessing approach to reduce the dimension of the
associated BDD problem. However, in our g-v decoding attack, we employ a more expensive
BDD solver than Babai’s Nearest Plane. Here, as in the hybrid-decoding attack, this approach
begins by finding a basis of sufficient quality for the dimension (n+m− τ) lattice:
{(y,A(τ)y mod q) | y ∈ Zn−τ},
followed by multiple calls to a decoding algorithm. However, the decoding algorithm considered
here is pruned enumeration. To establish the dimension of the projected sublattice in which
we perform enumeration (i.e. the enumeration dimension, denoted η), we deploy (a slight
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variant of) the success condition for uSVP from [ADPS16], outlined in Section 2.9.2 and, in
Section 3.2, we explain and compare these success conditions with a concrete example.
The g-v decoding attack can be summarised in three phases:
1. a dimension reduction phase which selects a guessing dimension τ ≤ n, and generates
the resulting (n+m− τ) dimension lattice basis to be reduced,
2. a lattice reduction phase producing a lattice basis of a sufficient quality, and
3. a guess-and-verify phase where guesses are verified by running pruned enumeration in
dimension η against the reduced lattice basis from step 1, and a target vector derived
from the particular guess under consideration.
Therefore, as opposed to applying a low probability BDD solver on a large number of
(candidate) BDD instances (e.g. Babai’s Nearest Plane algorithm, as in the hybrid-decoding
attack), our g-v decoding technique applies a heavier enumeration process, with a higher
probability of success, to a (typically) smaller1 number of (candidate) BDD instances. In
doing so, we hope to achieve a positive trade-off in the overall running time of the attack
when considered in comparison to the hybrid-decoding attack.
3.1.1.5 Summary
These four attacks (decoding, drop-and-solve decoding, hybrid-decoding, and guess-and-verify
decoding) all share the same genealogy. However, it is not the case that one of these techniques
always outperforms the others. Indeed, the ordering of these attack techniques depends on
the assumptions being used, and the parameter set under consideration.
1This is because the cost of performing pruned enumeration in some dimension η is typically more expensive
than Babai’s Nearest Plane algorithm. Therefore, for the same “enumeration budget”, we can perform less
BDD calls when using pruned enumeration compared to the Babai’s Nearest Plane algorithm.
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Attack Guessing? Multiple Guesses? Enumeration algorithm
Decoding No No Pruned enumeration
Drop-and-solve decoding Yes No Pruned enumeration
Hybrid-decoding Yes Yes Babai’s Nearest Plane
Guess-and-verify decoding Yes Yes Pruned Enumeration
Table 3.1: A summary of attacks found in the literature: decoding, drop-and-solve-decoding,
and hybrid-decoding, as well as our guess-and-verify decoding technique.
3.2 A Comparison of Success Conditions
The success condition from [ADPS16] for uSVP considers the length of the GSO vectors in
the context of the uSVP attack. As outlined in Section 2.9.2, for a given uSVP lattice L
of dimension d, the unusually short vector in which the LWE secret is embedded can be





β · σ ≤ δ2β−d · det(L)1/d, (3.1)
is satisfied. The variant of this condition used in this work considers the Gaussian Heuristic
directly, and the code used to compute the dimension η, in which we perform enumeration,
can be seen in Figure 3.1. This condition is exactly that the length of the projection of the
shortest vector (in the lattice πi(L), as predicted by the Gaussian Heuristic) is less than the
expected length of the target, offset, vector, i.e. σ
√
d− i. Specifically, the condition states:








For the first index j for which this condition is satisfied, we set the enumeration dimension
η as η = d − (j − 1) and, if this condition is never satisfied, the code reverts to considering
an enumeration dimension of η = 2. The choice of η = 2 corresponds to performing lattice
reduction such that Babai’s Nearest Plane algorithm succeeds with probability close to 1
(which is typically not optimal).
Since the ADPS16 success condition is defined such that η = β, i.e. requires the final block of
the lattice basis to be HKZ reduced, we consider this case in an example. We consider a q-ary
lattice of dimension d = 1522, with q = 4591 and determinant qd/2. For blocksize β = 561
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def ball log vol(n):
Return volume of ‘n‘=dimensional unit ball
:param n: dimension
return (n/2.) * log(pi) = lgamma(n/2. + 1)
def gaussian heuristic(r):
Return squared norm of shortest vector as predicted by the Gaussian heuristic.
:param r: vector of squared Gram=Schmidt norms
n = len(list(r))
log vol = sum([log(x) for x in r])
log gh = 1./n * (log vol = 2 * ball log vol(n))
return exp(log gh)
def enum dim(r, alpha, q):
Return eta for a given lattice shape and LWE noise.
:param r: squared GSO norms
:param alpha: LWE noise rate
:param q: LWE modulus
stddev = est.stddevf(alpha*q)
d = len(r)
for i, ri in enumerate(r):
if gaussian heuristic(r[i:]) < stddev**2 * (d=i):
return ZZ(d=(i=1))
return ZZ(2)
Figure 3.1: Code used to generate the required enumeration dimension which guarantees
success in the g-v decoding approach. Note that this code considers the squared
norms of the vectors ‖b∗i ‖, and thus varies slightly from Equation 2.2. The functions
gaussian heuristic() and ball log vol() are taken from the FPLLL library [FPL20].
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satisfying Equation 3.1 we have ηADPS = β = 561. Using Equation 3.2, we can determine
that ηgh = 562. The success condition considered in our work, i.e. Equation 3.2, explicitly
constructs a BDDα instance with α = 1. Note that we are not recovering the short vector
directly via lattice reduction, but instead via the usage of an enumeration algorithm with
an associated probability of success. The success condition we consider essentially states the
following:
When lattice reduction is conducted with blocksize β, the short vector can be recovered
via solving BDDα=1 in dimension η, where η satisfies Equation 3.2.
whereas the [ADPS16] success condition essentially states:
When lattice reduction is conducted with blocksize β satisfying the [ADPS16] success
condition, i.e. Equation 3.1, the short vector is recovered directly, and is contained
within the output basis provided by BKZ.
We note that, however, the condition used in our work allows the parameters β and η to be
uncoupled. That is, we no longer require the condition that η = β as in Equation 3.1.
3.3 The Hybrid-decoding Attack
The hybrid meet-in-the-middle and lattice reduction (hybrid-decoding) attack was introduced
by Howgrave-Graham [How07], and has been considered in the context of LWE with binary
error [BGPW16], with a quantum search [GvW17], and is typically used to set parameters for
encryption schemes based on the NTRU problem [HPS+15]. This attack combines the ideas of
May and Silverman’s dimension reduction techniques [MS01] against the NTRU cryptosystem,
with an algebraic observation which allows multiple (candidate) BDD instances to be solved
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gaussian heuristic({‖bi+1‖2, ‖bi+2‖2, . . . , ‖bd‖2}))
Figure 3.2: A comparison of success conditions. Here, the GSO norms are computed using
the Geometric Series Assumption. The dashed blue line represents the expected length of the
projected target vector in the projected sublattice π⊥i (L). The dashed black line represents
the length of the shortest vector in the same projected sublattice π>i (L) as predicted by the
Gaussian Heuristic. Note that we have used the GSA here to produce the GSO norms. This
analysis can also be carried out using a BKZ Simulator to generate the GSO norns, and we
consider both of these techniques (GSA and BKZ Simulator) throughout this chapter.
the hybrid-decoding attack sets a guessing dimension τ , carries out lattice reduction in
dimension (d − τ) and solves BDD on a dimension (d − τ) lattice by decoding on various
points associated to guesses in the τ -dimensional guessing space. In more detail: the first
phase of the hybrid-decoding attack involves choosing a guessing dimension τ and generating





recall that A(τ) denotes the matrix A where (without loss of generality) the first τ columns
have been dropped. The second phase involves performing lattice reduction on this basis to
retrieve BKZβ(B), and the third phase involves solving a batch of candidate (BDD) instances
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using Babai’s Nearest Plane algorithm [Bab86] on target points related to vectors in the








If the first τ components of s are all zero, then it is the case that A(τ)s(τ) = As, which
allows recovery of the LWE secret (with some probability, determined by the BDD solver)
by decoding on the point (b,0). If the first τ components of the LWE secret s are not all
equal to zero, then we are required to start searching for the first τ components of the secret
(e.g over the space {−1, 0, 1}τ ). When s ← B−, the coefficients si of the secret vector are













for some values ck ∈ {−1, 0, 1}. For this new guess, we can decode on the point (b −∑τ
k=1 ckAk, 0). This can be seen to be the correct point to attempt decoding on since, for
the correct guess v =
∑τ








= A(τ)s(τ) + e mod q.
Therefore, we have that (b−
∑τ
i=1 skAk, 0) is separated from the lattice point (A(τ)s(τ) mod
q, s(τ)) by the vector (−e, s(τ)), as is required. This means that we can consider a batch of
BDD instances, by decoding on several target points of the form (b−
∑τ
k=1 ckAk, 0).
Typically, this guessing is realised via the usage of a time-memory trade-off approach outlined
in [Wun19]. That is, we can consider Odlyzko’s meet-in-the-middle technique described
in [HGSW03] for the guessing phase of the attack. Specifically, the guessed part of the








g , and we in turn have




















l . We store each decoded vector in a hash table using a locality
sensitive hash function [Wun19] which permits collision finding. A collision involves detecting
pairs (v′g,v
′′








l . Wunderer [Wun19] gives a concrete
example of hash tables which guarantee that collisions can be detected. The probability that
the BDD solver is additively homomorphic has been analysed in the case that the BDD
solver is Babai’s Nearest Plane in [Wun19]. However, this refined model is not employed
e.g. in submissions to the NIST PQC process [BCLv17, SHRS17, ZCHW17a]. To summarise,
there are two probabilities at play when considering a meet-in-the-middle approach:
1. the probability that the BDD solver is homomorphic, and
2. the probability that collisions (as outlined above) are detected; which we can set to 1
by assuming the hash tables of Wunderer [Wun19].
3.3.1 Common Assumptions in Analyses of the Hybrid-decoding Attack
Throughout any analysis of the hybrid-decoding attack, there are several stages in which
assumptions are required in order to generate concrete security estimates. In this section, we
outline locations within an analysis in which assumptions are required, and we also outline
common choices which are made in the literature.
1. The lattice reduction cost model.
The cost of lattice reduction is an important assumption in an analysis of the hybrid-decoding
attack. Here we are referring explicitly to the cost of the BKZ algorithm, that is:
TBKZ(β, d),
where an example cost is TBKZ(β, d) = 8d · 20.292β+16.4.
2. The shape of the basis output by lattice reduction.
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As discussed in Section 3.3.2, typical choices are to consider the Geometric Series Assumption [Sch03],
the adapted q-ary Geometric Series Assumption [Wun19], or a BKZ simulator e.g. [CN11].
The output shape has an effect on the success probability of Babai’s Nearest Plane algorithm
(note the inclusion of the GSO lengths in the pbabai terms in 3.), and thus the overall running
time of the attack.
3. The success probability of Babai’s Nearest Plane, pbabai.
Typical choices are either to (conservatively) set this probability to be 1, or to use the formula














Here B(·) denotes the Beta function [OLBC10], and ri =
‖b∗i ‖
2‖(s(τ),e)‖
. Previous works [LP11]












under the assumption of a continuous LWE error distribution. In our work, we use Wunderer’s
formula, as is standard with state-of-the-art analyses of the hybrid-decoding attack.
4. The running time of Babai’s Nearest Plane algorithm, Tbabai.
Typical choices are either to (conservatively) set this running time to be a single operation,
i.e. 1, or to consider a cost which is either linear in the lattice dimension, such as d/21.06, or
quadratic in the lattice dimension, such as d2/21.06. In our work, we consider the quadratic
cost, i.e. d2/21.06.
5. The search strategy under consideration.
Typical choices are to consider a meet-in-the-middle approach, a quantum search, or a
classical guessing (exhaustive search) approach. As an example, all three techniques are
considered in the NTRU Prime submission to the second round of the NIST standardisation
procedure [BCLv19].
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6. The meet-in-the-middle probability, pmitm.























where the values ri and function B(·) are as in 3. This probability can be evaluated in






















under the assumption of a continuous LWE error distribution, as in [LP11].
7. Whether or not to consider the cost of memory.
Most analyses of the hybrid-decoding attack only consider the time cost. That is, they do
not consider memory costs of (a) lattice reduction (especially in the sieving regime, where
the memory cost is exponential in the blocksize β), and (b) the meet-in-the-middle step. The
second round NTRU Prime submission to the NIST standardisation procedure [BCLv19],
considers different memory scenarios. That is, they consider an analysis which includes
memory costs (referred to as “real” memory) and also consider an analysis which ignores
memory costs (referred to as “free” memory).
8. The length of the target, offset, vector.
There is also a decision to be made about the length of the target vector. Suppose we set our
guessing dimension to τ , then our target vector is:
(s(τ), e) = (sτ+1, . . . , sn, e).
Suppose further that s is a ternary vector of Hamming weight h, so that ‖s‖ = h and
‖e‖ = mσ2, then we can assume that:
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That is, we consider the expected length of the target offset. We note that for any given
instance of the attack, the target vector may be longer, or shorter, than this assumed length,
and this has an impact on the overall running time of the attack.
In Section 3.6 we consider these assumptions for both the hybrid-decoding attack as well
as our g-v decoding approach. We begin by making an initial set of assumptions, which
match the assumptions made in the NTRU Prime submission to the NIST standardisation
procedure, and swap out one assumption at a time until we reach the assumptions considered
in our work. At each intermediate stage we consider the complexities of both attacks under
the given assumptions, and we present the results in Tables 3.12 and 3.13. This highlights
the differences in attack complexity that certain assumptions can make, and shows that it is
vital to clearly state assumptions when analysing the hybrid-decoding attack.
3.3.2 Modelling Lattice Reduction for q-ary Bases
For lattice reduction we consider the BKZ algorithm [SE94] parametrised by a block size β
which determines the running time (at least exponential in β) and output quality. In this
chapter, when BKZ is instantiated with an enumeration algorithm [FP85, Kan83], we consider
the cost of lattice reduction using blocksize β on a lattice of dimension d to be:
TBKZ(β, d) = 8 d · 20.18728·β·log(β)−1.019β+16.1 enum. nodes,
which is taken from [APS15] based on experiments from [CN11]. To translate from the number
of nodes visited during enumeration to CPU cycles, the literature typically assumes one node
≈ 100 CPU cycles [FPL20]. This means that in terms of ring-operations the cost of lattice
reduction using blocksize β on a lattice of dimension d is:
TBKZ(β, d) = 8 d · 20.18728β log(β)−1.019β+16.1+log(100).
When BKZ is instantiated with a sieving algorithm [AKS01, BDGL16], we consider the cost
of lattice reduction using blocksize β on a lattice of dimension d to be:
TBKZ(β, d) = 8 d · 20.292β+16.4,
where the constant term is arbitrarily picked as in [APS15].
There are several models in the literature for the behaviour of the BKZ algorithm on q-ary
lattices. In most of the literature on solving LWE via BDD, we use the public LWE matrix
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A ∈ Z(m×n)q to construct a lattice basis of the form: In 0
A qIm
 , (3.4)
for which it is commonly assumed that the Geometric Series Assumption, defined in Definition 2.39,
is relatively accurate after running BKZ-β with β  m+ n. The literature on analysing the
hybrid-decoding attack considers lattice bases of the form: qIm A
0 In
 , (3.5)
where the qs are in the top left hand corner of the basis matrix, and the 1s are located in the
bottom right of the basis matrix. In Figure 3.3, we plot the initial GSO vector lengths from
the basis as in Equation 3.5.













Figure 3.3: Example of the initial GSO lengths for a q-ary lattice of dimension d = 180 with
q = 17 constructed as in Equation 3.5.
Wunderer [Wun19] notes that writing the basis matrix in the form of Equation 3.5 suggests
that the GSA does not hold. Indeed, when the GSA predicts that ‖b∗1‖ > q we notice that
this is longer than the first vector already contained within the GSO basis. Since lattice
reduction does not make the GSO vectors longer, we therefore will obtain ‖b∗1‖ = q. As a
consequence, lattice reduction is expected to produce a “Z-shaped” basis [How07], comprised
of leading qs, trailing ones and a middle part approximated by the GSA. In Figure 3.4 we give
an illustrative example of this phenomena of the output of lattice reduction as implemented
in FPLLL [FPL20] which clearly illustrates the Z-shape.
The structure of this Z-shape has been modelled by Wunderer [Wun19], via insisting on the
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condition ‖b∗i ‖ ≤ q for all 1 ≤ i ≤ d. Let k be the number of lattice vectors which follow a









If we make the additional assumption that the first vector in the “GSA-block”, i.e. b(d−k+1),








Wunderer refers to this shape as the “q-ary GSA”, and we follow this notation throughout. In
Figure 3.4 we observe that, for this example, the number of leading q’s predicted by Wunderer
closely resembles that produced by fpylll and the BKZ simulator. However, [Wun19] makes
no attempt to model the number of trailing ones. Some works fix the number of trailing
ones by choosing a sublattice to reduce [HPS+15], although there is currently no work in the
literature that offers a way to predict the number of trailing ones which occur when BKZ is
run on the full lattice.





















We define γi = α
i−1 δd det(Λ)1/d and so the GSA corresponds to the line at y = 0.
Figure 3.4: Example of BKZ-60 reduction on a q-ary lattice of dimension d = 180 with q = 17
and volume 1780 for bases constructed as in Equation (3.5), along with the output of BKZ
simulation and the heuristic from [Wun19].
For the remainder of this chapter, we do not consider the q-ary GSA. That is, we make
the assumption that the q-ary structure of the lattice bases on which we perform lattice
reduction does not impact the output basis shape. Explicitly, we do not assume that leading
qs or training ones occur. This assumption can be made to hold by re-randomising the input
basis for lattice reduction. Instead of reducing a lattice basis B directly, we reduce the lattice
basis given by Ui B for some unimodular matrix Ui. Considering the techniques in this work
in a regime exploiting the q-ary structure is an interesting area for future work. In Figure 3.5,
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we consider the GSA against such a randomised basis:
B′ = Ui B,
to determine how closely this example follows the GSA and/or a BKZ simulator. In Figure 3.5,
we plot the output GSO lengths against the GSA and the BKZ simulator. Here, we can
see that both the GSA and the BKZ simulator provide a good approximation to the GSO
lengths, although the BKZ simulator captures the HKZ-reduced behaviour in the last block
more accurately.





















We define γi = α
i−1 · δd · det(Λ)1/d and so the GSA corresponds to the line at y = 0.
Figure 3.5: Example of BKZ-60 reduction on a q-ary lattice of dimension d = 180 with q = 17
and volume 1780 for a basis constructed as in Equation 3.5, which has been re-randomised
via the application of a unimodular matrix. We also plot the output of the BKZ simulator
on a basis for the same lattice.
3.4 A Spectrum of Decoding Approaches for Solving Small-secret
LWE
In this section we outline the expected costs of:
1. the classical “decoding” approach in the LWE literature,
2. the “drop-and-solve decoding” approach, which is a combination of zero-guessing and
solving a single BDD instance in a reduced dimension, and
3. our guess-and-verify decoding approach, where multiple BDD instances are solved per
lattice reduction step.
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In our guess-and-verify decoding approach, the attack parameters are chosen such that pbdd ≈
1 and pbabai ≈ 12, although for clarity we include these probabilities in the running times
presented in this chapter. Note that the probability pbdd ≈ 1 ensures that the BDD algorithm
succeeds when called on the correct target point. Exploring trade-offs which arise by varying
these probabilities is interesting future work.
In order to produce these estimates, we make use of both enumeration-based, and sieving-
based, BDD solvers. When using enumeration to solve BDD in dimension η, we assume a
cost of:
Tbdd(η) = 2
0.18728η log(η)−1.019η+16.1 enum. nodes,
where again we assume that one node ≈ 100 CPU cycles [FPL20]. Such an enumeration is
assumed to succeed with probability close to one, i.e. pbdd ≈ 1. When using sieving to solve
BDD in dimension η, we assume a cost of:
Tbdd(η) = 2
0.292η+16.4,
based on the results of [Laa16], which suggest that sieving for short vectors has the same
asymptotic cost as sieving for close vectors. We assume that this sieving process succeeds
with probability close to one, i.e. pbdd ≈ 1. We note that it is always clear from context
whether an enumeration-based, or a sieving-based, BDD solver is being deployed.
To highlight the differences in the three decoding approaches discussed, we make use of
a running example to illustrate the behaviour of the approaches under consideration. We
consider the small-secret LWE parameter set:
n = 653, q = 4621, σ ≈
√
2/3, χs = B−100,
and use this parameter set as a reference throughout. Assuming the GSA, a combinatorial
dual attack costs 2214.4 ring-operaions (β = 198), and a combinatorial uSVP attack costs 2209.6
ring-operations (β = 223), according to the LWE Estimator [APS15]3, under the enumeration-
based BKZ cost model mentioned in Section 3.3.2.
2For g-v decoding, the probability pbabai is the probability that the solution found by the BDD algorithm is
lifted to the full lattice successfully.
3Using the LWE Estimator as of commit 428d6ea.
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3.4.1 Small-secret Decoding
As discussed in Section 3.1, the decoding approach for small-secret LWE [BG14] b = As + e
constructs a lattice for which the vector (b, 0) is separated by the short vector (−e, s) to the




















After lattice reduction on the lattice L(B), we perform enumeration around the target point
(b, 0) which, with some probability, will return the lattice point separated by (−e, s), allowing
for recovery of the LWE secret.
Typically, the cost of lattice reduction and decoding are balanced, and the output BDD
probability determines the number of times the algorithm is repeated. The total expected
running time is:
TDec =
TBKZ(βDec, d) + Tbdd(ηDec)
pbabai · pbdd
.
Lattice reduction is carried out on the full lattice with block size βDec, and a BDD solver is used
on a projected sublattice of dimension ηDec, where ηDec can be determined using Equation 3.2.
Here pbabai is the probability of lifting the candidate solution from πd−ηDec+1(L(B)) to the full
lattice. Since ηDec is determined using our variant of the condition from [ADPS16] we have
pbabai ≈ 1 [AGVW17]. For our running example parameter set, assuming the GSA, this
approach has a cost of 2293.0 ring-operations with an optimal blocksize βDec = 419, where
ηDec = 429.
3.4.2 Drop-and-solve Decoding
The drop-and-solve decoding approach for small-secret LWE combines the decoding approach
with dimension reduction techniques [MS01]. The attack begins by constructing a lattice for
which the vector (b, 0) is hopefully separated by the short vector (−e, s(τ)) to the lattice
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In this approach, we guess τ zero components of s and then run the decoding attack in
dimension (d − τ) [MS01, Alb17, ACD+18]. If we are unsuccessful, we restart with a fresh
guess for the positions of zeros.
The core idea is that the lower running time of the dimension-reduced problem will trade-off
positively against the probability of guessing zeros. If we correctly guess, for example, that
the first τ components of s are all zeros, then (sτ+1, . . . , sn, e) can be found via solving BDD
in the dimension-reduced lattice. The total expected running time of this strategy is:
TdsDec =
TBKZ(βdsDec, d− τ) + Tbdd(ηdsDec)
pbabai · pbdd · p0
,
where p0 is the probability of correctly guessing τ zero components in the LWE secret s.
Lattice reduction is carried out on a lattice of dimension (d − τ) with block size βdsDec, and
enumeration is carried out in the projected sublattice in dimension ηdsDec, as outlined in
Section 3.2. For our running example parameter set, assuming the GSA, this attack returns
a complexity of 2208.2 ring-operations with optimal values of βdsDec = 170 and τ = 315.
3.4.3 Guess-and-verify Decoding
As in the drop-and-solve decoding approach, our guess-and-verify approach begins by performing





and combines this technique with the following algebraic observation: if our initial zero guess
is incorrect, we can account for this by decoding on multiple points against the same lattice
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basis. For example, after decoding on the point (b, 0) with unsuccessful verification, we can





points of the form:
(b±Ai, 0) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ τ,





points of the form:
(b±Ai ±Aj , 0) for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ τ, i 6= j,
and repeating this process up to Hamming weight ψ for some optimal value ψ ≤ min(h, τ).
This allows us to make multiple guesses per lattice reduction step, exactly as in the hybrid-
decoding attack. There is no obvious reason to restrict the BDD solver in any guess-and-
verify decoding attack to Babai’s Nearest Plane algorithm (as in the hybrid-decoding attack).
Instead we may employ a stronger BDD solver, which in turn permits a reduction in the cost
of preprocessing or the usage of a lower guessing dimension.
In this g-v decoding attack, we consider a BDD dimension as defined by a variant of the
success condition from [ADPS16], as outlined in Section 3.2. The overall expected cost of this
approach is:
TgvDec =
TBKZ(βgvDec, d− τ) + ‖StgvDec‖ · TBDD(ηgvDec)




where pi is the probability that the guessed sub-vector of the secret s has Hamming weight i,
and ‖StgvDec‖ is the size of the guessing set, i.e. the number of target points decoded against.
For our running example parameter set, assuming the GSA, this attack returns a complexity
of 2186.1 ring-operations with βgvDec = 225 and τ = 335, with optimal choices of ηgvDec = 49







· 2i ≈ 2105.5.
We note that “guess-and-verify” decoding encompasses the usual decoding strategy (τ =
0, ‖StgvDec‖ = 1,
∑
pi = 1) and the “drop-and-solve” strategy (τ > 0, ‖StgvDec‖ = 1, tgvDec = 0).
On the other hand, as specified here, it does not encompass the hybrid-decoding attack, (even
without time-memory trade-offs) since we insist on picking (β, η) such that pbabai ≈ 1, which
is typically not the case for optimal hybrid-decoding attack parameters.
To summarise, we present a table of results outlining the complexity and optimal parameters
for the attack techniques considered in this section.
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Technique β τ Ring operations
uSVP 198 297 2214.4
dual 223 315 2209.6
decoding 419 n/a 2293.0
drop-and-solve decoding 170 315 2208.2
guess-and-verify decoding 225 335 2186.1
Table 3.2: Complexity estimates for uSVP, dual, and various decoding techniques on our
example parameter set with n = 653, q = 4621, σ ≈
√
2
3 , and χs = B
−
100.
3.5 Target Parameter Sets and Estimates
In this section we apply our techniques to parameter sets for the NTRU Prime [BCLv17]
and Round5 [BGL+18] submissions to the NIST PQC standardisation process, and, in order
to compare with previous works, we also target a sparse-secret parameter set, we consider
an old parameter set previously used in the homomorphic encryption library HElib [HEl20],
which was studied in [Alb17].4 We compare our results against the LWE Estimator under
the same assumptions, i.e. considering the cost models in Section 3.3.2 and the Geometric
Series Assumption. We also present our results considering usage of the BKZ simulator. Full
results can be seen in Tables 3.7, 3.8, 3.9 and 3.10. In each section, we present a subset of
the results for a classical guessing approach (i.e. exhaustive search).
3.5.1 NTRU Prime
We consider the NTRU LPrime parameter set from [BCLv19]. The construction is based on
LWE with a fixed Hamming weight ternary secret and a random ternary error. Specifically,
the parameter set considered is:
n = 761, q = 4591, σ ≈
√
2/3, χs = B−250.
In the enumeration regime, when the output basis shape is determined by the BKZ simulator,
g-v decoding outperforms the non-mitm hybrid-decoding attack by approximately 23-bits, as
4For up-to-date information on parameter selection in the homomorphic encryption library HElib, we refer
the reader to [HS20].
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can be seen in Table 3.3. In the sieving regime, solving Batch-BDD is less efficient than
solving BDD (i.e. combinatorics do not improve the running time). Our techniques are thus
not interesting in this regime, for this parameter set.
Attack GSO Profile Enumeration Sieving
(non-mitm) hybrid-decoding GSA 325.7 220.8
g-v decoding GSA 337.6 181.0†
(non-mitm) hybrid-decoding Simulator 385.3 303.3
g-v decoding Simulator 362.1 185.3†
Table 3.3: Summary of results for NTRU Prime for a classical guessing (i.e. exhaustive search)
approach. Estimates marked with † correspond to standard BDD decoding. Full results can
be found in Tables 3.7, 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10.
3.5.2 Round5
For Round5, we consider the NIST level 3 parameter set from [GZB+19]. Round 5 is based on
the Learning with Rounding problem (LWR) with a ternary, fixed hamming weight, secret.
In the case of LWR, we have another parameter p which is an additional modulus considered
in the deterministic rounding process. In this case, we can set σ ≈
√
(q/p)2−1
12 as in [ACD
+18].
We therefore model this parameter set as LWE with:
n = 756, σ ≈ 4.61, q = 212, p = 28, χs = B−242.
We also consider the IoT specific use-case parameter set from [GZB+19]. We can model this
parameter set as LWE with:
n = 372, σ ≈ 4.61, q = 211, p = 27, χs = B−178.
In the enumeration regime, when the output basis shape is determined by the BKZ Simulator,
g-v decoding outperforms the non-mitm hybrid-decoding attack for the NIST level 3 parameter
set by approximately 16-bits, and the IoT parameter set by approximately 19-bits, as can be
seen in Tables 3.4 and 3.5. In the sieving regime, for both parameter sets, solving Batch-BDD
is less efficient than solving BDD (i.e. combinatorics do not improve the running time). Our
techniques are thus not interesting in this regime, for this parameter set.
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Attack GSO Profile Enumeration Sieving
(non-mitm) hybrid-decoding GSA 392.5 275.2
g-v decoding GSA 416.9 218.9†
(non-mitm) hybrid-decoding Simulator 466.6 394.9
g-v decoding Simulator 449.6 224.1†
Table 3.4: Summary of results for Round 5 for a classical guessing (i.e. exhaustive search)
approach. Estimates marked with † correspond to standard BDD decoding. Full results can
be found in Tables 3.7, 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10.
Attack GSO Profile Enumeration Sieving
(non-mitm) hybrid-decoding GSA 205.5 156.9
g-v decoding GSA 214.3 122.4†
(non-mitm) hybrid-decoding Simulator 240.6 205.6
g-v decoding Simulator 221.4 124.3†
Table 3.5: Summary of results for Round 5 IoT for a classical guessing (i.e. exhaustive search)
approach. Estimates marked with † correspond to standard BDD decoding. Full results can
be found in Tables 3.7, 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10.
3.5.3 HElib
We also consider our approach in the context of a sparse LWE parameter set, in order to
gauge the performance of g-v decoding for sparse secrets. To compare with previous works,
we consider the sparse-secret parameter set outlined in [Alb17]. Specifically, the parameter
set we consider is:
n = 1024, q = 247, σ ≈ 3.19, χs = B−64.
Since the optimal blocksize β satisfies β  m + n, the output of the BKZ simulator is very
close to the GSA and thus the results in each case are similar, as can be seen in Table 3.6. We
can see in Tables 3.7 and 3.9 that the results for g-v decoding and non-mitm hybrid-decoding
are essentially the same.
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Attack GSO Profile Enumeration Sieving
(non-mitm) hybrid-decoding GSA 69.9 69.8
g-v decoding GSA 69.1 69.8
Table 3.6: Summary of results for HElib for a classical guessing (i.e. exhaustive search)
approach. Full results can be found in Tables 3.7, 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10.
3.5.4 Results and Notation
In the Tables 3.7, 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10, τ is the (fixed) optimal guessing dimension, β is optimal
the blocksize used in lattice reduction, η is the enumeration dimension considered, BDD cost is
the total cost of solving the candidate BDD instances in the dimension η projected sublattice,
|S| is the size of the search space considered, i.e. the number of points on which we decode, d is
the dimension of the lattice considered, #pp denotes the maximal Hamming weight considered
in the search space, and rop is the cost of running the algorithm in ring-operations. Note that
“g-v decoding” is the technique described in this work. Where meaningful, we highlight the
“best in class” values in bold. Finally, we note that the “λ” values outline the security claims
of each scheme, considering similar (pre-quantum) cost models and (pre-quantum) attacks;
we note that such values of λ can be generated using vastly different assumptions.
3.5.5 Results in the Enumeration Regime
Tables 3.7 and 3.8 represent results in the enumeration regime, for a classical guessing strategy
and a (square-root) meet-in-the-middle guessing strategy, respectively. Here, if the GSA is
assumed, then the hybrid-decoding attack (typically) outperforms g-v decoding. Considering
NTRU LPrime in Table 3.7, we see a complexity of 325.7-bits for the non-mitm hybrid
attack and a complexity of 337.6-bits for the g-v decoding attack. If the BKZ simulator is
assumed, then g-v decoding (typically) outperforms the hybrid-decoding attack in the case
of a “classical” guessing approach, but not in the case of a square-root meet-in-the-middle
approach. Considering NTRU LPrime in Table 3.7, we see a complexity of 385.3-bits for the
non-mitm hybrid attack, and a complexity of 362.1-bits for the g-v decoding attack.
This tells us that, under certain assumptions, g-v decoding outperforms a variant of the
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attack τ β η BDD cost |S| repeats d #pp log2(rop)
NTRU LPrime: n = 761, q = 4591, σ =
√
2/3, h = 250 λ = 222
uSVP (GSA) 92 458 458 n/a 1 257.2 1220 n/a 384.6
Dual (GSA) 69 495 n/a n/a n/a 2320.9 1281 11 374.0
g-v decoding (GSA) 285 430 102 2336.1 2252.8 234.1 1026 55 337.6
non-mitm hybrid (GSA) 275 400 n/a 2324.1 2255.6 249.6 1036 57 325.7
g-v decoding 225 435 272 2360.9 2146.4 253.9 1086 28 362.1
non-mitm hybrid 305 395 n/a 2384.3 2252.3 2113.1 1006 53 385.3
Round5: n = 756, q = 212, σ ≈ 4.61, h = 242 λ = 270
uSVP (GSA) 230 449 449 n/a 1 2160.1 936 n/a 478.9
Dual (GSA) 63 626 n/a n/a n/a 2413.5 1227 19 489.2
g-v decoding (GSA) 365 490 117 2415.2 2297.9 260.2 814 62 416.9
non-mitm hybrid (GSA) 335 445 n/a 2391.0 2295.7 276.8 844 64 392.5
g-v decoding 290 490 320 2448.2 2157.2 292.6 889 28 449.6
non-mitm hybrid 365 420 n/a 2465.5 2274.2 2172.9 814 55 466.6
Round5 (IoT): n = 372, q = 211, σ ≈ 4.61, h = 178 λ = 129
uSVP (GSA) 0 335 335 n/a n/a 1 682 n/a 220.0
Dual (GSA) 32 334 n/a n/a n/a 2174.7 661 14 221.7
g-v decoding (GSA) 65 315 224 2213.1 279.2 29.0 616 22 214.3
non-mitm hybrid (GSA) 115 270 n/a 2203.6 2149.5 236.9 566 43 205.5
g-v decoding 50 320 266 2220.4 251.6 212.8 631 13 221.4
non-mitm hybrid 120 270 n/a 2239.6 2150.8 271.5 561 42 240.6
HElib-1024: n = 1024, q = 247, σ ≈ 3.19, h = 64
uSVP (GSA) 140 105 105 n/a 1 214.0 1670 n/a 75.5
Dual (GSA) 189 107 n/a n/a n/a 222.3 1680 7 68.4
g-v decoding (GSA) 185 100 48 266.7 229.5 29.9 1624 4 69.1
non-mitm hybrid (GSA) 210 100 n/a 267.5 236.6 210.7 1599 5 69.9
Table 3.7: Estimates in the enumeration regime, where BKZ and the BDD solver are
instantiated with enumeration algorithms.
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attack τ β η BDD cost |S| repeats d #pp log2(rop)
NTRU LPrime: n = 761, q = 4591, σ =
√
2/3, h = 250 λ = 222
sqrt g-v decoding (GSA) 370 350 43 2243.5 2412.2 211.5 941 102 245.0
sqrt hybrid (GSA) 360 335 n/a 2240.1 2402.8 220.0 951 100 241.3
sqrt g-v decoding 370 380 119 2273.6 2400.0 215.5 941 97 274.7
sqrt hybrid 395 350 n/a 2274.9 2428.3 242.1 916 104 275.9
Round5: n = 756, q = 212, σ ≈ 4.61, h = 242 λ = 270
sqrt g-v decoding (GSA) 445 395 37 2283.9 2490.0 214.1 734 120 285.5
sqrt hybrid (GSA) 425 365 n/a 2277.0 2453.9 232.0 754 109 278.0
sqrt g-v decoding 450 430 131 2324.8 2474.6 222.7 729 113 325.9
sqrt hybrid 460 390 n/a 2320.5 2496.6 254.3 719 120 321.6
Round5 (IoT): n = 372, q = 211, σ ≈ 4.61, h = 178 λ = 129
sqrt g-v decoding (GSA) 175 250 48 2156.7 2250.8 24.0 506 80 157.8
sqrt hybrid (GSA) 165 225 n/a 2151.6 2234.5 217.4 516 74 152.9
g-v decoding 170 270 101 2174.3 2237.2 26.5 511 73 175.4
sqrt hybrid 180 240 n/a 2172.2 2256.4 227.1 501 81 173.4
HElib-1024: n = 1024, q = 247, σ ≈ 3.19, h = 64
sqrt g-v decoding (GSA) 210 95 36 259.9 259.7 25.2 1599 9 62.0
sqrt hybrid (GSA) 270 85 n/a 260.8 263.1 29.1 1539 9 61.8
Table 3.8: Estimates in the enumeration regime considering a “meet-in-the-middle” approach
which does not consider probabilities of failure in the meet-in-the-middle phase. Such an
approach considers a square-root speed-up in the guessing phase.
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attack τ β η BDD cost |S| repeats d #pp log2(rop)
NTRU LPrime: n = 761, q = 4591, σ =
√
2/3, h = 250 λ = 155
uSVP (GSA) 0 532 532 n/a n/a 1 1352 n/a 185.1
Dual (GSA) 45 586 n/a n/a n/a 2148.0 1383 14 203.1
g-v decoding (GSA) 0 515 549 2179.7 1 1 1351 n/a 181.0†
non-mitm hybrid (GSA) 170 580 n/a 2218.9 2178.1 221.4 1181 43 220.8
g-v decoding 0 530 562 2183.5 1 1 1351 n/a 185.3†
non-mitm hybrid 230 615 n/a 2302.1 2189.6 293.3 1121 40 303.3
Round5: n = 756, q = 212, σ ≈ 4.61, h = 242 λ = 193
uSVP (GSA) 0 664 664 n/a n/a 1 1266 n/a 223.6
Dual (GSA) 46 748 n/a n/a n/a 2198.6 1325 13 251.0
g-v decoding (GSA) 0 645 679 2217.7 1 1 1265 n/a 218.9†
non-mitm hybrid (GSA) 225 705 n/a 2273.7 2215.4 239.3 1040 49 275.2
g-v decoding 0 660 699 2223.5 1 1 1265 n/a 224.1†
non-mitm hybrid 290 700 n/a 2393.9 2214.8 2160.3 975 43 394.9
Round5 (IoT): n = 372, q = 211, σ ≈ 4.61, h = 178 λ = 96
uSVP (GSA) 0 335 335 n/a n/a 1 682 n/a 126.6
Dual (GSA) 22 396 n/a n/a n/a 2104.2 710 1 145.0
g-v decoding (GSA) 0 315 349 2121.6 1 1 681 n/a 122.4†
non-mitm hybrid (GSA) 85 375 n/a 2155.2 2119.5 218.3 596 38 156.9
sqrt g-v decoding 0 320 358 2123.9 1 1 681 n/a 124.3†
non-mitm hybrid 95 380 n/a 2204.5 2122.1 265.1 586 35 205.6
HElib-1024: n = 1024, q = 247, σ ≈ 3.19, h = 64
uSVP (GSA) 0 137 137 n/a n/a 1 1939 n/a 70.3
Dual (GSA) 80 115 n/a n/a n/a 219.6 1741 7 67.1
g-v decoding (GSA) 85 125 50 266.6 230.0 22.6 1853 5 69.8
non-mitm hybrid (GSA) 155 115 n/a 266.2 240.1 25.6 1783 6 69.8
Table 3.9: Estimates in the sieving regime, where BKZ and the BDD solver are instantiated
with sieving algorithms. Estimates marked with † correspond to standard BDD decoding.
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attack τ β η BDD cost |S| repeats d #pp log2(rop)
NTRUL Prime: n = 761, q = 4591, σ =
√
2/3, h = 250 λ = 155
sqrt g-v decoding (GSA) 0 515 549 2179.7 1 1 1351 0 181.0†
sqrt hybrid (GSA) 260 475 n/a 2181.3 2296.5 213.9 1091 75 182.7
sqrt g-v decoding 0 530 562 2183.5 1 1 1351 0 185.3†
sqrt hybrid 315 550 n/a 2230.4 2341.1 240.9 1036 83 231.7
Round5: n = 756, q = 212, σ ≈ 4.61, h = 242 λ = 193
sqrt g-v decoding (GSA) 0 645 679 2217.7 1 1 1265 0 218.9†
sqrt hybrid (GSA) 320 565 n/a 2216.4 2350.7 222.3 945 86 217.5
sqrt g-v decoding 0 660 699 2223.5 1 1 1265 0 224.1†
sqrt hybrid 390 660 n/a 2288.4 2405.8 267.0 875 96 289.6
Round5 (IoT): n = 372, q = 211, σ ≈ 4.61, h = 178 λ = 96
sqrt g-v decoding (GSA) 0 315 349 2121.6 1 1 681 0 122.4†
sqrt hybrid (GSA) 135 300 n/a 2126.9 2196.9 211.4 546 65 128.2
sqrt g-v decoding 0 320 358 2123.9 1 1 681 0 124.3†
sqrt hybrid 155 335 n/a 2155.2 2218.1 229.2 526 68 156.3
HElib-1024: n = 1024, q = 247, σ ≈ 3.19, h = 64
sqrt g-v decoding (GSA) 195 100 31 263.1 253.4 25.3 1743 8 65.1
sqrt hybrid (GSA) 235 95 n/a 261.7 272.1 25.2 1703 11 63.6
Table 3.10: Estimates in sieving regime for a “meet-in-the-middle” approach which does not
consider probabilities of failure in the meet-in-the-middle phase. Such an approach considers
a square-root speed-up in the guessing phase.
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hybrid-decoding attack. In order to compare directly to the (full) hybrid-decoding attack,
a proper analysis is required of the meet-in-the-middle probability for the g-v decoding
approach, and this is left to future work.
3.5.6 Results in the Sieving Regime
Tables 3.9 and 3.10 represent results in the sieving regime, for a classical guessing strategy and
a (square-root) meet-in-the-middle guessing strategy, respectively. Here, the results are less
interesting since combinatorics do not result in a complexity improvement for g-v decoding
and, therefore, the g-v decoding results correspond to the standard decoding attack.
Finally, we note that some of the complexities for the uSVP and decoding attacks considered
in these tables outperform the dual attack. Intuitively, since the dual attack solves decision-
LWE and the uSVP and decoding attacks solve search-LWE, we might expect that the dual
attack should have a lower complexity. This could highlight the fact that there may be
potential improvements for the dual attack which have yet-to-be discovered, or, it could
outline the fact that some of the assumptions used in our analysis of the hybrid attack, and
the variant of the dual attack considered in the LWE Estimator, are mis-aligned. Moreover,
we note that this behaviour can also be observed in a variety of other estimates in the
literature. For example, there are several examples of this behaviour in the estimates at
https://estimate-all-the-lwe-ntru-schemes.github.io, which are discussed in detail
in Chapter 4.
3.6 Assumptions Case Study: NTRU Prime
As discussed in Section 3.3.1, there are several points during a hybrid-decoding attack-based
security analysis where assumptions are required. This can make comparing two analyses
of the complexity of the hybrid-decoding attack cumbersome. In order to cross-check our
hybrid-decoding attack estimates, we align our code with the assumptions made in the NTRU
Prime security script. That is, we consider the set of assumptions A0 outlined in Table 3.11.
Explicitly, assumption set A0 consists of the following assumptions:
1. core-style BKZ models (“pre-quantum sieving” (i.e. 20.292β) and “pre-quantum enumeration”
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Technique Assumption A0 A1 A2 A3 A4 Our work
BKZ SVP calls
1 X X X




















X X X X
BKZ output shape
q-ary GSA X
BKZ Simulator X X X X X
Guessing strategy




mσ2 + h n−τn X X X X X X
Lattice scaling s 7→ ηs : ‖s‖ ≈ ‖e‖ X
Mitm probability 1 X X X X X X
Memory considered? yes
Table 3.11: Sets of assumptions considered in this case study.
(i.e. 20.18728β log(β)−1.019β+16.1), both with “free memory”, in the language of [BCLv19]),
2. the formula for the success probability of Babai’s Nearest Plane algorithm from [Wun19],
with an associated cost of one operation,
3. the q-ary GSA as the output basis shape of the BKZ algorithm,
4. a meet-in-the-middle guessing phase, with associated collision probability of one,
5. the target norm of the vector recovered via the BDD algorithm is
√
mσ2 + h n−τn ,
6. free memory, and
7. no lattice scaling is considered.
We note that [BCLv19] contains estimates which consider the cost of memory. We do not
compare against these estimates as we do not consider memory costs in our analysis. After
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considering the assumption set A0, we move through assumptions until we reach those used
in our work. In particular, we consider several sets of assumptions: Ai for 0 ≤ i ≤ 4.
1. Assumption set A1 corresponds to A0 with the q-ary GSA swapped for the BKZ
simulator, since this is a more accurate measure of the GSO basis output shape given
by BKZ.
2. Assumption set A2 corresponds to A1 with the cost of Babai’s Nearest Plane algorithm




3. Assumption set A3 corresponds to A2 with the core- style cost models changed to
cost models which consider eight tours. As an example, this means swapping from
e.g. TBKZ(β, d) = 2
0.292β+16.4 to TBKZ(β, d) = 8d · 20.292β+16.4.
4. Assumption set A4 corresponds to A3 with the guessing strategy changed from a
meet-in-the-middle approach to a classical guessing strategy, allowing us to drop the
inaccurate assumption that collisions occur with probability one.
5. The only difference between assumption set A4 and the assumptions considered in our
work is that we consider lattice scaling.
These assumption sets are summarised in Table 3.11. We now compare the outputs of the
NTRU Prime script5, our script for the hybrid-decoding attack (labelled our script (hybrid)),
and our script for the g-v decoding attack (labelled our script (g-v decoding)) under these
various assumption sets, to see how the complexities of the techniques compare in each case.
Table 3.12 outlines the complexities in the enumeration regime, and Table 3.13 outlines the
complexities in the sieving regime. Note that we consider the same search spaces as the
NTRU LPrime script in each case, i.e. β ∈ {40, 80, 120, . . . } and τ ∈ {0, 40, 80, . . . }. We note
the closeness of the results under assumptions A0 between the NTRU Prime script and our
script (hybrid) given in Tables 3.12 and 3.13, and comment that this lends confidence to the
estimates given by our scripts. Moreover, our code is open source and can be found at the
url listed in Section 1.6.
5The code used in the NTRU Prime submission can be found here https://ntruprime.cr.yp.to/
estimate-20190329.sage
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ass alg τ β η BDD cost |S| repeats d #pp log2(rop)
NTRU LPrime: n = 761, q = 4591, σ =
√
2/3, h = 250
A0
NTRU Prime script 360 320 n/a 2220.9 – 232.5 881 – 222.1
our script (hybrid) 360 320 n/a 2221.3 2375.4 233.6 951 89 222.9
our script (g-v decoding) 360 360 83 2239.0 2380.5 218.1 951 91 240.5
A1
our script (hybrid) 400 360 n/a 2257.6 2442.8 236.2 911 109 258.7
our script (g-v decoding) 360 400 139 2270.1 2390.6 214.4 951 95 271.2
A2
our script (hybrid) 400 360 n/a 2273.0 2404.5 252.2 911 94 274.5
our script (g-v decoding) 360 400 139 2270.1 2390.6 214.4 951 95 271.2
A3
our script (hybrid) 400 360 n/a 2276.2 2442.8 236.2 911 109 277.9
our script (g-v decoding) 360 400 139 2283.6 2409.8 28.7 951 103 284.9
A4
our script (hybrid) 320 400 n/a 2386.9 2256.3 2111.8 991 53 388.1
our script (g-v decoding) 240 440 280 2376.0 2141.3 268.1 1071 26 380.0
Table 3.12: Enumeration-based estimates, where each section corresponds to a set of
assumptions outlined in Table 3.11. “– ” denotes a value which is not compatible with
our notation (for example, our script considers a simple sqrt speed-up in the search space, the
NTRU Prime script considers splitting the search space as in a meet-in-the-middle approach).
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ass alg τ β η BDD cost |S| repeats d #pp log2(rop)
NTRU LPrime: n = 761, q = 4591, σ =
√
2/3, h = 250
A0
NTRU Prime script 240 480 n/a 2156.0 – 218.8 1081 – 159.4
our script (hybrid) 240 480 n/a 2158.1 2279.7 218.3 1111 72 159.4
our script (g-v decoding) 0 560 562 2164.1 1 1 1351 0 165.0†
A1
our script (hybrid) 320 600 n/a 2209.9 2348.2 235.8 1031 85 211.5
our script (g-v decoding) 0 560 593 2173.2 1 1 1351 0 173.2†
A2
our script (hybrid) 360 320 n/a 2221.3 2375.4 233.6 951 89 222.9
our script (g-v decoding) 0 560 593 2173.2 1 1 1351 0 173.2†
A3
our script (hybrid) 320 600 0 2227.2 2338.2 239.1 1031 81 228.3
our script (g-v decoding) 0 560 593 2176.2 1 1 1351 0 177.8†
A4
our script (hybrid) 200 640 0 2297.6 2180.7 297.6 1151 40 298.6
our script (g-v decoding) 0 560 593 2176.2 1 1 1351 0 177.8†
Table 3.13: Sieving-based estimates, where each section corresponds to a set of assumptions
outlined in Table 3.11. “– ” denotes a value which is not compatible with our notation (for
example, our script considers a simple sqrt speed-up in the search space, the NTRU Prime
script considers splitting the search space as in a meet-in-the-middle approach). Estimates
marked with a † correspond to a uSVP estimate with η, β uncoupled.
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3.7 Conclusion
There are two main observations from Tables 3.12 and 3.13. The first observation is that we
believe assumption set A4 represents assumptions which are more realistic than those used in
the preceding assumption sets and, as we can see in the enumeration regime (Table 3.12), the
g-v decoding attack outperforms (a variant of) the hybrid attack, under these assumptions,
for this parameter set. In the sieving regime, this is not the case, and here g-v decoding
corresponds to the standard BDD decoding approach.
The second observation is to highlight the differences that varying assumptions can make on
attacks of this type. If we consider assumption sets A0 and A3 in the enumeration regime
(Table 3.12), we note that the difference in complexity of the g-v decoding estimates is
≈ 285 − 241 = 44-bits, and the difference in complexity of the hybrid attack estimates is
≈ 278− 223 = 55-bits. This shows the importance of outlining the assumptions used in any
security analysis which considers decoding attacks.
3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we introduced a guess-and-verify decoding technique to solve the Small-
secret Learning with Errors problem. Throughout, we have compared this technique with
the hybrid-decoding attack. These two attack techniques consider a myriad of trade-offs and
are trick to optimise, due to the large number of degrees of freedom in the attack parameters
(e.g. (τ, β,m, |S|)). Conservative assumptions can be made (such as those discussed throughout
this chapter) in order to generate an underestimate of security fairly efficiently. This is a
reasonable approach, provided that the process is transparent. However, it is also important
to estimate the complexity of these attacks as accurately as possible. Throughout this chapter,
we have considered a variety of sets of assumptions and have shown that, under certain
assumptions our g-v decoding technique outperforms a (non-mitm) variant of the hybrid-
decoding attack and, under other sets of assumptions, the converse is true.
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Security in Communications Networks (SCN) (pp. 351-367). Springer, volume 11035 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2018. Additional details have been added in this thesis.
In this chapter, we survey the submissions to the first round of the NIST standardisation
process for post-quantum cryptographic algorithms. In particular, we consider every cost
model for lattice reduction used as part of a submission and estimate the complexity of all
parameter sets for each submission under every cost model, which allows the security claims
of two schemes to be compared more easily. Finally, we provide a status update regarding the
third round of the NIST standardisation process.
The author of this thesis contributed towards (a) the collection of data used in the tables and
(b) the writing of the paper. Furthermore, all updates for the third round are novel.
4.1 Introduction and Contribution
In 2015, the United States’ National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) began a
process aimed at the standardisation of post-quantum public-key encryption schemes (PKE),
key encapsulation mechanisms (KEM), and digital signature algorithms (SIG). The initial
call for proposals was in 2016 [Nat16]. The aim of the process is to ensure that cryptographic
requirements can be met in an era where quantum computers exist. Participants were invited
to submit their designs along with an associated cryptanalysis, and parameter sets aimed
at meeting one or more target security categories out of the five defined by NIST. The five
security categories are listed as follows:
1. Any attack that breaks the relevant security definition must require computational
resources comparable to or greater than those required for key search on a block cipher
with a 128-bit key (e.g. AES128).
2. Any attack that breaks the relevant security definition must require computational
resources comparable to or greater than those required for collision search on a 256-bit
hash function (e.g. SHA256/SHA3-256).
3. Any attack that breaks the relevant security definition must require computational
resources comparable to or greater than those required for key search on a block cipher
with a 192-bit key (e.g. AES192).
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4. Any attack that breaks the relevant security definition must require computational
resources comparable to or greater than those required for collision search on a 384-bit
hash function (e.g. SHA384/SHA3-384).
5. Any attack that breaks the relevant security definition must require computational
resources comparable to or greater than those required for key search on a block cipher
with a 256-bit key (e.g. AES 256).
One way to interpret these security levels is the following: each AES-n security level corresponds
to n-bits of classical security and n/2-bits of quantum security (based on the complexity of
key search, i.e. O(2n) classically and O(2n/2) using Grover’s algorithm), and each SHA-n
security level corresponds to n/2-bits of classical security and n/3-bits of quantum security
(based on the complexity of collision search, i.e. O(2n/2) classically and O(2n/3) using Grover’s
algorithm), leading to the security levels in Table 4.1.
Security Level Classical Security (bits) Quantum Security (bits)
1 (AES-128) 128 64
2 (SHA-256) 128 ≈ 85
3 (AES-192) 192 96
4 (SHA-384) 192 128
5 (AES-256) 256 128
Table 4.1: An example interpretation of the five NIST security levels.
Different interpretations of these five different security levels, alongside the use of vastly
different assumptions considered by each submission, means that the security (and efficiency)
of any two schemes can be difficult to compare fairly. In particular, the cost model for the
BKZ algorithm, as defined in Section 2.10.1.2, varies across submissions. This means that it
is possible for two identical parameter sets to be associated to two different security levels
λ1 and λ2, of which the difference can be significant. In this chapter, we are interested in
the lattice-based submissions to the NIST standardisation process. We extract the proposed
parameter sets, and lattice reduction cost models, used in each LWE-based and NTRU-based
submission. To provide a clearer view on the effect of the chosen cost model, we cross-estimate
the security of each parameter set under every cost model for all first round submissions.
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The five security categories are defined as target security levels when considering adversaries
who have access to a quantum computer. Furthermore, NIST propose the assumption that
such a quantum computing device would support a maximum circuit depth MAXDEPTH ≤
296 [Nat16]. We note that not all schemes take this limitation into account, and instead
opt for using an asymptotic cost model that considers the best known theoretical Grover
speed-up, resulting in overestimates of the adversary’s power.
This has caused confusion within the submissions and this confusion introduces further
difficulties when making a comparison of two schemes under a (quantum) cost model. Consider
category 1, which states that attacks on schemes should be at least as hard as AES-128 key
recovery. Some schemes interpret this by generating parameter sets with λ ≥ 128 under a
quantum cost model, whereas other schemes claiming the same category of hardness interpret
this to mean λ ≥ 64, since key recovery for AES-128 can be completed in time O(2n/2) using
Grover’s algorithm. This results in schemes listing parameter sets with vastly different claimed
security being in the same category. To make this clear we list the “claimed security” levels
of all schemes in our tables of estimates.
We restrict our attention to the uSVP variant of the primal lattice attack [ADPS16, AGVW17]
and the dual lattice attack [MR09], and we recall that both of these techniques were introduced
in Chapter 2. We note that, for certain schemes where the LWE secret is small and/or sparse,
we consider the small-secret variants of the uSVP attack [BG14] and dual attack [Alb17] which
we outline in Section 4.5. We do not consider algebraic [AG11, ACFP14] or combinatorial [AFFP14,
GJS15, KF15, GJMS17] attacks, since those algorithms are not competitive for the parameter
sets considered in this work.
We do not consider the primal attack via a combination of lattice reduction and BDD
enumeration often referred to as a “lattice decoding” attack [Sch03, LP11] as considered in
Chapter 3. However, note that the primal uSVP attack can be considered as a simplified
variant of the decoding attack in the enumeration regime. For NTRU, we restrict our
attention to the primal uSVP attack (possibly combined with guessing zero-entries of the
short vector). We do not consider the hybrid lattice reduction and meet-in-the-middle
attack [How07, Wun19] or “guessing + nearest plane” after lattice reduction, as considered
in Chapter 3.
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4.1.1 Related Work
NIST categorised each scheme according to the family of underlying problem (lattice-based,
code-based, SIDH-based, MQ-based, hash-based, other) in [Moo17]. This analysis was refined
in [Fuj17]. NIST then provided a first performance comparison of all complete and proper
schemes in [Nat17]. Bernstein provided a comparison of all schemes based on the sizes of
their ciphertexts and keys in [Ber17].
4.2 First Round Submissions
In total, 82 submissions were made to the standardisation process and, of these submissions,
69 were deemed “complete and proper” by NIST. These 69 submissions, of which 23 were
based on either the LWE or NTRU family of problems, formed the first round submissions.
The 18 LWE-based submissions and five NTRU-based submissions are outlined in Table 4.2.
Assumption Schemes
Crystals-Dilithium Crystals-Kyber
Ding Key Exchange Emblem
Frodo HILA5
KCL KINDI






NTRU Variants NTRUEncrypt NTRU Prime
pqNTRUSign
Table 4.2: Complete and proper lattice-based submissions to the NIST standardisation
process.
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4.3 Costing Lattice Reduction
There are a variety of approaches within the literature to cost the running time of the BKZ
algorithm [CN11, APS15, ADPS16]. The main divergence stems from whether cost models are
based on using enumeration-based algorithms as the SVP solver (the enumeration regime), or
sieving-based algorithms as the SVP solver (the sieving regime). A second divergence stems
from how many calls to the SVP oracle are expected to be required to recover a vector of
length ≈ δd Vol(Λ)1/d.
The cost of BKZ with blocksize β on a lattice of dimension d can be written in the form:
TBKZ(β, d) = a · 2f(β,d)
= 2f(β,d)+log(a),
where a denotes the number of calls to an SVP oracle of cost 2f(β,d). We refer to the exponent,
i.e. f(β, d) + log(a), as a BKZ cost model. In this section, we review the cost models used as
part of all first round submissions. We note that the cost models considered in this chapter do
not consider the coefficient size, that is the bit-length of the modulus q. We assume that the
output costs are in ring-operations, i.e. a number of operations in Zq, but we do not consider
the additional costs (e.g. in binary operations) brought by varying the value of q. For the
schemes considered in this work, where the moduli are reasonably close in size, this is not
particularly an issue. However, for homomorphic encryption schemes, where modulus sizes
larger than 21000 are considered, it may be important to also consider the coefficient size in
the cost of lattice reduction.
4.3.1 Enumeration-based Cost Models
Let d be the dimension of the lattice used inside BKZ with blocksize β. In the literature,
the cost of enumeration can be found to be estimated as 2c1β log β+c2β+c3 [Kan83, MW15]
or as 2c1β
2+c2β+c3 [FP85, CN11], with Grover speedups considered to half the exponent.
There are four enumeration-based cost models used as part of the first round submissions to
the NIST standardisation process. The estimates 0.187β log β − 1.019β + 16.1 [APS15] and
0.000784β2 + 0.366β − 0.9 [HPS+15] are both based on fitting the same data from [Che13].
LOTUS [PHAM17] is the only submission not to provide a closed formula for estimating
the cost of BKZ. Given their preference for enumeration, we fit their estimated cost model
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0.187β log(β)− 1.019β + 16.1
1
2
(0.187β log(β)− 1.019β + 16.1)
0.000784β2 + 0.366β − 0.9 + log(8d)
0.125β log(β)− 0.755β + 2.25
Figure 4.1: Enumeration-based cost models used as part of a first round submission to the
NIST standardisation process for a lattice of dimension d = 1024 with 40 ≤ β ≤ 400.
to a curve of shape 2c1β log β+c2β+c3 following [MW15]. We fit a curve to the values given
by [PHAM17, (39)], the script used is available in the public repository [Lot18]. To summarise,
the four enumeration-based cost models considered in the first round submissions are:
1. 0.187β log(β)− 1.019β + 16.1,
2. 12(0.187β log(β)− 1.019β + 16.1),
3. 0.000784β2 + 0.366β − 0.9 + log(8d), and
4. 0.125β log(β)− 0.755β + 2.25.
To illustrate the differences in these models, we plot the costs for a lattice of dimension
d = 1024 for 40 ≤ β ≤ 400 in Figure 4.1.
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4.3.2 Sieving-based Cost Models
There are ten sieving-based cost models used as part of first round submissions to the NIST
standardisation process. Recall that sieving algorithms require the usage of exponential
memory. However, in our work, we do not consider the memory costs associated to sieving
algorithms, and simply consider the time cost. Let d be the dimension of the lattice used
inside BKZ with blocksize β. The 0.292β model comes from [BDGL16], and the 0.265β model
accounts for speed-ups associated Grover’s algorithm, and appears in [Laa15a]. There is a
min-space variant 0.368β which also appears in [BDGL16], where Grover speed-ups account
for the 0.2975β model, occurring in [Laa15a]. The constant 16.4 comes from experiments
in [Laa15b], interpolated by [APS15]. The log(β) term appears in submissions which assume
that a sieving cost model of the form 2cβ requires β2cβ CPU cycles.
With respect to the number of SVP oracle calls required by BKZ, a popular choice was to
follow the “Core-SVP” model introduced in [ADPS16], that considers a single call. Alternatively,
the number of calls has also been estimated to be 8d (for example, in [Alb17]), where d is the
dimension of the embedding lattice. To summarise, there are ten sieving-based cost models
considered in the first round submissions, all of which are the result of combinations of the
above assumptions. Of the ten cost models, the five classical models are:
1. 0.292β,
2. 0.292β + 16.4,
3. 0.368β,
4. 0.292β + log(β), and
5. 0.292β + 16.4 + log(8d).
The five quantum models are:
6. 0.265β,
7. 0.265β + 16.4,
8. 0.2975β,
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9. 0.265β + log(β), and
10. 0.265β + 16.4 + log(8d).
























0.265β + 16.4 + log(8d)
Figure 4.2: Sieving-based cost models, used as part of a first round submission to the NIST
standardisation process, for a lattice of dimension d = 1024 with 40 ≤ β ≤ 400.
4.3.3 Cost Models Used in the Submissions
In this section we match the models outlined in Section 4.3 to the first round submissions.
Specifically, in Table 4.3, we outline the cost models considered by each individual submission.
We note that some submissions consider several models, and cost their scheme under each
model (for example, LIMA [SAL+17] considers both the 0.292β + 16.4 and 0.265β + 16.4
models).
The different cost models diverge on the unit of operations they are using. In the enumeration
models, the unit is “number of nodes visited during enumeration”. As discussed in Chapter 3,
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it is typically assumed that processing one node costs about 100 CPU cycles [CN11]. For
sieving, the elementary operation is typically an operation on word-sized integers, costing
about one CPU cycle (recall, however, that the cost models including a log(β) term assume
that a sieving cost model of the form 2cβ requires β2cβ CPU cycles). For quantum algorithms
the unit is typically the number of Grover iterations required, and it is not clear how this
translates to traditional CPU cycles. Of course, for models which suppress lower order terms,
the unit of computation considered is immaterial.
4.4 Parameter Sets
In this section we outline the individual parameter sets considered inside every submission. In
this work we consider Learning with Rounding-based, Ring/Module LWE-based, and NTRU-
based parameter sets.
Learning with Rounding. Recall from Chapter 2 that the Learning with Rounding (LWR)
problem replaces the addition of a noise term (used in LWE) with a deterministic rounding







∈ Znq × Zp,
and we can interpret this as an LWE instance by multiplying the second component by q/p
and assuming that:
(q/p) · b = 〈a, s〉+ e,
where e is chosen uniformly from the set {−q2p + 1, . . . ,
q
2p} [Ngu18]. We can therefore view
LWR samples as LWE samples with modulus q and error distribution uniform over the set
{−q2p + 1, . . . ,
q
2p}.
Ring/Module Learning with Errors. We view Ring-LWE and Module-LWE instances as
LWE instances by considering the coefficients of elements in Rq as vectors in Znq and ignoring
any algebraic structure of Rq. This approach is standard when considering the complexity of
algorithms solving the Ring-LWE and Module-LWE problems due to the lack of cryptanalytic
techniques exploiting the algebraic structure.
NTRU. Let (f ,g) ∈ Z2n be the NTRU secret as introduced in Chapter 2. We treat f as the
























0.292β + log(β) KCL [ZJGS17]
0.265β + log(β) Lizard [CPL+17]
Round2 [GZB+17]
0.292β + 16.4 + log(8d)
Ding Key Exchange [DTGW17]
EMBLEM [SPL+17]
0.265β + 16.4 + log(8d) qTESLA [BAA+17]
NTRU HRSS [SHRS17]
0.187β log β − 1.019β + 16.1 pqNTRUSign [ZCHW17b]
NTRUEncrypt [ZCHW17a]
1
2(0.187β log β − 1.019β + 16.1) NTRU HRSS [SHRS17]
0.000784β2 + 0.366β − 0.9 + log(8d) NTRU Prime [BCLv17]
0.125β log β − 0.755β + 2.25 LOTUS [PHAM17]
Table 4.3: All cost models proposed as part of a submission to the first round of the NIST
standardisation procedure. The name of a model is the log (to the base 2) of its cost.
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The LWE degree n is exactly the degree of the NTRU polynomial φ, the standard deviation of
the LWE error distribution is set to ‖g‖2/
√
n, and the LWE modulus q is exactly the NTRU
modulus. We account for the presence of rotations by amplifying the success probability p of
guessing entries of the secret correctly to 1− (1− p)k, where k is the number of rotations.
In Table 4.4 we present the parameters considered in the NTRU-based submissions. In
Table 4.5, these parameters have been represented as LWE samples using the techniques
discussed above. In Table 4.6, we outline the parameters considered in the LWE and LWR-
based schemes.
Name n q ‖f‖ ‖g‖ NIST Assumption φ Primitive
NTRUEncrypt 443 2048 16.94 16.94 1 NTRU xn − 1 KEM, PKE
743 2048 22.25 22.25 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 NTRU xn − 1 KEM, PKE
1024 1073750017 23168.00 23168.00 4, 5 NTRU xn − 1 KEM, PKE
Falcon 512 12289 91.71 91.71 1 NTRU xn + 1 SIG
768 18433 112.32 112.32 2, 3 NTRU xn − xn/2 + 1 SIG
1024 12289 91.71 91.71 4, 5 NTRU xn + 1 SIG




SNTRU Prime 761 4591 16.91 22.52 5 NTRU xn − x− 1 KEM
pqNTRUSign 1024 65537 22.38 22.38 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 NTRU xn − 1 SIG
Table 4.4: Parameter sets for NTRU-based schemes with secret dimension n, modulo q, small




Name n q σ Secret dist. NIST Assumption φ Primitive
NTRUEncrypt 443 2048 0.80 ((−1, 1), 287) 1 NTRU xn − 1 KEM, PKE
743 2048 0.82 ((−1, 1), 495) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 NTRU xn − 1 KEM, PKE
1024 1073750017 724.00 normal 4, 5 NTRU xn − 1 KEM, PKE
Falcon 512 12289 4.05 normal 1 NTRU xn + 1 SIG
768 18433 4.05 normal 2, 3 NTRU xn − xn/2 + 1 SIG
1024 12289 2.87 normal 4, 5 NTRU xn + 1 SIG




SNTRU Prime 761 4591 0.82 ((−1, 1), 286) 5 NTRU xn − x− 1 KEM
pqNTRUSign 1024 65537 0.70 ((−1, 1), 501) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 NTRU xn − 1 SIG
Table 4.5: LWE parameter sets for NTRU-based schemes, with dimension n, modulo q,
standard deviation of the error σ, and ring Zq[x]/(φ). The NIST column indicates the NIST
security category aimed at.
Name n k q σ Secret dist. NIST Assumption φ Primitive
KCL-RLWE 1024 — 12289 2.83 normal 5 Ring-LWE xn + 1 KEM
KCL-MLWE 768 3 7681 1.00 normal 4 Module-LWE xn/k + 1 KEM
768 3 7681 2.24 normal 4 Module-LWE xn/k + 1 KEM
BabyBear 624 2 1024 1.00 normal 2 ILWE qn/k − qn/(2k) − 1 KEM
624 2 1024 0.79 normal 2 ILWE qn/k − qn/(2k) − 1 KEM
MamaBear 936 3 1024 0.94 normal 5 ILWE qn/k − qn/(2k) − 1 KEM
936 3 1024 0.71 normal 4 ILWE qn/k − qn/(2k) − 1 KEM
PapaBear 1248 4 1024 0.87 normal 5 ILWE qn/k − qn/(2k) − 1 KEM
1248 4 1024 0.61 normal 5 ILWE qn/k − qn/(2k) − 1 KEM
CRYSTALS-Dilithium 768 3 8380417 3.74 (−6, 6) 1 Module-LWE xn/k + 1 SIG
1024 4 8380417 3.16 (−5, 5) 2 Module-LWE xn/k + 1 SIG
1280 5 8380417 2.00 (−3, 3) 3 Module-LWE xn/k + 1 SIG
CRYSTALS-Kyber 512 2 7681 1.58 normal 1 Module-LWE xn/k + 1 KEM, PKE
768 3 7681 1.41 normal 3 Module-LWE xn/k + 1 KEM, PKE
1024 4 7681 1.22 normal 5 Module-LWE xn/k + 1 KEM, PKE
Ding Key Exchange 512 — 120883 4.19 normal 1 Ring-LWE xn + 1 KEM
1024 — 120883 2.60 normal 3, 5 Ring-LWE xn + 1 KEM
EMBLEM 770 — 16777216 25.00 (−1, 1) 1 LWE — KEM, PKE
611 — 16777216 25.00 (−2, 2) 1 LWE — KEM, PKE
R EMBLEM 512 — 65536 25.00 (−1, 1) 1 Ring-LWE xn + 1  KEM, PKE
512 — 16384 3.00 (−1, 1) 1 Ring-LWE xn + 1  KEM, PKE
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Name n k q σ Secret dist. NIST Assumption φ Primitive
Frodo 640 — 32768 2.75 normal 1 LWE — KEM, PKE
976 — 65536 2.30 normal 3 LWE — KEM, PKE
NewHope 512 — 12289 2.00 normal 1 Ring-LWE xn + 1 KEM, PKE
1024 — 12289 2.00 normal 5 Ring-LWE xn + 1 KEM, PKE
HILA5 1024 — 12289 2.83 normal 5 Ring-LWE xn + 1 KE
KINDI 768 3 16384 2.29 (−4, 4) 2 Module-LWE xn/k + 1 KEM, PKE
1024 2 8192 1.12 (−2, 2) 4 Module-LWE xn/k + 1 KEM, PKE
1024 2 16384 2.29 (−4, 4) 4 Module-LWE xn/k + 1 KEM, PKE
1280 5 16384 1.12 (−2, 2) 5 Module-LWE xn/k + 1 KEM, PKE
1536 3 8192 1.12 (−2, 2) 5 Module-LWE xn/k + 1 KEM, PKE
LAC 512 — 251 0.71 normal 1, 2 PLWE xn + 1 KE, KEM, PKE
1024 — 251 0.50 normal 3, 4 PLWE xn + 1 KE, KEM, PKE
1024 — 251 0.71 normal 5 PLWE xn + 1 KE, KEM, PKE
LIMA-2p 1024 — 133121 3.16 normal 3 Ring-LWE xn + 1 KEM, PKE
2048 — 184321 3.16 normal 4 Ring-LWE xn + 1 KEM, PKE
















Lizard 1024 — 2048 1.12 ((−1, 1), 140) 1 LWE, LWR — KEM, PKE
1024 — 1024 1.12 ((−1, 1), 128) 1 LWE, LWR — KEM, PKE
1024 — 2048 1.12 ((−1, 1), 200) 3 LWE, LWR — KEM, PKE
1024 — 2048 1.12 ((−1, 1), 200) 3 LWE, LWR — KEM, PKE
2048 — 4096 1.12 ((−1, 1), 200) 5 LWE, LWR — KEM, PKE
2048 — 2048 1.12 ((−1, 1), 200) 5 LWE, LWR — KEM, PKE
RLizard 1024 — 1024 1.12 ((−1, 1), 128) 1 Ring-LWE, Ring-LWR xn + 1 KEM, PKE
1024 — 2048 1.12 ((−1, 1), 264) 3 Ring-LWE, Ring-LWR xn + 1 KEM, PKE
2048 — 2048 1.12 ((−1, 1), 164) 3 Ring-LWE, Ring-LWR xn + 1 KEM, PKE
2048 — 4096 1.12 ((−1, 1), 256) 5 Ring-LWE, Ring-LWR xn + 1 KEM, PKE
LOTUS 576 — 8192 3.00 normal 1, 2 LWE — KEM, PKE
704 — 8192 3.00 normal 3, 4 LWE — KEM, PKE
832 — 8192 3.00 normal 5 LWE — KEM, PKE
uRound2.KEM 500 — 16384 2.29 ((−1, 1), 74) 1 LWR — KEM
580 — 32768 4.61 ((−1, 1), 116) 2 LWR — KEM
630 — 32768 4.61 ((−1, 1), 126) 3 LWR — KEM
786 — 32768 4.61 ((−1, 1), 156) 4 LWR — KEM
786 — 32768 4.61 ((−1, 1), 156) 5 LWR — KEM






















Name n k q σ Secret dist. NIST Assumption φ Primitive
uRound2.PKE 500 — 32768 4.61 ((−1, 1), 74) 1 LWR — PKE
585 — 32768 4.61 ((−1, 1), 110) 2 LWR — PKE
643 — 32768 4.61 ((−1, 1), 114) 3 LWR — PKE
835 — 32768 2.29 ((−1, 1), 166) 4 LWR — PKE
835 — 32768 2.29 ((−1, 1), 166) 5 LWR — PKE
















































LightSaber 512 2 8192 2.29 normal 1 Module-LWR xn/k + 1 KEM, PKE
NTRU LPrime 761 — 4591 0.82 ((−1, 1), 250) 5 Ring-LWR xn − x− 1 KEM
Saber 768 3 8192 2.29 normal 3 Module-LWR xn/k + 1 KEM, PKE
FireSaber 1024 4 8192 2.29 normal 5 Module-LWR xn/k + 1 KEM, PKE
qTESLA 1024 — 8058881 8.49 normal 1 Ring-LWE xn + 1 SIG
2048 — 12681217 8.49 normal 3 Ring-LWE xn + 1 SIG
2048 — 27627521 8.49 normal 5 Ring-LWE xn + 1 SIG
Titanium.PKE 1024 — 86017 1.41 normal 1 PLWE xn +
∑n−1
i=1 fix
i + f0 * PKE
1280 — 301057 1.41 normal 1 PLWE xn +
∑n−1
i=1 fix
i + f0 * PKE
1536 — 737281 1.41 normal 3 PLWE xn +
∑n−1
i=1 fix
i + f0 * PKE
2048 — 1198081 1.41 normal 5 PLWE xn +
∑n−1
i=1 fix
i + f0 * PKE
Titanium.KEM 1024 — 118273 1.41 normal 1 PLWE xn +
∑n−1
i=1 fix
i + f0 * KEM
1280 — 430081 1.41 normal 1 PLWE xn +
∑n−1
i=1 fix
i + f0 * KEM
1536 — 783361 1.41 normal 3 PLWE xn +
∑n−1
i=1 fix
i + f0 * KEM
2048 — 1198081 1.41 normal 5 PLWE xn +
∑n−1
i=1 fix
i + f0 * KEM
Table 4.6: Parameter sets for LWE-based schemes with secret dimension n, Module-LWE
rank k (if any), modulo q, standard deviation of the error σ. If the LWE samples come from a
Ring- or Module-LWE instance, the ring is Zq[x]/(φ). The NIST column indicates the NIST
security category aimed at. *For Titanium no ring is explicitly chosen but the scheme relies
on a family of rings where fi ∈ {−1, 0, 1} and f0 ∈ {−1, 1}.  For R EMBLEM we list the
parameters from the reference implementation since a suitable φ could not be found for those
proposed in [SPL+17, Table 2].
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In Tables 4.5 and 4.6 we see that a total of 104 parameter sets were submitted to the
first round. Of these parameter sets, nine consider the NTRU assumption, 23 consider the
LWE and/or LWR assumptions, 39 consider the Ring-LWE and/or Ring-LWR assumptions,
16 consider the Module-LWE and/or Module-LWR assumptions, and a further 17 consider
alternative LWE-based assumptions1.
4.5 Small Secret Variants of the uSVP and Dual Attacks
The uSVP and dual attacks can be optimised for variants of Small-secret LWE. In a similar
manner to the decoding attack in Chapter 3, we can combine the uSVP and dual attacks
with combinatorics to retrieve a complexity improvement. In this section, we introduce the
small-secret variants of the uSVP and dual attacks.
4.5.1 uSVP
The uSVP attack on Small-secret LWE considers the Bai and Galbraith embedding [BG14].
As opposed to the uSVP variant outlined in Chapter 2, where the target vector is (e, 1), the



























In the case of normal-form LWE, we can view this variant of the uSVP attack as identical to
the approach considered in Chapter 2. However, we note that in the small secret variant of
this attack, we can employ dimension reduction techniques [MS01, APS15, Alb17] to reduce
the overall complexity. That is, we guess τ components of the LWE secret, before solving
1These assumptions are Polynomial-LWE [SSTX09], and Integer Module-LWE [Ham17].
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where we recall that A(τ) corresponds to the matrix A with the first τ columns removed. If
we correctly guess zeros then the vector (sτ+1, sτ+2, . . . , sn, e, 1) is embedded in the lattice
L(B) reduced by BKZ, and this allows for complete recovery of the LWE secret. If we
incorrectly guess the zero components, then we have to restart this process with a fresh guess
of τ zero components. The running time of the dimension reduced problem, constrained by
the [ADPS16] success condition outlined in Chapter 2, is:





· TBKZ(β, n+m− τ)
}
,
where pτ is the probability of correctly guessing τ zero components of the LWE secret, and
TBKZ(β, n + m − τ) is the cost of running BKZ on a dimension (n + m − τ) lattice with
blocksize β. We note that setting τ = 0 corresponds to not performing any guessing.
4.5.2 Dual
Recall the dual attack from Section 2.9.1, which finds short vectors v in the lattice:
Λ∗ = {x ∈ Zmq | xA ≡ 0 mod q},
before computing inner products of the form:
〈v,b〉 = 〈v,As + e〉 = 〈vA, s〉+ 〈v, e〉 = 〈v, e〉 mod q.
Inner products of this form allow us to distinguish LWE from random. For small and/or sparse
secrets, Albrecht suggests several improvements to this attack [Alb17], which we summarise
in the following four subsections.
4.5.2.1 Combinatorics
For sparse secrets, Albrecht suggests splitting the matrix A = [A0 | A1] where A0 ∈ Zm×(n−τ)q
and A1 ∈ Zm×τq . Splitting the LWE secret s = (s0, s1) in the same manner, we can see that:
As = A0s0 + A1s1.
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In this variant of the attack, we begin by finding short vectors in the lattice:
Λ′ = {v ∈ Zm | vA0 ≡ 0 mod q},
which corresponds to guessing τ components of the LWE secret as zero, i.e. (s1 = 0) and
hoping that As = A0s0, or equivalently that A1s1 ≡ 0 mod q (in a similar manner to the
hybrid-decoding attack outlined in Chapter 3, and the small-secret uSVP attack outlined
in Section 4.5.1). Note that setting τ = 0 corresponds to not performing any guessing,
and therefore reduces to the original dual attack. Suppose, then, that we proceed with the
following steps:
1. we collect ν short vectors {vi}νi=1 each contained within the lattice Λ′, typically by
performing lattice reduction ν times, and
2. compute a collection of inner products {ẽi = 〈vi,b〉}νi=1.
We have:
ẽi = 〈vi,b〉 = 〈vi,As + e〉 = 〈viA, s〉+ 〈vi, e〉
= 〈viA0, s0〉+ 〈viA1, s1〉+ 〈vi, e〉
= 〈viA1, s1〉+ 〈vi, e〉,
since viA0 ≡ 0 mod q. If our guess of τ zeros (i.e. s1 = 0) was correct, then these computed
terms are of the form 〈vi, e〉 since 〈viA1, s1〉 = 0. In this case, the ẽi terms follow a Discrete
Gaussian distribution and we have solved Decision-LWE.
Otherwise, we know that our guess of τ zeros is incorrect, and we can therefore make
additional guesses in the τ -dimensional guessing space (which, for example, if s← B− would
be {−1, 0, 1}τ ). For each guess, we compare the corresponding distributions provided by the
inner products against the uniform distribution modulo q. Specifically, we know that the
additional term is of the form 〈viA1, s1〉 and we can therefore search over possible secrets
s1 and attempt to remove this additional term from the inner product/s. In particular, for




For the correct candidate secret, i.e. s′ = s1, the terms e
′′
i are of the form 〈vi, e〉 as is required.
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4.5.2.2 Amortising the Cost of Lattice Reduction
Albrecht also considers re-randomisation techniques to amortise the cost of lattice reduction.
Recall that, for a successful attack, we may require ν short vectors from the lattice L(B). To
retrieve these vectors, one could imagine re-randomising the input basis before running the
BKZ algorithm on a new, randomised, lattice basis:
B̃i ← BKZβ(UiB),
ν times, and using the shortest vectors in the lattice bases {B̃i}νi=1. Albrecht notes that this
is unnecessary and suggests performing an initial, heavy, lattice reduction step:
B̃← BKZβ(B),
and applying randomisation after this lattice reduction has taken place. That is, we can use
the shortest vectors in the lattice bases:
B′i ← BKZβ′(UiB̃),
for some blocksize β′  β. The idea is to take the shortest vector from each of these re-
randomised lattice bases, and use the resulting set of short vectors to distinguish against
the uniform distribution modulo q. The length of the short vectors generated via this re-
randomisation process are longer than those generated using using a fresh call to BKZ-β.
Albrecht suggests that these vectors have their norms increased by a factor of two compared
to the initial vector retrieved directly from BKZ-β, and provides experimental evidence to back
up this heuristic [Alb17]. However, these longer vectors can be generated at a significantly
lower cost via this amortisation technique. The hope is that this trade-off in vector length vs
computation time provides a speed-up in the overall attack cost.
4.5.2.3 Scaled Normal Form
The final technique stems from the observation that it is sufficient to find a short vector (v,w)
in the lattice given by:
Λ′′ =
{





)n∣∣∣∣vA ≡ cw mod q} ,
If we find such a short vector, then we note that:
〈v,b〉 = 〈v,As + e〉 = 〈vA, s〉+ 〈v, e〉 = 〈cw, s〉+ 〈v, e〉,
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and, assuming that w, s are both sufficiently short, we can still distinguish LWE from random
modulo q, albeit with a different advantage, since the additional error term 〈cw, s〉 is small.
A scaling factor c is computed to balance the contributions of the two terms (i.e. 〈cw, s〉 and








The small-secret variant of the dual attack combines these techniques (where appropriate) to
leverage both the smallness as well as any sparsity of the LWE secret vector s. We note that
these techniques are implemented in the LWE Estimator for both binary and ternary secrets.
4.5.3 Multiple Hardness Assumptions
The Lizard (RLizard) scheme is based on two hardness assumptions, LWE (Ring-LWE) and
LWR (Ring-LWR). Secret key recovery corresponds to the underlying LWE problem, and
ephemeral key recovery corresponds to the underlying LWR problem. There exists parameter
sets for which secret key recovery is harder than ephemeral key recovery (i.e. the underlying
LWE problem is harder than the underlying LWR problem), and there also exists parameter
sets for which the converse is true, i.e. ephemeral key recovery is harder than secret key
recovery. To deal with this issue, in each cost model, for every attack, we consider both the
cost of ephemeral key recovery and the cost of secret key recovery and always choose the
lower of the two estimates.
4.5.4 Number of Samples
LWE as defined in Definition 2.32 provides the adversary with an arbitrary number of samples
denoted by m. When using the LWE Estimator we can set the value m = ∞ and allow the
adversary to have access to an infinite number of samples. In practice, however, this is not
the case. In particular, in the Ring-LWE KEM setting – which is the most common for the
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schemes considered in this chapter – the public key is one Ring-LWE sample:
(a, b) = (a, as+ e),
for some short s, e, and encapsulations consist of two Ring-LWE samples
va+ e′,
and:
vb+ e′′ + m̃,
where m̃ is some encoding of a random string and v, e′, e′′ are short. Thus, depending on the
target, the adversary is given either n or 2n plain LWE samples.
In a typical setting, though, the adversary does not get to enjoy the full power of having two
Ring-LWE samples at its disposal, because, firstly, the random string m̃ increases the noise
in vb+e′′+ m̃ and, secondly, because many schemes drop lower order bits from vb+e′′+ m̃ to
save bandwidth. Due to the way decryption works this bit dropping can be quite aggressive,
and thus the noise in the second sample can be quite large. In the case of Module-LWE, a
ciphertext in transit produces a smaller number of LWE samples, but n samples can still be
recovered from the public key. In this work, we consider the m = n and m = 2n scenarios
for all schemes. We note that, for many schemes, n samples are sufficient to run the most
efficient variant of either attack.
4.6 First Round Security Estimates
We provide estimates for all first round parameter sets considered as part of a submission,
under all BKZ cost models considered as part of a submission, for both the uSVP and dual
attacks (where appropriate). This corresponds to over 150 parameter sets, under 14 cost
models, yielding more than 2000 individual security estimates. Our results can be found
at https://estimate-all-the-lwe-ntru-schemes.github.io/docs/. In this chapter, we
present a small subset of the results. Specifically, in Table 4.7, we present the results for a
single parameter set considered in each of the schemes EMBLEM, CRYSTALS-Kyber, NTRU
Prime, and uRound2.KEM, under the two cost models 0.292β and 0.187β log(β)− 1.019β +
16.1. In each case we highlight the associated value of n for clarity.
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4.6 First Round Security Estimates
4.6.1 Observation: Cost Swaps
One of the interesting observations from our data is that cost models for lattice reduction do
not necessarily preserve the ordering of the schemes under consideration. More explicitly: if
scheme A is considered harder to break than scheme B under cost model 1, the same does not
necessarily hold for cost model 2. That is, under cost model 2, scheme B could be considered
harder to break than scheme A.
To find an example of this, we consider EMBLEM and uRound2.KEM, as highlighted in [Ber18].
As can been seen in Table 4.8, in the sieving-based cost model 0.292β, the associated security
estimate of EMBLEM is 76 bits and uRound2.KEM is 84 bits, making EMBLEM easier to
break. However, under the enumeration-based cost model 0.187β log(β) − 1.019β + 16.1 the
associated security estimate of EMBLEM is 142 bits and uRound2.KEM is 126 bits, making
uRound2.KEM easier to break.
EMBLEM uRound2.KEM
0.292β 76 84
0.187β log(β)− 1.019β + 16.1 142 126
Table 4.8: Security estimates for the first round variants of EMBLEM and uRound2.KEM.
Best in class are highlighted in bold, and we can see this is an example of a cost swap: in the
0.292β model uRound2.KEM has a higher security estimate (84-bits vs 76-bits), whereas in
the 0.187β log(β) − 1.019β + 16.1 model EMBLEM has a higher security estimate (142-bits
vs 126-bits).
Similar swaps can be observed for several other pairs of schemes and cost models. In most
cases the estimated securities of the two schemes are very close to each other (differing by,
say, 1 or 2 bits) and thus a swap of ordering does not fundamentally alter our understanding
of their relative security, as these estimates are typically derived by heuristically searching
through the space of possible parameters and computing with limited precision. In some
cases, though, such as the one highlighted in [Ber18], the differences in security estimates can
be significant. As part of our work, we identified two cases in which this can happen: the
first involves sparse secrets, and the second concerns the dual attack.
128
4.6 First Round Security Estimates
4.6.1.1 Sparse secrets
The first class of cases involves instances with sparse secrets. The LWE Estimator applies
guessing strategies when costing the dual attack [Alb17] and the primal attack. The basic
idea, as discussed throughout this chapter, is that many of the entries of the secret vector are
zero, and hence can be ignored. We guess τ entries to be zero, and drop the corresponding
columns from the attack lattice. In dropping τ columns from a n-dimensional LWE instance,
we obtain a (n− τ)-dimensional LWE instance with a more dense secret distribution, where
the density depends on the choice of τ and the original value of h. On the one hand, there is
a probability of failure when guessing which columns to drop. On the other hand there may
exist a τ for which the (n− τ)-dimensional LWE instance is easier to solve, and in particular
requires a smaller BKZ blocksize β.
The trade-off between running BKZ on smaller lattices and having to run it multiple times
can correspond to an overall lower expected attack cost. This probability of failure when
guessing secret entries does not depend on the cost model, but rather on the weight and
dimension of the secret, making this kind of attack more effective for very sparse secrets.
In the case of comparing an enumeration cost model versus a sieving cost model, we have
that the cost of enumeration is fitted as 2Θ(β log β) or 2Θ(β
2) whereas the cost of sieving is
2Θ(β). The steeper curve for enumeration means that as we increase τ , and hence decrease
β, savings are potentially larger, justifying a larger number τ of entries guessed. Concretely,
the computed optimal guessing dimension τ can be much larger than in the sieving regime.
This phenomenon can also be observed when comparing two different sieving models or two
different enumeration models.
In Figure 4.3, we illustrate this for the EMBLEM and uRound2.KEM example. EMBLEM
does not have a sparse secret, while uRound2.KEM does. For EMBLEM the best guessing
dimension, giving the lowest overall cost, is τ = 0 in both cost models. For uRound2.KEM,
we see that the optimal guessing dimension varies depending on the cost model. In the 0.292β
cost model, the lowest overall expected cost is achieved for τ = 1 while in the 0.187β log β −
1.019β + 16.1 model the optimal choice is τ = 197.
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EMBLEM 0.187β log(β)− 10.19β + 16.1
EMBLEM 0.292β
uRound2.KEM 0.187β log(β)− 10.19β + 16.1
uRound2.KEM 0.292β
Figure 4.3: Estimates of the cost of the primal attack when guessing τ secret entries for the
schemes EMBLEM (n = 611) and uRound2.KEM (n = 500).
4.6.1.2 The Dual attack
The second class of cases can be observed for the dual attack. Recall that the dual attack
runs lattice reduction to find a small vector v in the scaled dual lattice of A, and then
considers 〈v,b〉 which is short when A,b is an LWE sample. In more detail, the advantage
of distinguishing 〈v,b〉, as discussed in Chapter 2, is:
ε = exp(−δ2 dc0),
for some constant c0 depending on the instance and with d being the dimension of the lattice
under consideration [LP11]. To amplify this advantage to a constant advantage, we have






4.7 Second Round Submissions
In the sieving regime we have TBKZ(β, d) ≈ 2c1β, and in the enumeration regime we have:
TBKZ(β, d) ≈ βc2β (from enumeration costing 2Θ(β log β)). For large β we have δ ≈ β1/2β [Che13],
and thus we have overall log costs of roughly:
c1 β + 2 log(e)β
d/β c0,
and
c2 β log(β) + 2 log(e)β
d/β c0.
We wish to minimise both expressions (under the constraint that β ≥ 2) and the optimal
trade-off depends on c0, c1 and c2. In particular, the optimal β in the sieving regime is not
necessarily the optimal β in the enumeration regime.
4.7 Second Round Submissions
In January 2019, NIST announced the second round submissions. Of the 69 submissions
from the first round, 26 submissions made it through to the second round [Moo19]. The
23 lattice-based submission from the first round became 12. At this point, designers were
allowed to make more significant changes to their submissions including e.g. the merging of
multiple submissions, design changes, and new parameter sets. The second round submissions
are outlined in Table 4.9.
4.8 The Third Round
In July 2020, NIST announced the third round submissions. Of the 26 submissions from
the second round, NIST announced seven third round finalists, as well as eight candidate
algorithms. Of these eight finalists, five are lattice-based submissions, and of the seven
candidate algorithms, two are lattice-based submissions [Moo20]. The third round submissions
are outlined in Table 4.10.
4.8.1 Cost Models
Next, we consider which of the cost models from the first round, given in Table 4.3, are
considered in third round submissions, and we present these cost models in Table 4.11.
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LWE Variants NewHope [PAA+19]





NTRU Variants NTRU [ZCH+19] Merge of NTRUEncrypt and NTRU HRSS
NTRU Prime [BCLv19]
Table 4.9: Second round lattice-based submissions to the NIST standardisation process.
Assumption Schemes Notes
Crystals-Dilithium [LDK+20] Finalist




NTRU Variants NTRU [ZCH+20] Finalist
NTRU Prime [BCLv20] Candidate
Table 4.10: Third round lattice-based submissions to the NIST standardisation process.
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0.265β NTRU Prime [BCLv20]
Crystals-Kyber [SAB+20]
Crystals-Dilithium [LDK+20]




0.265β + log(β) Frodo [NAB+20]
0.2075β + log(β)†
0.187β log β − 1.019β + 16.1 NTRU Prime [BCLv20]
1
2(0.187β log β − 1.019β + 16.1) NTRU Prime [BCLv20]
Table 4.11: All cost models proposed as part of a submission to the third round of the NIST
standardisation procedure. The name of a model is the log (to the base 2) of its cost. Cost
models which were not used as part of our analysis for the first round submissions are marked
with a †. The 0.396β model considers the 0.292β model mapped to the AT metric [Ber20].
The 0.3496β and 0.4150β models are used in the NTRU submission under the assumption of
a “local” model of computation. The 0.2075β + log(β) model was mentioned in the round
one Frodo submission, but wasn’t used to produce estimates.
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4.8.2 Parameter Sets and Estimates
Next, we consider the seven lattice-based schemes listed in Table 4.10. We present updated
parameter selections in Tables 4.12, 4.13, and 4.14. Finally, we present Core-SVP estimates,
both in the classical regime (0.292β) and the quantum regime (0.265β) for the Round 3
parameter sets in Tables 4.15 and 4.16.





















q/8− 2 5 NTRU xn − 1 KEM, PKE
701 8192 20.92 20.92 3 NTRU xn − 1 KEM, PKE









q/2 5 NTRU xn + 1 SIG









































2/3 5 NTRU xn − x− 1 KEM
Table 4.12: Parameter sets for third round NTRU-based schemes with secret dimension n,
modulo q, small polynomials f and g, and ring Zq[x]/(φ). The NIST column indicates the
NIST security category aimed at. Each parameter set from SNTRU Prime has been assigned
two security levels in the round 3 submission, and we always choose the lowest of the two.
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Name n q σ Secret dist. NIST Assumption φ Primitive
NTRU 509 2048
√
2/3 ((−1, 1), q/8− 2) 1 NTRU xn − 1 KEM, PKE
677 2048
√
2/3 ((−1, 1), q/8− 2) 3 NTRU xn − 1 KEM, PKE
821 4096
√
2/3 ((−1, 1), q/8− 2) 5 NTRU xn − 1 KEM, PKE
701 8192 0.79 ((−1, 1), 437) 4 NTRU xn − 1 KEM, PKE
Falcon 512 12289 1.17
√
q/2n normal 1 NTRU xn + 1 SIG
1024 12289 1.17
√
q/2n normal 5 NTRU xn + 1 SIG
SNTRU Prime 653 4621
√
2/3 ((−1, 1), 288) 1 NTRU xn − x− 1 KEM
761 4591
√
2/3 ((−1, 1), 286) 2 NTRU xn − x− 1 KEM
857 5167
√
2/3 ((−1, 1), 322) 2 NTRU xn − x− 1 KEM
953 6343
√
2/3 ((−1, 1), 396) 3 NTRU xn − x− 1 KEM
1013 7177
√
2/3 ((−1, 1), 448) 4 NTRU xn − x− 1 KEM
1277 7879
√
2/3 ((−1, 1), 492) 5 NTRU xn − x− 1 KEM
Table 4.13: LWE parameter sets for third round NTRU-based schemes, with dimension n,
modulo q, standard deviation of the error σ, and ring Zq[x]/(φ). The NIST column indicates
the NIST security category aimed at. Each parameter set from SNTRU Prime has been
assigned two security levels in the round 3 submission, and we always choose the lowest of
the two.
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Name n k q σ Secret dist. NIST Assumption φ Primitive
CRYSTALS-Dilithium 1024 4 8380417
√
24/12 (−2, 2) 2 Module-LWE xn/k + 1 SIG
1280 5 8380417
√
80/12 (−4, 4) 3 Module-LWE xn/k + 1 SIG
1792 7 8380417
√
24/12 (−2, 2) 5 Module-LWE xn/k + 1 SIG
CRYSTALS-Kyber 512 2 3329
√
3/2 normal 1 Module-LWE xn/k + 1 KEM, PKE
768 3 3329 1 normal 3 Module-LWE xn/k + 1 KEM, PKE
1024 4 3329 1 normal 5 Module-LWE xn/k + 1 KEM, PKE
Frodo 640 — 32768 2.80 normal 1 LWE — KEM, PKE
976 — 65536 2.30 normal 3 LWE — KEM, PKE
1344 — 65536 1.40 normal 5 LWE — KEM, PKE
NTRU LPrime 653 — 4621
√
2/3 ((−1, 1), 252) 1 Ring-LWR xn − x− 1 KEM
761 — 4591
√
2/3 ((−1, 1), 250) 2 Ring-LWR xn − x− 1 KEM
857 — 5167
√
2/3 ((−1, 1), 281) 2 Ring-LWR xn − x− 1 KEM
953 — 6343
√
2/3 ((−1, 1), 345) 3 Ring-LWR xn − x− 1 KEM
1013 — 7177
√
2/3 ((−1, 1), 392) 4 Ring-LWR xn − x− 1 KEM
1277 — 7879
√
2/3 ((−1, 1), 429) 5 Ring-LWR xn − x− 1 KEM
LightSaber 512 2 8192
√
63/12 (−5, 5) 1 Module-LWR xn/k + 1 KEM, PKE
Saber 768 3 8192
√
63/12 (−4, 4) 3 Module-LWR xn/k + 1 KEM, PKE
FireSaber 1024 4 8192
√
63/12 (−3, 3) 5 Module-LWR xn/k + 1 KEM, PKE
Table 4.14: Parameter sets for third round LWE-based schemes with secret dimension n,
Module-LWE rank k (if any), modulo q, standard deviation of the error σ. If the LWE samples
come from a Ring- or Module-LWE instance, the ring is Zq[x]/(φ). The NIST column indicates
the NIST security category aimed at. Note that, for the SABER submission, we consider the
binomial secret drawn from Bη to be uniform over the interval (−η2 ,
η
2 ). Each parameter set
from NTRU LPrime has been assigned two security levels in the round 3 submission, and we
always choose the lowest of the two.
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Name n k q σ Secret dist. NIST Dual uSVP
CRYSTALS-Dilithium 1024 4 8380417
√
24/12 (−2, 2) 2 39 124
1280 5 8380417
√
80/12 (−4, 4) 3 202 183
1792 7 8380417
√
24/12 (−2, 2) 5 292 252
CRYSTALS-Kyber 512 2 3329
√
3/2 normal 1 148 119
768 3 3329 1 normal 3 218 182
1024 4 3329 1 normal 5 303 255
Frodo 640 — 32768 2.80 normal 1 170 142
976 — 65536 2.30 normal 3 241 207
1344 — 65536 1.40 normal 5 314 272
NTRU LPrime 653 — 4621
√
2/3 ((−1, 1), 252) 1 152 131
761 — 4591
√
2/3 ((−1, 1), 250) 2 179 156
857 — 5167
√
2/3 ((−1, 1), 281) 2 204 177
953 — 6343
√
2/3 ((−1, 1), 345) 3 227 198
1013 — 7177
√
2/3 ((−1, 1), 392) 4 241 211
1277 — 7879
√
2/3 ((−1, 1), 429) 5 309 271
LightSaber 512 2 8192
√
63/12 (−5, 5) 1 168 125
Saber 768 3 8192
√
63/12 (−4, 4) 3 244 203
FireSaber 1024 4 8192
√
63/12 (−3, 3) 5 321 278
NTRU 509 — 2048
√
2/3 ((−1, 1), q/8− 2) 1 — 108
677 — 2048
√
2/3 ((−1, 1), q/8− 2) 3 — 149
821 — 4096
√
2/3 ((−1, 1), q/8− 2) 5 — 180
701 — 8192 0.79 ((−1, 1), 437) 4 — 135
Falcon 512 — 12289 1.17
√
q/2n normal 1 — 141
1024 — 12289 1.17
√
q/2n normal 5 — 285
SNTRU Prime 653 — 4621
√
2/3 ((−1, 1), 288) 1 — 130
761 — 4591
√
2/3 ((−1, 1), 286) 2 — 155
857 — 5167
√
2/3 ((−1, 1), 322) 2 — 176
953 — 6343
√
2/3 ((−1, 1), 396) 3 — 197
1013 — 7177
√
2/3 ((−1, 1), 448) 4 — 211
1277 — 7879
√
2/3 ((−1, 1), 492) 5 — 272
Table 4.15: “Core-SVP” estimates for third round NTRU-based schemes, with dimension n,
modulo q, standard deviation of the error σ, ring Zq[x]/(φ) and with m = 2n samples. The
NIST column indicates the NIST security category aimed at.
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Name n k q σ Secret dist. NIST Dual uSVP
CRYSTALS-Dilithium 1024 4 8380417
√
24/12 (−2, 2) 2 127 113
1280 5 8380417
√
80/12 (−4, 4) 3 186 166
1792 7 8380417
√
24/12 (−2, 2) 5 275 229
CRYSTALS-Kyber 512 2 3329
√
3/2 normal 1 137 108
768 3 3329 1 normal 3 202 166
1024 4 3329 1 normal 5 279 232
Frodo 640 — 32768 2.80 normal 1 155 128
976 — 65536 2.30 normal 3 223 188
1344 — 65536 1.40 normal 5 285 247
NTRU LPrime 653 — 4621
√
2/3 ((−1, 1), 252) 1 142 119
761 — 4591
√
2/3 ((−1, 1), 250) 2 166 141
857 — 5167
√
2/3 ((−1, 1), 281) 2 188 161
953 — 6343
√
2/3 ((−1, 1), 345) 3 208 179
1013 — 7177
√
2/3 ((−1, 1), 392) 4 223 191
1277 — 7879
√
2/3 ((−1, 1), 429) 5 280 246
LightSaber 512 2 8192
√
63/12 (−5, 5) 1 156 113
Saber 768 3 8192
√
63/12 (−4, 4) 3 222 184
FireSaber 1024 4 8192
√
63/12 (−3, 3) 5 300 253
NTRU 509 — 2048
√
2/3 ((−1, 1), q/8− 2) 1 — 98
677 — 2048
√
2/3 ((−1, 1), q/8− 2) 3 — 136
821 — 4096
√
2/3 ((−1, 1), q/8− 2) 5 — 163
701 — 8192 0.79 ((−1, 1), 437) 4 — 123
Falcon 512 — 12289 1.17
√
q/2n normal 1 — 128
1024 — 12289 1.17
√
q/2n normal 5 — 259
SNTRU Prime 653 — 4621
√
2/3 ((−1, 1), 288) 1 — 118
761 — 4591
√
2/3 ((−1, 1), 286) 2 — 140
857 — 5167
√
2/3 ((−1, 1), 322) 2 — 160
953 — 6343
√
2/3 ((−1, 1), 396) 3 — 180
1013 — 7177
√
2/3 ((−1, 1), 448) 4 — 192
1277 — 7879
√
2/3 ((−1, 1), 492) 5 — 247
Table 4.16: Quantum “Core-SVP” estimates for third round NTRU-based schemes, with
dimension n, modulo q, standard deviation of the error σ, ring Zq[x]/(φ), and with m = 2n
samples. The NIST column indicates the NIST security category aimed ats.
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4.9 Conclusion
In Tables 4.15 and 4.16 we see the 30 parameter sets analysed using the 0.292β and 0.265β
BKZ cost models, under the uSVP attack and the dual attack (where appropriate).
4.9 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have considered the first, second, and third round submissions to the NIST
standardisation process. We extracted the parameter sets from all first round submissions,
and estimated the security of the uSVP and dual attacks (where appropriate) for each scheme,
under every cost model considered as part of a submission. This allows for the security of
any two schemes to be compared in a more easy manner. Moreover, we have also shown that
cost models for the BKZ algorithm are not order preserving, and have provided a summary
of the schemes which progressed into the second and third rounds. In the case of the third
round schemes, we have provided an updated analysis on the security of these schemes under
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This chapter is based on the following publication: Benjamin R. Curtis and Rachel Player. On
the Feasibility and Impact of Standardising Sparse-secret LWE Parameter Sets for Homomorphic
Encryption. In Proceedings of the 7th ACM Workshop on Encrypted Computing and Applied
Homomorphic Cryptography (pp. 1-10). Association for Computing Machinery, 2019. Additional
details have been added in this thesis.
In this chapter we investigate the security of homomorphic encryption-style LWE parameter
sets against hybrid attacks. We consider the effect of secret sparsity on both the performance
and security of these schemes.
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5.1 Introduction and Contribution
The author of this thesis contributed towards (a) the writing of the paper, (b) the writing
of the code used for experiments, as well as (c) running the experiments and presenting the
experimental data.
5.1 Introduction and Contribution
The homomorphicencryption.org consortium have begun an effort to standardise both
an API [BDH+17] and advice on secure parameter selection for LWE-based homomorphic
encryption schemes. The Homomorphic Encryption Security Standard (HE Standard) [ACC+18]
recommends parameter sets for usage in homomorphic encryption schemes achieving target
security levels λ ∈ {128, 192, 256}.
Recall from Chapter 2 that LWE instances can always be transformed into Normal form,
where the secret follows the error distribution [ACPS09]. For error distributions Dσ which
satisfy σ = O(
√
n), reductions exist from worst-case hard lattice problems to LWE [Reg05].
In this setting, hardness results for a binary secret s ∈ {0, 1}n can be obtained at the cost
of increasing the LWE dimension [BLP+13]. We note that there are currently no known
hardness results for ternary secret LWE, or sparse-secret LWE.
Implementations of LWE-based homomorphic encryption libraries typically choose an error
distribution which is much narrower than those considered in security reductions. Indeed, an
early example uses σ = 3.19 [GHS12], which remains a popular choice today. We note that
for σ = 3.19, currently known security reductions do not apply1. However, σ = 3.19 is used
for all of the the currently recommended parameter sets in the HE Standard [ACC+18].
The HE Standard specifies parameters (n, q, σ) achieving a security level λ ∈ {128, 192, 256}
according to the LWE Estimator [APS15], described in Chapter 2. The parameters considered
are power-of-two ring dimensions n ∈ {1024, 2048, ..., 32768}, and a fixed Discrete Gaussian
error distribution Dσ with standard deviation σ = 3.19. For each ring dimension n, a bit-
length log q is standardised. For a given modulus q, the constraint on the error distribution
can be equivalently expressed as fixing the parameter α = 8q , where α is defined such that
σ = αq√
2π
, as outlined in Definition 2.30. Typical secret distributions χs used in homomorphic
1Further, we note that this is not just the case for homomorphic encryption schemes, and that some of the
parameters typically considered in e.g. lattice-based KEMs (see Chapter 4) are not covered by these reductions
either.
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encryption schemes are:
1. uniform ternary, i.e. s is chosen uniformly at random from the set {−1, 0, 1}n,
2. uniform, i.e. s is chosen uniformly at random from the set Znq ,
3. error, i.e. each coefficient of s is sampled from the error distribution Dσ, or
4. uniform binary, i.e. s is chosen uniformly at random from the set {0, 1}n,
and we note that the HE Standard supports the first three secret distributions. All major
implementations of homomorphic encryption use a uniform binary or a ternary secret distribution.
Moreover, many implementations use a sparse secret, for which all but a certain Hamming
weight h of the coefficients are zero. As an example, HEAAN [HEA20], uses by default a
sparse ternary secret of Hamming weight h = 64. An important issue motivating the use of
sparse secrets is the complexity of bootstrapping.
It is worth noting that, in this chapter, we are not concerned with the depth of computation,
or any potential issues with correctness. Our goal is, for power-of-two ring dimensions n, to
provide a maximal permissible modulus log q which allows a user to attain a desired level
of security λ, as in the HE Standard [ACC+18]. Determining the optimal parameters for a
specific computation of multiplicative depth L is beyond the scope of this work.
5.1.1 Bootstrapping Complexities for CKKS, BFV, and BGV
We provide a brief overview of the complexity of the bootstrapping procedures for the
CKKS [CKKS17], BGV [BGV12], and BFV [FV12] schemes. We have deliberately chosen
to omit details on encoding and decoding as these details are not required. Recall that
Rq = Zq[X]/(Xn + 1). Throughout this section we let χ be some distribution which samples
small polynomials from the ring Rq. We also set R3 = Z3[X]/(Xn + 1) and we recall here
that Z3 = {−1, 0, 1} and, therefore, the co-efficient vector g of non-zero polynomials g ← R3
satisfies ‖g‖∞ = 1.
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5.1.1.1 CKKS
We briefly outline the CKKS homomorphic encryption scheme as presented in [CKKS17].
Consider values p, q0 > 0,q` = p
`q0 for 0 < ` ≤ L for some L ∈ N, and set P ≈ qL.
 KGen(1n). The key generation algorithm takes as input the security parameter and
generates three keys: a secret key sk, a public encryption key pk, and a public evaluation
key ek.
– To generate the secret key, we sample a small polynomial s← R3 and set:
sk = (1, s) ∈ R2qL .
– To generate the public key, we sample a← RqL , e← χ and set:
pk = (−(as+ e) mod qL, a) ∈ R2qL .
– To generate the evaluation key we sample a′ ← RPqL , e′ ← χ and set:
ek = (−a′s+ e+ Ps2 mod PqL, a′) ∈ R2PqL .
 Enc(pk,m). The encryption algorithm takes as input a public key pk = (pk1, pk2) ∈ R2qL
and a message m ∈ R, samples v ← R3 and e1, e2 ← χ, and outputs:
c = vpk + (m+ e1, e2) ∈ R2qL .
 Dec(sk, c). The decryption algorithm takes as input a secret key sk = s ∈ R3 and a
ciphertext c = (c1, c2) ∈ R2qL , and outputs:
m′ ← (c1 + c2s) mod qL.
 Add(c, c′). The addition algorithm takes as input two ciphertexts c, c′ ∈ R2q` and outputs:
c+ = (c1 + c
′
1, c2 + c
′
2) mod q`.




2) ∈ R2q` and computes the values d1 = c1c
′








c× = (d1, d2) + bP−1 · d3 · eke mod q`.
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The decryption function in the CKKS scheme is a modular reduction, i.e. evaluating:
m′ ← 〈ct, sk〉 mod qL.
In order to bootstrap we need to homomorphically evaluate the decryption function, we note
that this decryption function can be represented as a scaled sine function [CHK+18]:














when ‖[〈ct, sk〉]qL‖ ≤ ε · qL. Bootstrapping can therefore be implemented by evaluating a
Chebyshev interpolant (polynomial) in degree d = O(K + log q), where q is the ciphertext
modulus, and K is a constant depending on the secret distribution. This evaluation requires
O(
√
d) ciphertext multiplications [CCS19a]. For sparse secrets with Hamming weight h, the
heuristic argument of [CHK+18] shows that we have K = O(
√
h), while for a uniform ternary
secret we have K = O(
√
n). We note that a passive attack against CKKS, as well as potential
countermeasures, has been outlined in [LM20].
5.1.1.2 BGV
We briefly outline the BGV homomorphic encryption scheme as presented in [CLP19]. Here,
the ciphertext space is Rq and the plaintext space is Rt. We note that w is a base, and
` denotes the number of terms in the decomposition of an integer modulo q into base w,
i.e. w = blogw(q)c.
 KGen(1n). The key generation algorithm takes as input the security parameter and
generates three keys: a secret key sk, a public encryption key pk, and a public evaluation
key ek.
– To generate the secret key, we sample a small polynomial s← R3 and set:
sk = s.
– To generate the public key, we sample a← Rq, e← χ and set:
pk = (−(as+ te) mod q, a).









5.1 Introduction and Contribution
 Enc(pk,m). The encryption algorithm takes as input a public key pk = (pk1, pk2) ∈ R2q
and a message m ∈ Rt, samples v ← R3 and e1, e2 ← χ, and outputs a ciphertext of
the form:
c = (pk1v + te1 +m, pk2v + te2) ∈ R2q .
 Dec(sk, c). The decryption algorithm takes as input a secret key sk = s ∈ Rq and
aciphertext c = (c1, c2) ∈ R2q , and outputs:
m = (c1 + c2s mod q) mod t.
 Add(c, c′). The addition algorithm takes as input two ciphertexts c, c′ ∈ R2q and outputs:
c+ = (c1 + c
′
1 mod q, c2 + c
′
2 mod q).
 Mult(c, c′). The multiplication algorithm takes as input two ciphertexts c, c′ ∈ R2q and
computes the values d1 = c1c
′




1 mod q, and d3 = c2c
′
2 mod q.
From there, we output c× = (d1, d2, d3), that is:
c× = (c1c
′




1 mod q, c2c
′
2 mod q).
 Relinearize(ek, c). The relinearisation algorithm takes as input an evaluation key ek =















outputs crelin = (d1, d2), that is:











The decryption function in the BGV scheme is:
m′ ← (c1 + c2s mod q) mod t,
and bootstrapping therefore requires the evaluation of a circuit of depth log (‖s‖1)+log t [CH18],
where t is the plaintext modulus. This evaluation requires O(log3/2 ‖s‖1 + log1/2 ‖s‖1 · log t+
log2 t) ciphertext multiplications [CH18, Table 2].
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5.1.1.3 BFV
We briefly outline the BFV homomorphic encryption scheme as presented in [CLP19]. Here,
the ciphertext space isRq and the plaintext space isRt. We also define the quantity ∆ = bq/tc.
We note that w is a base, and ` denotes the number of terms in the decomposition of an integer
modulo q into base w, i.e. w = blogw(q)c.
 KGen(1n). The key generation algorithm takes as input the security parameter and
generates three keys: a secret key sk, a public encryption key pk, and a public evaluation
key ek.
– To generate the secret key, we sample a small polynomial s← R3 and set:
sk = s.
– To generate the public key, we sample a← Rq, e← χ and set:
pk = (−(as+ e) mod q, a).








 Enc(pk,m). The encryption algorithm takes as input a public key pk = (pk1, pk2) ∈ R2q
and a message m ∈ Rt, samples v ← R3 and e1, e2 ← χ, and outputs a ciphertext of
the form: and outputs a ciphertext of the form:
c = (pk1v + e1 + ∆m, pk2v + e2) ∈ R2q .
 Dec(sk, c). The decryption algorithm takes as input a secret key sk = s ∈ R3 and a





(c1 + c2s) mod q
⌉
mod t.
 Add(c, c′). The addition algorithm takes as input two ciphertexts c, c′ ∈ R2q and outputs:
c+ = (c1 + c
′




5.1 Introduction and Contribution
 Mult(c, c′). The multiplication algorithm takes as input two ciphertexts c, c′ ∈ R2q




















































 Relinearize(ek, c). The relinearisation algorithm takes as input an evaluation key ek =















q, and outputs crelin = (d1, d2), that is:










3 ) mod q.
The decryption function in the BFV scheme can be written as:
m′ ←
⌊




which requires the evaluation of a circuit of depth log (‖s‖1)+log log t. This, in turn, requires
O((log ‖s‖1 + log t)1/2 log ‖s‖1) ciphertext multiplications [CH18, Table 2].
5.1.1.4 Summary
For sparse ternary secret with Hamming weight h, we have ‖s‖1 = h, whereas for a uniform
ternary secret we expect ‖s‖1 = O(n). Current implementations for bootstrapping in CKKS,
BGV or BFV use sparse secrets for efficiency reasons [CH18, CHK+18]. We also note that
there are works aimed towards improving bootstrapping techniques for non-sparse keys [BMTPH20].
We summarise this discussion in Table 5.1.
5.1.1.5 Sparse Secrets
Sparse secret distributions are not currently supported in the HE Standard. This is likely
due to the loss of security as compared to a uniform ternary secret for a fixed set of LWE
parameters (n, q, σ), as well as uncertainty over the attack landscape for these distributions.
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Scheme CKKS BGV BFV
Decryption circuit depth O(K + log q) log (‖s‖1) + log t log (‖s‖1) + log log t
Ciphertext multiplications O(
√
d) O(log3/2 ‖s‖1 + log1/2 ‖s‖1 · log t+ log2 t) O((log ‖s‖1 + log t)1/2 log ‖s‖1)
Parameter sizes when s← B− K = O(
√
n) ‖s‖1 = O(n) ‖s‖1 = O(n)
Parameter sizes when s← B−h K = O(
√
h) ‖s‖1 = h ‖s‖1 = h
Table 5.1: A summary of the bootstrapping complexities for CKKS, BGV and BFV.
The loss of security is intuitive, as this corresponds to shrinking the size of the keyspace.
Moreover, several attacks are known which can exploit the sparsity of an LWE secret [How07,
Alb17, HHC19]. As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, these attack techniques trade-off the
probability of guessing τ secret components against the lower cost of solving a lattice problem
in dimension (d− τ).
Another way in which the recommended parameter sets in the HE Standard do not always
reflect implementation choices is in the maximal supported dimension n = 215. For example,
many implementations of bootstrapping, such as [CHK+18, CCS19a, HHC19], choose ring
dimension n = 216. In addition, advanced applications of homomorphic encryption, such as
logistic regression training [KSK+18, KSW+18], have been reported using dimension n = 216
or n = 217. Such large dimensions are used to support the choice of q, which is chosen to be
large enough to allow for evaluation of a circuit of a specific depth.
5.1.2 Structure and Contributions
The discussion from Section 5.1.1.5 motivates the widening of the recommended parameter
sets to include sparse secrets, or parameter sets for larger dimension n > 215. In this chapter
we consider such possible extensions.
An outline of the structure and contributions of this chapter is as follows. In Section 5.2 we
make some comments on small and sparse secret LWE. In Section 5.3 we discuss algorithms
used to solve small and sparse LWE, including introducing the hybrid dual attack [CHHS19].
In Section 5.4 we outline some of the parameter sets recommended in the current variant
of the HE Standard. In Section 5.5 we assess the impact on security and performance of
using a sparse secret of Hamming weight h instead of a uniform ternary secret, for various
choices of h. In Section 5.5.4 we show how the methodology of the Standard could be used
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to select parameters with larger power-of-two dimension n ≥ 216. In Section 5.6 we discuss
open problems and future work.
5.2 Comments on Small and Sparse-secret LWE
Definition 2.34 outlines some small-secret distributions of interest. Recall that the uniform
ternary distribution is denoted by B−, and the uniform binary distribution is denoted by B+.
5.2.1 Keyspace Size
When considering combinatorial attacks against LWE, the size of the keyspace is an important
quantity, since this determines the maximal size of the guessing set in combinatorial attacks.
To illustrate this, we consider the following examples:
1. when the secret is drawn from Znq , the size of the keyspace is ‖SZnq ‖ = q
n,
2. when the secret is drawn from B−, the size of the keyspace is ‖SB−‖ = 3n,






4. when the secret is drawn from B+, the size of the keyspace is ‖SB+‖ = 2n, and






In Figure 5.1 we highlight the size of the keyspace B−h , and B
+
h , for each potential value of
h when the associated ring dimension is n = 1024. If h = 64 then the size of the keyspace
is ≈ 2405, whereas if the secret is is drawn from B− then the size of the keyspace is ≈ 21623.
We note that the LWE Estimator, as well as our scripts for hybrid attacks, assume that
uniformly random ternary secrets have fixed Hamming weight h = b2n3 c, and that uniformly
random binary secrets have fixed Hamming weight h = bn2 e. For the examples considered





· 2683 ≈ 21618, and
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Figure 5.1: Example LWE (secret) keyspace sizes with n = 1024 for binary, ternary, fixed-
weight binary, and fixed-weight ternary secrets.
5.2.2 Secret Density
Keeping a fixed Hamming weight (e.g. h = 64) for a variety of ring dimensions means that
the density κ = hn of the secret decreases as n grows. One approach to scaling sparse secrets





For example, we could consider κ = 116 such that:
(n, h) ∈ {(1024, 64), (2048, 128), (4096, 256), . . . }.
This follows the approach of several submissions to the ongoing NIST post-quantum standardisation
effort: for example, Lizard [CKLS18] uses h = n8 , i.e. κ =
1
8 . For larger ring dimensions used
in homomorphic encryption libraries this approach can lead to a large Hamming weight h,
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leading to a more expensive bootstrapping operation. For example, for a ring dimension
n = 32768, choosing κ = 116 would require h = 2048.
Another approach is to fix the ratio between the Hamming weight h of the secret and the





This approach would mean that, for each target security level λtarget, the value of the Hamming
weight h for every ring dimension n = 2k is fixed. For example, if ζ = 1, then for a fixed
security level λ we consider secrets of Hamming weight h = λ. Such an approach means that
the (theoretical) complexity of bootstrapping would remain the same for each dimension n
with an associated security level λ. In this work we consider the second approach, i.e. fixing
the value of ζ = hλ .
5.3 Algorithms for solving Small-secret LWE
As discussed in Chapter 2, the concrete security of LWE-based parameter sets is typically
determined by considering the best known attacks. That is, given an LWE parameter
set (n, α, q) and a corresponding secret distribution, we set λ to be the logarithm of the
running time of the fastest attack. The current version of the HE Standard [ACC+18] uses
the LWE Estimator to determine parameters, based on the running time of three attacks:
uSVP, decoding and dual. Hybrid attacks [How07, CHHS19] are typically among the most
competitive in the case of sparse secrets, although they are not currently supported by the
LWE Estimator, and therefore have not been considered in the latest version of the HE
Standard.
Following the HE Standard, in this chapter we only consider sieving-based cost models for
BKZ. Specifically, we view BKZ as a black box which runs in (pre-quantum) time:
TBKZ(β, d) = 2
0.292β+16.4+log(8d),
and, if instantiated with quantum algorithms to solve SVP, runs in time:
TBKZ(β, d) = 2
0.265β+16.4+log(8d).
Estimates for the primal decoding attack [LP11, LN13] reported by the LWE Estimator do not
assume state-of-the-art techniques, hence may be inaccurate and are often not competitive.
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More precisely, the Estimator currently assumes the decoding attack is implemented with the
Nearest Planes algorithm [LP11] as opposed to the more efficient pruned enumeration [LN13].
Moreover, the Estimator does not consider combinatorial techniques for the decoding attack
as considered in [ACW20] and Chapter 3. As an example, for the example parameter set
n = 653, q = 4621, σ ≈
√
2/3, χs = B−100 considered in Section 3.4, the decoding estimate
provided by the LWE Estimator estimates the complexity as 2229.9, whereas the batch-BDD
techniques outlined in Chapter 3 report a complexity of 2186.1. For this reason, we do not
report dec estimates in this chapter.
We consider the uSVP, hybrid-decoding, dual and hybrid-dual attacks on LWE. For uSVP
and dual, we consider the small-secret variant of these attacks as described in Chapter 4. For
the hybrid-decoding attack, as discussed in Chapter 3, we outline the assumptions considered
in this Chapter in Section 5.3.1. We describe the hybrid-dual attack in Section 5.3.2.
5.3.1 Hybrid-decoding Attack Assumptions
As discussed in Chapter 3, an analysis of the hybrid-decoding attack requires the usage of
several assumptions. In Chapter 3 we considered multiple sets of assumptions. For clarity,
we outline the assumptions considered in this chapter:
 The output GSO basis shape of lattice reduction is given by the Geometric Series
Assumption [Sch03].
 The (heuristic) success probability of Babai’s Nearest Plane algorithm follows the analysis















where d is the dimension of the lattice under consideration, and ri = ‖b∗i ‖/2‖v‖
where ‖v‖ is the (expected) norm of the target vector, and B(·, ·) denotes the Beta
function [OLBC10].





 The meet-in-the-middle search phase provides a square-root speed-up as compared to
an exhaustive search.
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 The associated meet-in-the-middle probability is set to be pmitm = 1, thus providing an
explicit underestimate of security.
 The meet-in-the-middle search phase has access to unlimited memory.













where β is the BKZ blocksize, d is the dimension in which lattice reduction is performed,
τ is the guessing dimension (i.e. the number of guessed components of the secret), t is the
maximal Hamming weight considered in the search space, and
∑t
i=0 ‖Si‖ is the size of the
search space, i.e. the number of points on which we decode. Here p is the probability of
success of Babai’s Nearest Plane algorithm, and pi is the probability that the guessed part of
the secret has Hamming weight i. Estimates for the cost of the hybrid-decoding attack are
generated using custom code2.
5.3.2 The Hybrid-dual Attack
Albrecht’s variant of the dual attack, as described in Chapter 4, was recently adapted by
Cheon et al. [CHHS19] to include a meet-in-the-middle step in the combinatorial search
phase of the attack, giving rise to a hybrid-dual attack. It is shown in [CHHS19] that when
fixing a maximal memory of 280, the hybrid dual attack outperforms the dual attack for
certain homomorphic encryption-style parameter sets with a sparse ternary secret. Cheon et
al. [CHHS19] provide a script3 that can be used to estimate the security of a given parameter
set against the hybrid dual attack. Recall from Chapter 4 that the small-secret variant of the
dual attack proceeds by performing lattice reduction on the lattice Λ′′, where:
Λ′′ =
{





)n∣∣∣∣vA ≡ cw mod q} .
For an LWE instance (A,b = As + e), with sparse secret of Hamming weight h, the crux of
the meet-in-the-middle process is based on considering the noisy relationship:
As1 ≈ b−As2
2This code can be found at https://github.com/bencrts/hybrid_attacks/hybrid_decoding.py
3The script is available at https://github.com/swanhong/HybridLWEAttack.
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for a pair s1, s2 satisfying s1 + s2 = s. The attack begins by considering the list which
constructs Av1 for candidate values v1 of s1:
T = {Av1 | v1 ∈ {−1, 0, 1}n : HW(v1) ≤ h′},
which is constructed for some h′ ≤ h. Note that h′ is an attack parameter and can be
optimised over. A hash table H, initialised as 2m empty linked lists with indexes in {0, 1}m,




1 if ti ∈ [0, q/2)
0 else
.
After this process is completed for all t ∈ T , we begin a search overH. The search proceeds by
checking whether b−Av2 is close to the list T for candidate choices v2, where the closeness
depends on the size of the error vector e. That is, we are interested in the norm of:
‖As1 − (b−As2)‖∞ = ‖e‖∞,
and the meet-in-the-middle process is successful if ‖e‖∞ < B, for some B. This is referred to
as a B-noisy collision.
Definition 5.1 (B-noisy collision [CHHS19]) For a vector a ∈ Zmq , a vector t ∈ Zmq is
referred to as a B-noisy collision of a if ‖a− t‖∞ ≤ B for some B < q2 .












where y is the short vector retrieved via lattice reduction on the lattice Λ′′. If we can find
a B-noisy collision of As1, for a candidate s1, then we can find b −As2 and therefore solve
decisional LWE.
The search phase takes as input the constructed hash table H, a query point q (which
corresponds to b−Av2 for some candidate v2 of s2) as well as a distance bound B. Defining:
sgn′(t)i =
{
sgn(ti) if ti ∈ VB
× else
,
where VB = [−q/2 +B,−B) ∪ [B, q/2−B), we then consider:
sgn′(q),
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where q is a candidate for s2. sgn
′(q) represents a list of binary strings generated by replacing
each × by 0 or 1. Then, for each element x in this list, we check if H contains a set indexed
by x. If this is the case, then for every t within this list we check if:
‖q− t‖∞ < B,
and, if this is the case, we return this vector.
To summarise, the hybrid-dual attack consists of three phases:
1. a lattice reduction phase, where we perform lattice reduction on the lattice Λ′′,
2. a hash-table construction phase, where we generate the hash table H, and
3. a searching phase, where we search for B-noisy collisions using the hash table H.
The total cost of phases 2. and 3. is the sum of:
(a) constructing the list T ,
(b) generating the hash table H, and
(c) the cost of the search algorithm applied to the candidate secrets.
These costs are computed as NT (n
2 + m) for steps (a) and (b) and O(Nq24mB/q) for step
(c) [CHHS19].
5.3.2.1 Hybrid-dual Assumptions
In this thesis, we do not use the script provided by [CHHS19].4 Instead, we conservatively
assume that the meet-in-the-middle process admits a square-root speed-up with no probability
loss – thus providing an explicit underestimate of security, for the purposes of generating
conservative parameters. This matches our approach with the hybrid-decoding attack (i.e. pmitm =
1). To do this, we consider Albrecht’s attack script [Est20] and, in the search phase, balance
the cost of searching with the square of the lattice reduction cost (as opposed to simply
balancing the cost of searching with the cost of lattice reduction). The changes to the source
code can be found in Figure 5.2.
4This is because the script was not designed to be used for non-sparse (i.e. uniform-ternary) secrets.
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for i in range(1, k):
cost post i = (2 * repeat * dim * k) + (repeat * binomial(k, i) * (b=a)**i * i)
probability i = success probability drop(n, h, k, i, rotations=rotations)
if cost post + cost post i >= cost lat**2:
postprocess = i
break
cost post += cost post i
probability += probability i
current["rop"] = cost lat + sqrt(cost post)
Figure 5.2: Changes applied to the dual attack source code inside the LWE Estimator to
produce our hybrid-dual estimates. This replaces lines 1944-1959 in commit 428d6ea of the
LWE Estimator.
5.4 Currently Recommended Parameters
In Tables 5.2 we reproduce a subset of the parameter sets (n, log q, α) recommended in the
current version of the HE Standard [ACC+18] to achieve target security level λ for λ ∈
{128, 192, 256}, for power-of-two ring dimensions between 1024 and 32768 and for a secret
having coefficients chosen uniformly in {−1, 0, 1}. Table 5.2 reports the estimated cost of
running the uSVP, decoding, and dual attacks on these parameter sets under the sieving cost
model:
T (β, d) = 20.292β+16.4+log(8d).
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n log q α usvp decoding dual λtarget
1024 27 8/q 131.6 160.2 138.7
128
2048 54 8/q 129.7 144.4 134.2
4096 109 8/q 128.1 134.9 129.9
8192 218 8/q 128.5 131.5 129.2
16384 438 8/q 128.1 129.9 129.0
32768 881 8/q 128.5 129.1 128.5
1024 19 8/q 193.0 259.5 207.7
192
2048 37 8/q 197.5 233.0 207.8
4096 75 8/q 194.7 212.2 198.5
8192 152 8/q 192.2 200.4 194.6
16384 305 8/q 192.1 196.2 193.2
32768 611 8/q 192.7 194.2 193.7
1024 14 8/q 265.6 406.4 293.8
256
2048 29 8/q 259.1 321.7 273.5
4096 58 8/q 260.4 292.6 270.1
8192 118 8/q 256.7 270.4 260.6
16384 237 8/q 256.9 264.2 259.8
32768 476 8/q 256.4 260.2 258.2
Table 5.2: Currently standardised LWE parameters at the 128-, 192- and 256-bit security
level for uniform ternary secret specified in [ACC+18, Table 1] and estimates of their
security against usvp, decoding, and dual attacks under the BKZ cost model T (β, d) =
20.292β+16.4+log(8d), where β is the blocksize and d is the dimension. The best performing
attack for each parameter set is highlighted in bold.
5.5 Investigating Sparse-secrets
It may be desirable to extend the HE Standard to include parameter sets with sparse secret
distributions, due to the complexity of bootstrapping outlined in Section 5.1.1. In this section,
we consider the feasibility and impact of including sparse ternary secret distributions in the
HE Standard. To begin, in Figure 5.3 we compare the four attack techniques discussed in
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this chapter for the parameter set n = 1024, q = 240 and σ ≈ 3.2 with a sparse ternary secret
of Hamming weight h ∈ {64, 128, 256, 512}, to see which attacks perform best as the density
of the secret changes.




















Figure 5.3: A comparison of the usvp, dual, hybrid=dual and hybrid=decoding attacks under
the BKZ cost model T (β, d) = 20.292β+16.4+log(8d), for the parameter set n = 1024, q = 240 and
σ ≈ 3.2 with a sparse ternary secret with a variety of Hamming weights h ∈ {64, 128, 256, 512}.
5.5.1 Using Sparse Secrets with Existing Recommended Parameter Sets
Next, we consider the impact of using a sparse ternary secret of Hamming weight h = 128
for the sets of parameters (n, log q, α) as recommended in Table 5.2 for uniform ternary
secret. That is, we take the parameter sets currently recommended in the HE standard for
uniform-ternary secrets, and swap the secret distribution to be sparse ternary of Hamming
weight h = 128, in order to determine the effect on the security. In Table 5.3 we report the
output of the LWE Estimator giving an estimate of the concrete security of the parameter
sets (n, log q, α, h) with a sparse ternary secret of Hamming weight h = 128. For consistency,
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we have used the same sieving cost model T (β, d) = 20.292β+16.4+log(8d) which is used to
generate [ACC+18, Table 1].
n log q α h usvp dual λtarget
1024 27 8/q 128 124.9 127.8
128
2048 54 8/q 128 125.0 122.0
4096 109 8/q 128 124.9 117.9
8192 218 8/q 128 126.4 117.2
16384 438 8/q 128 127.0 117.1
32768 881 8/q 128 127.5 116.5
1024 19 8/q 128 178.2 179.2
192
2048 37 8/q 128 186.5 173.7
4096 75 8/q 128 186.6 165.2
8192 152 8/q 128 186.4 167.5
16384 305 8/q 128 187.7 159.1
32768 611 8/q 128 188.8 161.9
1024 14 8/q 128 235.4 238.5
256
2048 29 8/q 128 231.9 217.3
4096 58 8/q 128 234.3 210.2
8192 118 8/q 128 232.8 207.9
16384 237 8/q 128 233.8 195.8
32768 476 8/q 128 234.6 214.7
Table 5.3: Impact of using a sparse ternary secret of Hamming weight h = 128, using the
currently standardised LWE parameter sets at the target 128-, 192- and 256-bit security level
for uniform ternary secret specified in Table 5.2. Estimates of the security of each parameter
set against usvp and dual attacks under the BKZ cost model T (β, d) = 20.292β+16.4+log(8d) are
presented, where β is the blocksize and d is the dimension. The best performing attack for
each parameter set is highlighted in bold.
It can be seen from Table 5.3 that introducing a sparse secret of Hamming weight h = 128,
there is a noticeable security loss, by up to 11 bits at the target 128-bit security level, by
up to 32 bits at the target 192-bit security level, and by up to 60 bits at the target 256-bit
security level. Table 5.3 does not take into account hybrid attacks, which are likely to be
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competitive, and hence the security loss may be even greater.
5.5.2 Sparsity vs. Performance Trade-off
In Table 5.4 we illustrate the effect of using a sparse ternary secret with various Hamming
weights h on the bit size log q with n = 1024 and σ = 3.19 fixed. For comparison, we also
note the bit-length logQ which is currently recommended to achieve target security level λ
for the same n, σ with a uniform ternary secret in the HE Standard. A smaller modulus q
may impact on practical performance of the schemes. For example when we need to ensure
that q is large enough to support the full computation, to ensure correct decryption. The
lower q required by introducing a sparse secret may necessitate moving to a higher dimension
n to support the computation, which in turn will be slower.
5.5.3 Sparsity as a Proportion of Target Security: Exploration of Choices for ζ
In Table 5.5 we present an exploration of possible choices for the value ζ = hλ , illustrating
the reduction in bit-length log q required to retain the desired level of security when using a
sparse ternary secret compared to a uniform ternary secret. Table 5.5 uses the cost model
T (β, d) = 20.292β+16.4+log(8d), i.e. BKZ.sieve available in the LWE Estimator, and considers
the following attacks: uSVP, dual, hybrid-decoding, and hybrid-dual. We provide as a point
of comparison logQ, the bit-length of the modulus Q currently recommended in [ACC+18]
for the given parameters (n, σ = 3.19) with uniform ternary secret at target security level λ.
Table 5.5 indicates that a choice such as ζ = 1 gives a reasonable trade-off between performance
and security. In this case, we can retain secure parameters with at most a 24% drop in the bit-
length of the modulus log q compared to that recommended at target security level λ for the
same values of n and σ = 3.19) and uniform ternary secret. This choice corresponds to a sparse
ternary secret with Hamming weight h ∈ {128, 192, 256}, depending on the desired security
level, which allows for more efficient bootstrapping when compared to uniform-ternary secrets.
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h n λ log q usvp dual logQ
64 1024 128 24 131.0 133.8 27
192 16 193.8 198.3 19
256 11 265.2 279.1 14
128 1024 128 26 130.4 131.4 27
192 17 198.6 199.8 19
256 12 269.6 279.7 14
256 1024 128 27 128.1 134.1 27
192 18 194.9 208.6 19
256 13 267.0 293.2 14
512 1024 128 27 132.0 137.6 27
192 18 202.9 219.0 19




1024 128 27 133.3 138.7 27
192 19 194.7 207.7 19
256 14 265.6 293.8 14
Table 5.4: Bit-length log q of moduli required to provide target security level λ, for λ ∈
{128, 192, 256}, for various secret densities. We note that the LWE Estimator treats uniform






performing attack for each parameter set is highlighted in bold.
5.5.4 Standardising Larger Dimensions n
With current progress in applied homomorphic encryption it is becoming necessary to work
in dimensions larger than n = 215, the largest dimension currently supported in the HE
Standard. Several recent papers [CHK+18, CCS19a, HHC19, KSK+18] have reported implementations
in dimension n = 216, and an implementation in dimension n = 217 was reported in [KSW+18].
A natural extension of the current standard would therefore be to standardise parameter sets
for dimension n = 2k for some k ≥ 16, since power-of-two n remain the most widely used
in practice. Moreover, power-of-two n enables convenient coefficient-wise error sampling and
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1024 128 14 19 21 23 27
192 10 13 14 16 19
256 7 10 11 12 14
2048 128 27 37 41 46 54
192 19 26 29 32 37
256 15 19 22 24 29
4096 128 55 74 83 92 109
192 37 52 57 64 75
256 30 39 44 49 58
8192 128 111 148 171 186 218
192 84 100 114 130 152
256 60 79 89 98 118
16384 128 223 300 342 377 438
192 157 201 232 265 305
256 115 161 176 202 237
32768 128 496 619 699 767 881
192 350 411 479 523 611
256 263 313 361 408 476
Table 5.5: The reduction in bit-length log q of the modulus q required to retain the desired
level of security against the dual, usvp, hybrid-dual and hybrid-decoding attacks, under our
assumptions, when using a sparse ternary secret parameterised by ζ = hλ compared to a
uniform ternary secret. The lattice reduction cost model is T (β, d) = 20.292β+16.4+log(8d), and
a (conservative) estimate for both the hybrid-dual and hybrid-decoding attacks are obtained
by considering a square-root speed-up in the search space, and ignoring any meet-in-the-
middle probabilities.
would require no change to the currently standardised error distribution.
For n = 216, it is straightforward to apply the methodology used in the current HE Standard [ACC+18],
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i.e. to use the LWE Estimator to find an appropriate log q to meet security requirements for
fixed σ = 3.19 and a currently standardised secret distribution. We present the results of such
an analysis for a uniform ternary secret distribution in Table 5.6, which gives an estimate of
the security of the proposed parameter sets (n = 216, σ = 3.19, log q) against the usvp and
dual attacks under a sieving lattice reduction cost model.
λ n log q usvp dual
128 65536 1782 128.3 128.4
192 65536 1242 192.5 192.0
256 65536 963 256.7 257.7
Table 5.6: Required bit-length log q of moduli required to attain target security level λ under
the usvp and dual attacks, with λ ∈ {128, 192, 256}, for dimension n = 65536, under the
sieving-based cost model T (β, d) = 20.292β+16.4+log(8d).
For n ≥ 217 the same methodology works in theory, although it can become cumbersome to
run hybrid attack estimates many times for such very large parameter sets. To find suitable
moduli q achieving target security λ for higher values of n, we can extrapolate using the data
we already have using the apparent linear relationship between n and log q. That is, for a
fixed σ, n log q is essentially constant for a fixed target security level. This means we can easily
extrapolate entries for larger values of n, without having to explicitly run new experiments.
We illustrate in Figure 5.4 this for a sparse ternary secret of fixed Hamming weight h = λ
(i.e. ζ = 1). When considering pre-quantum estimates, we can represent log(q) as a linear
function of n by extrapolation from the data in Table 5.5:
logqsieve(λ,ζ)=(128,1)(n) = 0.021370n− 3.601989
logqsieve(λ,ζ)=(192,1)(n) = 0.014630n− 3.139303, and
logqsieve(λ,ζ)=(256,1)(n) = 0.011007n− 1.184080.
These linear models were found using the find fit function in SageMath [S+20]. For readability,
we round the coefficients to six decimal places in each case.
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Figure 5.4: Extrapolation to n = 65536 and n = 131072 using the data from Table 5.5
for the value ζ = 1. Here, we consider the lattice reduction cost model TBKZ(β, d) =
20.292β+16.4+log(8d) and extrapolate using the SageMath function find fit. Note that the solid
lines represent values covered by data points, and the dashed lines represents extrapolation.




that is, for λ = 128 we have log(q) = 1396, for λ = 192 we have log(q) = 955, and for λ = 256
we have log(q) = 720. For n = 131072, we see that:
blogqsieve(λ,ζ)=(128,1)(131072)c = 2797,




that is, for λ = 128 we have log(q) = 2797, for λ = 192 we have log(q) = 1914, and for
λ = 256 we have log(q) = 1441.
5.5.4.1 Standardising the Standard Deviation σ
The choice of standard deviation σ = 3.19 is somewhat arbitrary, and we could consider
including wider standard deviations. In Table 5.7 we consider the impact of various standard
deviations σ ∈ {0.80, 2.90, 3.20, 32, 320, 3200} on the bit-length log q of the required modulus
to achieve a target level of security λ for fixed λ = 128, and fixed weight ternary secret
with Hamming weight h = 128. As an illustrative example, we choose the case of n = 8192.
We consider security against the usvp and dual attacks under the sieving-based cost model
T (β, d) = 20.292β+16.4+log(8d) for lattice reduction. However, we note that, as σ decreases, it
may be beneficial to guess components of the error vector, and the LWE Estimator does not
consider such techniques.
σ n log q usvp dual
0.80 8192 194 141.8 128.5
2.90 8192 196 141.7 128.5
3.20 8192 196 141.8 128.6
32 8192 204 138.2 128.4
320 8192 203 141.5 128.1
3200 8192 211 137.9 128.1
Table 5.7: Maximal moduli q required to attain target security level λ = 128 for various
values of σ. In each case, we consider a ring dimension of n = 8192 and a fixed weight ternary
secret with Hamming weight h = 128.
In general, we can see that as the value of σ increases, we attain a larger permissible value of




In this chapter, we have considered the current state of the Homomorphic Encryption Security
Standard. We have considered the impact and feasibility of considering sparse secret parameter
sets in future variants of the standard. We note that the current version of the HE Standard
does not consider hybrid attacks, and urge that any parameter sets are analysed against
hybrid attacks before standardisation.
We have shown that, when sparse secrets are considered, the LWE modulus q can require a
significant reduction in size in order to attain the target security level. This can be problematic
in homomorphic encryption schemes, where we are looking for a large modulus q in order to
be able to carry out computations correctly. The attack landscape for sparse-secret LWE is
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This chapter is based on the following publication:
James Alderman, Benjamin R. Curtis, Oriol Farràs, Keith M. Martin, and Jordi Ribes-
González. Private Outsourced Kriging Interpolation. The 5th Workshop on Encrypted Computing
and Applied Homomorphic Cryptography. In International Conference on Financial Cryptography
and Data Security Workshops (pp. 75-90). Springer, volume 10323 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science. 2017. Additional details have been added in this thesis.
In this chapter we present a solution which enables private outsourced Kriging interpolation.
We outline techniques that can be used to “factor out” sensitive parameters from the system
of equations which need to be solved by the server. Using these technique, alongside additively
homomorphic encryption, we can securely outsource Kirging interpolation.
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The author of this thesis contributed towards (a) the design of the private outsourced kriging
interpolation scheme, and (b) the writing of the paper. No contribution was made towards the
implementation, and therefore minimal details are provided in this chapter.
6.1 Introduction and Contribution
Kriging is a spatial interpolation algorithm which provides the best linear unbiased prediction
(BLUP) of an observed phenomenon, by taking a weighted average of samples within a
specified neighbourhood. It is widely used in areas such as geo-statistics where, as an example,
it may be used to predict the quality of mineral deposits at an unobserved location based on
previous measurements. There are many variants of Kriging, but we focus on the widely used
Ordinary Kriging variant, and refer to it simply as Kriging throughout this chapter. Kriging
can be outsourced to a cloud service provider, although measurements and predictions can
be highly sensitive and must therefore be protected.
In this chapter, we present a method for the private outsourcing of Kriging interpolation. We
use a modified variant of the Kriging algorithm in combination with homomorphic encryption
(as described in Chapter 2). Our solution allows crucial information relating to measurement
values to be hidden from the cloud service provider. Crucially, we only require additively
homomorphic encryption which allows for an efficient solution to be built.
Kriging is a form of linear interpolation that predicts the value [z∗0 ] of some phenomenon
at an unobserved location q0 = (x0, y0) in a two-dimensional region. The quality of Kriging
prediction relies on the parameters considered, as well as the variogram model which describes
the spatial continuity of the data. These parameters, and the variogram model, are chosen
prior to interpolation. The Kriging prediction is then formed as a weighted sum of prior
measurements, where measurements closer to the query point q0 are given a greater weight in
the sum than those which are further away. This reflects the assumption that measurements
taken at nearby locations are more likely to be ‘similar’ than measurements taken further
apart.
Kriging was designed with geo-statistical applications in mind (e.g. to predict the best location
to mine based on the mineral deposits found at previous measurements within a region), but
has also found applications in a variety of settings including remote sensing [RDB94], real-
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estate appraisal [KH14], and computer simulations [Kle09]. Kriging has been identified as a
good candidate process to be outsourced, based on the practical and legislative requirements
of industrial users [Cla16, Ing16].
Many users may need access to a Kriging prediction service (indeed, legal frameworks may
require such data to be shared amongst relevant authorities [Eur07]). A secured storage server
may be preferable to distributing copies of the entire dataset to each authorised user, especially
when datasets are large and/or user devices are constrained. Furthermore, Kriging might
need to be performed over data owned by multiple organizations, with an independent cloud
service provider performing processing duties on behalf of all concerned parties.1 Centralised
outsourcing also makes sense when remote sensors take frequent measurements and push the
results to a central database.
Consider a client C that owns a Kriging dataset (a set of measurements taken at various
locations) which it wishes to outsource to an honest-but-curious cloud service provider S. In
the honest-but-curious model, the cloud service provider S follows the protocol as described,
but also attempts to learn as much as possible from the resulting transcript of messages.
Our results do not translate to the malicious setting, since we have no way of verifying the
computations made by the sever in our solution. A maliciously-secure protocol for the private
outsourcing of Kriging interpolation is left for future work. The client C would like to make
use of both the storage and computational power of the server S to make a Kriging prediction
service on its dataset available to multiple users. Further, other data generating nodes may
be authorised by C to add/remove data (measurements) to/from the outsourced dataset.
A trivial solution consists of encrypting all data using a symmetric encryption scheme and
using the server only for storage-as-a-service. To compute a Kriging prediction, all relevant
data is retrieved, decrypted and computed on locally. Unfortunately, this solution may not be
efficient, particularly if client devices have limited computational power or storage capacity.
Moreover, this solution requires high bandwidth during queries. This may be an issue if, for
example, a surveyor in the field requires an on-line Kriging prediction service. In this case,
mobile data services may be expensive, intermittently available, or slow.
An alternative is to compute the entire Kriging process on encrypted data by encrypting
all data using FHE. Unfortunately, Kriging involves several computations that are currently
1In this case, it may be preferable to use Multi-key Homomorphic Encryption [LTV12, PS16, CCS19b,
CDKS19]. We do not consider this setting in our work, and assume that there is a single data owner C.
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challenging when using FHE, including computing square roots and natural exponentiations.
It is certainly possible to outsource the Kriging process and protect all information using
FHE. However, this results in prohibitively high encryption and decryption costs as well as
a large amount of interactivity and local computation, which may diminish the benefits of
the client/server setting. Preliminary experiments using the SEAL library [Mic20] (without
optimization of code or parameter choices) did not yield promising results when computing
a Kriging prediction using a dataset of only three measurements.
Our proposed solution uses additively homomorphic encryption to outsource Kriging interpolation
efficiently. We make a trade-off by protecting only the most sensitive parameters. That is,
we protect the measurement values in the dataset, the generated Kriging predictions and (a
subset of) the variogram parameters chosen by the client. We do not hide locations (of prior
measurements or queries), noting that prior measurement locations may well be externally
observable (e.g. if measurements come from previous mining operations). We discuss issues
surrounding data leakage in more detail in Section 6.6.
Our main contribution is to show that the Kriging process can be adapted such that the
sensitive variogram parameters may be ‘factored out’ from the online computation provided
by the server, whilst the remainder of the Kriging computation may be performed on encrypted
measurement values using an additively homomorphic encryption scheme. We thus gain a
practical, efficient, and secure solution to privately outsource Kriging. An outline of our
protocol is as follows:
1. C uploads an encrypted dataset, consisting of n measurements, to S.
2. S prepares the Kriging dataset for future queries. This process includes plaintext
operations that are also necessary in an unprotected outsourced Kriging scheme.
3. C makes a query to S requesting a Kriging prediction at a location (x0, y0), which is
done in plaintext with virtually no cost.
4. S computes the interpolation on encrypted measurements.
5. C decrypts the result.
Cryptographically-secured Kriging has been studied previously in a different setting, where a
server owns a dataset and clients may query the dataset at a previously unsampled location [TP13]:
170
6.2 Kriging Interpolation
the queried location and resulting prediction should be private from the server, whilst the
dataset held by the server should be private from the client. Two solutions are proposed
in [TP13] which, unlike our solution, support only one variogram model and require high
communication complexity, interactivity and local computation. The first is based on creating
random ‘dummy’ queries to hide the queried location, and using an oblivious transfer protocol
to hide predictions for all but the legitimate query location. The second solution uses the
Paillier encryption scheme [Pai99] in an interactive protocol requiring multiple round-trips
between client and server. In [TP14] collaborative private Kriging was investigated, where
users combine their datasets to gain more accurate Kriging predictions.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 6.2 we describe the Kriging
interpolation process. In Section 6.3 we define our system model and analyse the required
security properties of each piece of data in our setting. In Section 6.4 we introduce the idea
of a canonical variogram, which we use in our construction to allow the server to compute a
Kriging prediction without relying on the sensitive parameters. Our construction is given in
Section 6.5 and we discuss its performance in Section 6.6. Finally, in Section 6.7, we conclude
and outline some potential directions for future work.
6.2 Kriging Interpolation
This section outlines the background theory of Kriging interpolation. For more detail, see
[CD99, Cre92, Kri51, Wac13]. To highlight which objects are to be kept secret from the sever,
we use brackets, e.g. [x] represents that we want to keep the value x secret (via encryption
or other techniques). The Kriging process starts with a set of measurements taken at some
locations in a spatial region, and produces predicted measurements at unsampled locations.
We denote this spatial region by R ⊂ R2, and the locations of prior measurements by P =
(r1, r2, . . . , rn), where each ri = (xi, yi) ∈ R. The Euclidean distance2 between two locations
ri, rj ∈ R is:
d(ri, rj) =
√
(xi − xj)2 + (yi − yj)2.
We refer to the set of taken measurements by S = ([z1], [z2], . . . , [zn]), where [zi] corresponds
to a measurement taken at the corresponding location ri ∈ P . We define the Kriging dataset
to be the tuple (P, S), which consists of all measurement values and their corresponding
2We note that some Kriging datasets consider the Great Circle distance, i.e. the distance between two points




(P, S) = ((r1, r2, . . . , rn), ([z1], [z2], . . . , [zn])).
The Kriging process allows a client to query an arbitrary location r0 ∈ R, in order to receive
a prediction [z∗0 ] of the true value [z0] that would be measured at r0.
6.2.1 Overview of the Kriging Procedure
Informally, Kriging consists of three phases:
1. Computing the experimental variogram: one of the underlying assumptions of the Kriging
process is that two measurements of a phenomenon will be similar when measured at
nearby locations. Using the sampled dataset, one can plot the experimental variogram
to show the dependence between measurements sampled at locations at certain distances
h.
2. Fitting a variogram model : the experimental variogram is not usually sufficient to
use in the Kriging prediction directly, since there may not be sampled data at every
required distance. Therefore, one chooses a variogram model and empirically selects
model parameters to fit a curve to the points of the experimental variogram.
3. Computing the prediction: using the variogram, we can determine the appropriate
weights for each measurement (based on the distance between each measurement and
the queried location). The Kriging prediction is then computed as a weighted sum of
the measured samples.
6.2.2 The Variogram
Let N(h) be the set of all pairs of measurements taken approximately distance h apart, that
is:
N(h) = {([zi], [zj ]) | d(ri, rj) ∈ (h−∆, h+ ∆)}.3
3The approximation tolerance ∆ can be increased when the Kriging dataset does not include enough sample
points at a close enough distance.
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([zi]− [zj ])2. (6.1)
A suitable variogram function γ : R≥0 → R must satisfy a set of conditions [CD99, Cre92].
The most commonly used models require:
 γ(0) = 0,
 γ(h) is positive and bounded, and
 the existence of the limits limh→0+ γ(h) and limh→∞ γ(h).
These models are parametrized by the following four variables:
1. the nugget effect [η]: the limit of γ(h) as h→ 0+,
2. the sill [ν]: the limit of γ(h) as h→∞,
3. the range ρ: which controls how fast γ(h) approaches [ν] as h increases, and
4. the partial sill [µ]: the difference between the sill and the nugget, i.e. [µ] = [ν]− [η].
Typically, a variogram model is chosen from a set of standard parametric variogram models.
This model is then fitted to the experimental variogram by empirically adjusting the nugget
effect, sill, and range parameters. The most common choices of bounded variogram models
are, for h > 0:





2. the exponential variogram model : γ(h) = [ν]− ([ν]− [η])e−h/ρ,







4. the Gaussian variogram model : γ(h) = [ν]− ([ν]− [η])e−h2/ρ2 ,
where 1I(x) = 1 if x ∈ I, and 1I(x) = 0 otherwise.
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6.2.3 The Normal Equations
Let γ be one of the variogram models discussed in Section 6.2.2 with parameters chosen
to fit the experimental variogram. To construct the best linear unbiased predictor of the
phenomenon at a queried location r0 = (x0, y0) ∈ R, we first form the Kriging matrix K ∈
R(n+1)×(n+1) with elements:
 Ki,j = γ(d(ri, rj)) for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n,
 Kn+1,i = Ki,n+1 = 1 for i 6= n+ 1, and




γ(d(r1, r1)) γ(d(r1, r2)) . . . γ(d(r1, rn)) 1
γ(d(r2, r1)) γ(d(r2, r2)) . . . γ(d(r2, rn)) 1
...
... . . .
...
...
γ(d(rn, r1)) γ(d(rn, r2)) . . . γ(d(rn, rn)) 1
1 1 . . . 1 0

∈ R(n+1)×(n+1).
Define v ∈ Rn+1 with vi = γ(d(r0, ri)) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and vn+1 = 1. Finally, let w ∈ R(n+1)
satisfy Kw = v:
γ(d(r1, r1)) γ(d(r1, r2)) . . . γ(d(r1, rn)) 1
γ(d(r2, r1)) γ(d(r2, r2)) . . . γ(d(r2, rn)) 1
...
... . . .
...
...
γ(d(rn, r1)) γ(d(rn, r2)) . . . γ(d(rn, rn)) 1


















The (Ordinary) Kriging prediction [z∗0 ] of the measured phenomenon at the location r0 is








The set of linear equations defined by K, w, and v are known as the Normal Equations.
They are derived by ensuring that the induced linear predictor is unbiased (this is done by
forcing the first n weights to sum to one, i.e.
∑n
i=1wi = 1) while minimizing the variance
of the induced linear predictor [Wac13]. The resulting minimized variance [σ∗20 ] is called the
(Ordinary) Kriging variance, and it is described by the following expression:




The Kriging variance allows for the construction of confidence intervals for each prediction and
this describes the error associated with the prediction. We define a variogram function to be
non-degenerate if [η] 6= [ν], and we restrict our attention to non-degenerate variograms in this
chapter. Using the degenerate variogram (also called the nugget effect variogram [Wac13])
results in the average Kriging predictor [z∗0 ] =
∑n
i=1[zi]/n at all unsampled locations r0 /∈ P ,
with Kriging variance [σ∗20 ] = n+ 1.
6.2.4 Toy Example
Throughout this chapter, we make use of a small example dataset for illustrative purposes.
To do this, we use the PyKrige library [PYK20] following in a similar fashion to the example
code provided with the library. Specifically, we expand their Ordinary Kriging example code
and utilise their example dataset. This example code considers the toy dataset, consisting of







Table 6.1: The toy dataset used throughout this section, as in the ordinary kriging example
used in the PyKrige library [PYK20]. The xi, yi values are coordinates of the measurement
[zi].
In our example, we choose to set the value of ∆ to be 0. Therefore, since the size of our
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def compute experimental variogram(data):
vals = []
Nh = 1
variogram vals = []
h = []
for i in range(len(data)):
for j in range(i+1,len(data)):
xij = data[i][0] = data[j][0]
yij = data[i][1] = data[j][1]
zij = data[i][2] = data[j][2]
hij = sqrt(xij**2= yij**2)
h.append(hij)
vals.append(zij**2)
variogram vals = [1/(2*Nh) * z for z in vals]
return (h, variogram vals)
Figure 6.1: Code used to plot the experimental variogram of a dataset, such as the example
dataset presented in Table 6.1.





= 10 distinct sets of the form:
N(hk) = {([zi], [zj ]) | d(ri, rj) = hk},
for 1 ≤ k ≤ 10. For our dataset, it turns out that each value hk is distinct, and we therefore
have exactly ten sets {N(hk)}10k=1. We plot h against γ∗(h) in Figure 6.2.
We can use the custom code outlined in Figure 6.1 to determine a good variogram model.
We note that PyKrige allows the usage of binning when computing a variogram, which
corresponds to a selection of ∆ 6= 0 and considering Euclidean distances in the range (h −
∆, h + ∆). As noted above, we consider ∆ = 0 in our example. We begin by plotting the
experimental variogram according to Equation 6.1 in Figure 6.1.
We can also use Pykrige to plot the experimental variogram, which we do using the example
code provided with the PyKrige library, and fit a linear variogram to the data (since Figure 6.2
shows that this is a good model for fitting). Recall that the linear model is of the form:























Figure 6.2: The experimental variogram for our example dataset, presented in Table 6.1, with
∆ = 0
and PyKrige fits a model of the form:
γ(h) = 5.2517 · 10−11 + 0.1168h,
which corresponds to choices of ρ = 1, [η] ≈ [0.1168], [ν] = [5.2517 ·10−11]. Note that PyKrige
does not consider a range in their linear models, so we have omitted the Indicator function
used in Section 6.2.2. For this variogram we perform Kriging interpolation on a 10× 10 grid
between the values x, y ∈ [0, 5], and the results are displayed in Figure 6.4. We can, of course,
change the granularity of this prediction and predict over an (r × s) grid for any r, s ∈ Z.
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Figure 6.3: A linear model fitted to the experimental variogram using the Pykrige library, for
our example dataset presented in Table 6.2.
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y | x 0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0
5.0 0.90 0.95 1.02 1.11 1.20 1.31 1.42 1.52 1.61 1.67 1.72
4.5 0.83 0.89 0.96 1.05 1.15 1.27 1.40 1.51 1.61 1.69 1.73
4.0 0.77 0.81 0.88 0.97 1.08 1.21 1.34 1.47 1.59 1.70 1.74
3.5 0.70 0.74 0.79 0.88 1.00 1.13 1.27 1.40 1.52 1.64 1.69
3.0 0.64 0.67 0.71 0.81 0.93 1.05 1.18 1.31 1.43 1.53 1.59
2.5 0.58 0.61 0.66 0.75 0.85 0.97 1.09 1.21 1.32 1.42 1.48
2.0 0.53 0.56 0.61 0.69 0.78 0.89 1.01 1.12 1.23 1.32 1.39
1.5 0.49 0.51 0.56 0.62 0.71 0.81 0.92 1.04 1.14 1.23 1.30
1.0 0.46 0.48 0.52 0.56 0.63 0.74 0.85 0.96 1.06 1.15 1.22
0.5 0.45 0.46 0.49 0.53 0.58 0.69 0.80 0.90 1.00 1.08 1.15
0 0.44 0.46 0.49 0.52 0.58 0.67 0.76 0.86 0.94 1.02 1.09
Figure 6.4: Example interpolation grid using the linear model fitted to the experimental
variogram presented in Figure 6.3.
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6.3 Private Outsourced Kriging Interpolation
We now introduce the setting that we consider in this chapter. We have a client C that
owns a Kriging dataset (P, S), as defined in Section 6.2, along with a variogram γ computed
as in Section 6.2.4. We also have an honest-but-curious server S that is willing to perform
outsourced Kriging on behalf of the client C. Finally, we have additional users U that are
authorised by C to make Kriging queries to S, and we may also consider additional data
generating nodes (e.g. several remote sensors placed in locations of interest) that may update
the outsourced dataset by producing additional measurement data or removing previous
(e.g. outdated) measurements. The requirements of each party are as follows:
 The data owner must choose the variogram model to be used, as well as the associated
parameters. They upload a Kriging dataset to the server, and should be able to update
data and request Kriging predictions.
 The data users may request Kriging predictions and update data. Here, update data
refers to the addition of a new measurement [zi] to the set of measurements S, and the
addition of the corresponding location ri to the set of locations P . After an update has
taken place, all future Kriging predictions use the updated dataset.
 The data generating nodes should only be able to update data.
 The honest-but-curious server should only be able to perform Kriging predictions, and
should do so without learning the data used in the computation.
We now informally describe the protocol, which proceeds as follows:
1. The data owner C chooses the variogram model to be used and runs the Outsource
algorithm to generate the (protected) dataset to be sent to the server, as well as ‘keys’
that are issued to authorise a party to update the outsourced dataset, or to perform
Kriging queries.
2. Upon receipt of the protected data, the server may run the Setup algorithm to process
the data and perform any necessary pre-computation. After this step has been completed,
the system is ready to accept queries and perform the associated predictions.
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3. The data owner, or an authorised data user (in possession of the query key), may request
a Kriging prediction at a specified location by running the Query algorithm to generate
a query token Q.
4. This query token Q is sent to the server, who runs the Interpolate algorithm using the
processed database to generate an encrypted prediction and an encoding of the Kriging
variance (the estimation of the error in the prediction).
5. A party authorised to perform queries may learn the prediction and variance by running
the Decrypt algorithm.
6. To dynamically update the outsourced dataset, an authorised party (in possession of
the update key) may run the AddRequest algorithm on a specified location r′ and
measurement [z′], or the DeleteRequest algorithm on a specified location r. These
algorithms produce an addition token αr′,[z′] or deletion token δr, respectively, that
is sent to the server.
7. Upon receipt of an addition or deletion token, the server runs the Add or Delete
algorithm, respectively, to update the database accordingly.
We note that, throughout execution of all of the algorithms discussed above, the server
cannot access the underlying predictions due to the encryption provided by the homomorphic
encryption scheme. In this chapter, we assume that any user authorised to generate a Kriging
query is also permitted to update the dataset. If this is not the case, then the construction
can be modified to include a digital signature computed on any addition or deletion token,
where the signing key is contained in the update key (and not the query key). The server
should be trusted to reject any tokens that do not have a valid signature (which is the case
since we are working in the honest-but-curious model). In this case, only users in possession
of the private signature key would be able to update the dataset. We now formalise this
discussion.
Definition 6.1 (Private Outsourced Kriging Interpolation Scheme) A private
outsourced Kriging interpolation scheme is made up of the following algorithms:
 (UK,QK,C)
$←− Outsource(1λ, P, S, γ): a probabilistic algorithm run by C which takes
as input a security parameter λ, the Kriging dataset which is made up of measurement
locations P and measurement values S, and the chosen variogram γ. It produces:
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– an update key UK that may be used to update the outsourced dataset, which is
given to parties authorised by C to update the dataset,
– a query key QK which may be used to form Kriging queries, which is kept by C,
and
– an outsourceable dataset C that may be transmitted to the server.
 DB← Setup(C): a deterministic algorithm run by S which takes as input the outsourceable
dataset C. This algorithm enables S to perform any necessary processing that will enable
it to compute Kriging predictions, and produces a processed outsourced dataset DB.
 Q
$←− Query(QK, r0): a probabilistic algorithm run by C or a data user in U which takes
as input a query key QK and a query location r0 = (x0, y0) ∈ R for which a Kriging
prediction should be computed. The output is a query token Q which is sent to S.
 (Z̃0, σ̃0
∗2)← Interpolate(Q,DB): a deterministic algorithm run by S that, given a query
token Q and the database DB, returns an encrypted Kriging interpolation Z̃0 and the
partially computed Kriging variance σ̃∗20 .
 ([z∗0 ], [σ
∗2
0 ]) ← Decrypt(QK, Z̃0, σ̃0∗2): a deterministic algorithm run by C or a user in
U that takes the query key QK, the Kriging results Z̃0 and σ̃0∗2 from the server and
outputs the Kriging prediction [z∗0 ] and the Kriging variance [σ
∗2
0 ] at the queried location.
 αr′,[z′] ← AddRequest(UK, r′, [z′]): a deterministic algorithm run by C, a data user in U
or a data generating node, which takes the update key UK, a location r′, a measurement
value [z′], and outputs an addition token αr′,[z′].
 DB′ ← Add(DB, αr′,[z′],): a deterministic algorithm run by S which takes the current
outsourced database DB and an addition token αr′,[z′], and outputs an updated database
DB′ representing the Kriging dataset (P ∪ {r′}, S ∪ {[z′]}).
 δr ← DeleteRequest(UK, r): a deterministic algorithm run by C, a data user in U or a
data generating node which takes as input a location r ∈ P and the update key UK and
outputs a deletion token δr.
 DB′ ← Delete(DB, δr): a deterministic algorithm by the server which takes as input the
current database DB, as well as a deletion token δr, and outputs an updated database DB
′
representing the Kriging dataset (P \ {r}, S \ {[zr]}), where [zr] ∈ S is the measurement
corresponding to location r ∈ P in DB.
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Next, we analyse the security requirements of each component within a Kriging system.
1. The measurement values [zi] ∈ S are highly sensitive and must be protected at all times.
2. We consider the coordinates ri ∈ P of previous measurements to not be sensitive. This
is reasonable since in some applications these locations may be externally observable,
such as the case where they are the locations of previous mining activity.
3. The queried location r0 at which a new prediction should be computed may reveal
areas of particular interest to the user. The sensitivity of this relies on the setting and
individual user requirements. However, in practice, Kriging queries are often made at
every location within a region to produce a heat map of a phenomenon (as considered in
our toy example), which may limit the sensitivity of individual query locations. Further,
the basic assumption of Kriging is that the quality of predictions degrades with distance.
Therefore, the best Kriging results will be obtained when the queried location is broadly
within the region of prior (observed) measurements.
4. The computed prediction [z∗0 ] is highly sensitive as it may form the basis of future
decisions and may also be business-critical, and therefore must be protected.
5. The choice of variogram model (without the variogram parameters) may reveal something
about the overall trend of the spatial dependencies of the measurements. We assume
that this is not particularly sensitive information, and we leave a detailed leakage
analysis to future work.
6. The range parameter ρ of the variogram is a constant scaling of the region R denoting the
inter-measurement distance h at which the spatial dependency becomes negligible. For
distances h > ρ, the variogram approaches the variance of the measurements [Wac13],
which is represented by the sill [ν].
7. The nugget effect [η] reveals the spatial dependency at very small distances.
We assume that the range is not sensitive (as it merely scales the region R), but that
information revealed by the nugget and sill may be sensitive. Even in applications where
this direct information on the variance and spatial dependency of measurements is deemed
non-sensitive, it may be the case that the variogram parameters are commercially sensitive.
These parameters must be chosen empirically to best fit the experimental data, a process
which may be time-consuming. The quality of predictions depends on how well the variogram
matches the experimental variogram. We summarise our security requirements in Table 6.2.
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Data ri [zi] (x0, y0) [z
∗
0 ] γ model ρ [ν] [η]
Protection 7 3 7 3 7 7 3 3
Table 6.2: Data protection offered by our private outsourced Kriging scheme.
6.4 Our Techniques
In this section we introduce the main concepts used in our construction: the canonical
variogram. We show how to factor out the variogram parameters in the Normal equations
which allows us to remove these parameters from the outsourced dataset, and use them
to recover the final prediction on the client side. The crux of our solution for the private
outsourcing of Kriging interpolation is to observe how the Kriging prediction varies according
to the variogram nugget effect [η], the sill [ν], and range ρ in the non-degenerate case. We
define a canonical variogram for each variogram model by arbitrarily fixing the parameters
[η] = ρ = 1 and [ν] = 0, although our results clearly translate to other choices.
Since the Kriging process is inherently linear, we show how to ‘factor out’ the sensitive
parameters [η] and [ν] from the variogram to leave just the canonical variogram. Using
this result, in combination with an additively homomorphic scheme, an untrusted server can
compute a related Kriging prediction, and variance, without any knowledge of [η], [ν] and the
actual measurements. The variogram parameters can then be used by the client locally to
compute the final prediction.
6.4.1 The Canonical Normal Equations
Definition 6.2 (Canonical Variogram) Let γ(h) be a non-degenerate variogram function
with nugget effect [η], sill [ν] and range ρ. We define its associated canonical variogram as the
function γ̃ : R≥0 → R satisfying γ̃(0) = 0 and:





for h > 0. (6.2)
Note that for any non-degenerate variogram function coming from the parametric variogram
models defined in Section 6.2.2, the canonical variogram depends only on the model and not
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on any of the parameters. Given a Kriging dataset (P, S) of n measurements, a query position
r0 /∈ P and a variogram function γ with nugget effect [η], sill [ν] and range ρ, let Kw = v be
the corresponding Normal equations as defined in Section 6.2. Our main result is that it is
sufficient to consider a canonical version of the Normal equations that depends only on the
chosen variogram model, as well as P and the range parameter ρ of γ.
Definition 6.3 (Canonical Normal Equations) We define the canonical Normal equations
as the linear system obtained from the Normal equations Kw = v by replacing:
1. every ri ∈ P by ri/ρ, i.e. (xi, yi) 7→ (xiρ ,
yi
ρ ),
2. the query position r0 by r0/ρ, similarly to above, and
3. the variogram γ(h) by the canonical variogram γ̃(h).





We denote the canonical Normal equations as K̃w̃ = ṽ. The matrix K̃ is given by:
γ̃(d(r1/ρ, r2/ρ)) γ̃(d(r1/ρ, r2/ρ) . . . γ̃(d(r1/ρ, rn/ρ)) 1
γ̃(d(r2/ρ, r1/ρ)) γ̃(d(r2/ρ, r2/ρ)) . . . γ̃(d(r2/ρ, rn/ρ)) 1
...
... . . .
...
...
γ̃(d(rn/ρ, r1/ρ)) γ̃(d(rn/ρ, r2/ρ)) . . . γ̃(d(rn/ρ, rn/ρ)) 1
1 1 . . . 1 0

∈ R(n+1)×(n+1),


















Note that, since the canonical variogram is parameterless, the canonical Normal equations
involve only the variogram model and the locations in P scaled by 1/ρ. This observation
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allows us to take advantage of the linearity of the Kriging predictor in order to protect the
measurements and interpolation value, whilst hiding the sill and nugget parameters [ν] and
[η] from the server by storing them locally. We now discuss the solution to the canonical
Normal equations in Proposition 6.1.
Proposition 6.1 Let K,K′ ∈ R(n+1)×(n+1) be real matrices, and let v,v′ ∈ Rn+1 be real
vectors such that:
1. there exists a, b ∈ R such that K′i,j = aKi,j + b and v′i = avi + b for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n,




n+1,i = vn+1 = v
′
n+1 = 1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
3. Kn+1,n+1 = K
′
n+1,n+1 = 0.
Then, if w ∈ Rn+1 satisfies Kw = v, the vector w′ ∈ Rn+1 defined by:
w′i = wi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and
w′n+1 = awn+1,
satisfies K′w′ = v′.
Proof. Note that:




for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and we have (K′w′)n+1 = 1. Since
∑n
i=1 wi = 1 (by the last equation of the
system Kw = v), the result follows. 
This result extends an observation in [Cre92], which states that summing a constant to the
variogram does not alter the solutions of the Normal equations, and that such a transformation
of the variogram may sometimes be necessary in order to obtain a numerically stable Kriging
prediction. We apply this proposition to the Normal equations with a = −1/([ν] − [η]) and
b = [ν]/([ν] − [η]), and consider the canonical Normal equations. By the definitions of the
Kriging prediction and the Kriging variance in Section 6.2, we obtain Proposition 6.2.
Proposition 6.2 Let [z∗0 ] and [z̃0
∗] be the Kriging predictions computed from the Normal and
the canonical Normal equations respectively. Denote by [σ∗20 ] and σ̃0
∗2 the Kriging variance
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associated with each of the predictors. Then:
[z̃0
∗] = [z∗0 ] and σ̃0






In the case that the variogram is non-degenerate, the Kriging prediction is independent of
the sill [ν] and nugget [η] parameters of the variogram, whilst the range parameter [ρ] scales
positions. When we apply a linear transformation to the variogram, the Kriging variance of
the obtained Kriging predictor changes according to the same transformation.
6.5 Our Construction
We now outline the operation of each of the algorithms in our scheme. Denote by H =
(KGen,Enc,Dec,Eval) an IND-CPA-secure additive homomorphic encryption scheme. Then:
 (C,UK,QK)
$←− Outsource(1λ, P, S, γ): If γ is a degenerate variogram function, halt
and return ⊥; in this case, our protocol fails.4 Otherwise, generate a keypair for the
homomorphic encryption scheme:
(pk, sk)← KGen(1λ).
Recall that: P ⊆ R2 is the ordered set of locations (ri)ni=1, S ⊆ R is the ordered set of
measurements ([zi])
n
i=1, and that the variogram γ is made up of three parameters: the
nugget [η], the sill [ν] and the range ρ. Let γ̃ be the canonical variogram associated
with γ, as defined in Section 6.4. Define the update key UK and the query key QK as:
UK = (pk, ρ) and QK = (sk, [η], [ν], ρ).
To account for the factor of ρ in the input to γ in Equation 6.2, compute the scaled
locations:
P̃ = ((xi/ρ, yi/ρ))
n
i=1.
Finally, encrypt each measurement in S and define the ordered set:
Z = (Enc(pk, [zi]))
n
i=1.
Output C = (P̃ ,Z, γ̃), along with UK and QK.
4However, if γ is degenerate, the variogram is constant (the so-called ‘nugget effect model’) and models a
purely random variable with no spatial correlation. In this case the prediction is [z∗0 ] =
∑
[zi]/n for r0 6∈ P
and the variance is [σ∗20 ] = n+ 1.
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 DB← Setup(C): Instantiate the matrix K̃ from the canonical Normal equations using
the positions r′i ∈ P̃ , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and the canonical variogram γ̃. Set




j)) for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n,
2. K̃n+1,i = K̃i,n+1 = 1 for i 6= n+ 1, and
3. K̃n+1,n+1 = 0.
Return DB = (K̃, C).
 Q
$←− Query(r0, QK): Let r0 = (x0, y0) and, recalling that ρ is contained within QK,
return Q = (x0/ρ, y0/ρ).
 (Z̃0, σ̃0
∗2) ← Interpolate(Q,DB): Recall that C = (P̃ ,Z, γ̃). If Q ∈ P̃ , then the exact
measurement is contained in the outsourced dataset and no prediction is required. Let
j be the index such that Q = rj , and return (Zj ,⊥), where ⊥ is a distinguished symbol
denoting that the prediction is exact.
Otherwise, compute the vector v from the canonical Normal equations using the locations
r′i ∈ P̃ , the query position Q and the canonical variogram γ̃:
1. vi = γ̃(d(Q, r
′
i)) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and
2. vn+1 = 1.
Compute the solution w̃ to the canonical Normal equation K̃w̃ = ṽ in plaintext. This
step essentially computes the Kriging coefficients w using the canonical variogram and
the scaled locations without requiring the parameters of the variogram. Then, using the




w̃i · Zi and σ̃0∗2 = w̃n+1 +
n∑
i=1
w̃i · γ̃(Q, r′i).
Return the encrypted prediction Z̃0, and the partially computed Kriging variance (error
estimation) σ̃0
∗2.
 ([z∗0 ], [σ
∗2
0 ])← Decrypt(Z̃0, σ̃0∗2, QK): First decrypt the Kriging prediction:
[z̃0
∗] = Dec(sk, Z̃0),
where sk is contained within QK. Then, if σ̃0
∗2 =⊥, set [σ∗20 ] = 0. Else, compute the
Kriging variance:
[σ∗20 ] = [ν]− ([ν]− [η])σ̃0∗2.
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This final step essentially adds back in the parameters of the variogram, which were
removed for outsourcing, using the result from Proposition 6.2.
 αr′,[z′] ← AddRequest(r′, [z′], UK): Let ra = r
′
ρ and compute the ciphertext:
Za = Enc(pk, [z
′]),
where ρ and pk are contained within UK. Output the addition token:
αr′,[z′] = (ra, Za).
 DB′ ← Add(DB, αr′,[z′]): Recall that αr′,[z′] = (ra, Za). Compute the updated dataset:
if ra ∈ P̃ then let j be the index such that rj = ra and modify Zj ∈ Z to be Za.
Otherwise, set C ′ = (P̃ ∪ {ra},Z ∪ {Za}, γ̃). Return the output of Setup(C ′).
 δr ← DeleteRequest(r, UK): Return δr = r/ρ.
 DB′ ← Delete(DB, δr): If δr /∈ P̃ , return DB as there is nothing to remove. Otherwise,
let j be the index such that r = rj in P̃ . Compute the updated dataset C
′ = (P̃ \
{rj},Z \ {Zj}, γ̃) and return the output of Setup(C ′).
6.6 Discussion
The correctness of the scheme is immediate from Proposition 6.2 as well as the correctness of
the homomorphic encryption scheme H. These homomorphic properties enable addition and
scalar multiplication of ciphertexts, whilst ensuring that the results decrypt appropriately.
Proposition 6.2 shows that the Kriging prediction, as well as the Kriging variance, can be
computed by applying a linear transformation to the result computed using the canonical
(parameterless) variogram. Correctness of the updates is apparent because the addition and
deletion tokens format the data in the same way as the original dataset. Since we are using
the honest-but-curious model, the server will modify the dataset correctly. The remainder of
the update algorithms then simulate a new setup procedure running Setup on a new Kriging
dataset from Outsource.
In terms of security, measurement values are always in encrypted form whilst outsourced.
Leakage is bounded by the variogram model as well as both the queried and observed
locations (scaled by the inverse of range parameter ρ). Therefore, assuming no collusion
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between the server and users, the data is confidential from the server. The homomorphic
encryption scheme enables the computation to be performed on the measurements whilst
they are encrypted, and therefore at no point during the computation is the data revealed to
the server.
It is also clear that neither the variogram parameters η and ν, nor any values computed from
them, are ever revealed to the server. The final parameter of the variogram, the range ρ, is
never explicitly given to the server. However, the server does learn the coordinates (scaled
by ρ) of the measurements. Hence, the range could be revealed if the server has existing
knowledge of the measurement locations. Of the three variogram parameters, we believe
that the range is the least sensitive: it reveals how quickly the variogram approaches the sill
(i.e. the distance at which the spatial correlation between measurements becomes negligible)
but does not reveal anything relating to the measurement values themselves.
Whilst the queried location is revealed in the plain to the server, we note that the mechanism
of Tugrul and Polat [TP13] may easily be used to gain a weak form of secrecy: during the
Query algorithm, the party carrying out the query may choose (q − 1) additional locations
from the region, and scale each by ρ. The query token then is made up of q scaled locations,
randomly permuted. The server must perform Interpolate for each location, and the client
discards all results except the one that it is interested in. Unlike [TP13], we do not require
an oblivious transfer protocol, since the querier is authorised to learn as many queries on the
dataset as it wishes. However, as in [TP13], the server may guess the location of interest with
probability 1/q (but cannot learn the prediction at this location). Data generating nodes
cannot learn Kriging predictions as they do not have the decryption key and H is assumed
to be IND-CPA secure.
6.6.1 Implementation
We have used the PHE library [PHE16] to implement our construction, and consider the
Paillier encryption scheme [Pai99]. We note that the plaintext space of the Paillier encryption
scheme is Zn for some n. In order to encode the values [zi] ∈ R into this plaintext space, we
can use the phe.encoding function in PHE. This function takes as input a number x ∈ R,
multiplies by a large constant, usually 10k for some value of k, and rounds the result to
recover dx10kc ∈ Z. The implementation is intended as a proof of concept to evaluate the
efficiency of the proposed solution. All code is executed locally on an Amazon EC2 instance
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with a 2.5GHz Intel Xeon processor and 1GB memory running Ubuntu 14.04.4. All timings
are averaged over 30 iterations, each on a new randomly generated dataset.




















Figure 6.5: Graphs showing the timing costs of each algorithm.
Figures 6.5 and 6.6 give some basic timing results for the implementation our construction.
Figure 6.5 shows the algorithm costs. Note that the cost of the Outsource algorithm dominates
all others, and this is due to the cost of n encryptions.
Therefore, for clarity, we also present Figure 6.6, which shows the same results with the
exclusion of the Outsource algorithm. It can be seen that, with the exception of the (high)
one-time cost of Outsource (which may be amortised over many queries), the remaining client-
side processes are very efficient. The server must perform quadratic work to perform Setup,
but this will be required only during initial setup and when the outsourced dataset is updated.
The online workload of the client is very low, whilst the server’s online workload is linear in
the size of the dataset. Further, we note that the server’s online workload greater than the
client’s workload, which makes outsourcing worthwhile.
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Figure 6.6: Graphs showing the timing costs of each algorithm, excluding Outsource.
We believe that these experiments demonstrate the performance and scalability of our solution.
We have considered the well-known Meuse dataset [BMML15], which contains 155 measurements,
and we believe this to be reasonable compared to what is used in practice.
6.7 Conclusion
The Kriging interpolation technique describes the best unbiased linear prediction of an observed
phenomenon in a geographical region, based on a set of measurements, and it is used in a
wide range of applications. In this chapter, we have presented a construction that allows
for Kriging interpolation to be securely outsourced to a cloud service provider, such that the
measurement values and sensitive variogram parameters are withheld from the server. This
solution allows the Kriging interpolation technique to be performed in a privacy-preserving
manner, under the assumption that the cloud service provider acts in an honest-but-curious
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manner. We have implemented this solution in the PHE library, making use of the Paillier
encryption scheme, and have provided some timing results for our implementation.
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Conclusion and Future Work
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7.1 Conclusion
In this thesis we have considered a variety of topics within lattice-based cryptography and
homomorphic encryption. Our work has focused around three areas: security, standardisation,
and applications. We have studied the security of lattice-based cryptosystems in Chapters 3, 4,
and 5, standardisation efforts in Chapters 4 and 5, and applications in Chapter 6.
7.1.1 Security
Understanding the security of the Learning with Errors problem is of central importance
to the future of lattice-based cryptography. In this thesis, we have considered variants of
the uSVP, dual, decoding, hybrid-dual, and hybrid-decoding attacks which can be used to
determine the security of a given set of LWE parameters.
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Specifically, in Chapter 3 we introduced a guess-and-verify decoding attack (g-v decoding)
on small-secret LWE. This approach follows the approach of the hybrid-decoding attack, but
considers a more expensive, higher probability, BDD solver. This alters the landscape of
trade-offs and we show that, when the BKZ simulator is assumed, aswell as an enumeration
cost model for BKZ, our g-v decoding technique outperforms a (non-mitm) variant of the
hybrid-decoding attack.
In Chapters 4 and 5 we have considered the security of a variety of different LWE-based
parameter sets currently involved in standardisation processes. As part of this work, we have
also contributed to the LWE Estimator, to ensure that current state-of-the-art attacks are
switched on for binary secrets, and have also released custom code1.
7.1.2 Standardisation
Standardisation efforts for public-key encryption schemes, digital signature algorithms, and
homomorphic encryption schemes based on the Learning with Errors problem are well underway.
The NIST standardisation process, discussed in Chapter 4, aims to standardise a suite of
public-key encryption and digital signature algorithms designed for use in an era where
quantum computers exist. In this thesis, we have analysed the security of all of the first
round submissions against the uSVP and dual attacks (where appropriate). This resulted in
a large set of security estimates, which allows for any two schemes to be compared in a fair
manner. Moreover, our work highlighted that cost models for BKZ are not order preserving.
We also provided an update regarding the current state of the NIST standardisation process,
including some security estimates for the schemes in the third round.
The homomorphicencryption.org standardisation effort, discussed in Chapter 5, aims to
standardise LWE-based parameter sets to be used in homomorphic encryption schemes2. In
our work we have considered potential extensions to the latest variant of the Homomorphic
Encryption Security Standard. Specifically, we considered the feasibility and impact of
standardising LWE-based parameter sets with a sparse secret distribution. We present a
variety of parameter sets which balance security requirements with the cost of the expensive
1Available at https://github.com/bencrts/hybrid_attacks and https://github.com/estimate-all-
the-lwe-ntru-schemes/estimate-all-the-lwe-ntru-schemes.github.io.





Applications of homomorphic encryption schemes are plentiful and ever-increasing. In Chapter 6,
we have considered the outsourcing of an interpolation algorithm called Kriging to an honest-
but-curious cloud server. In our work, we showed how to “factor out” sensitive parameters in
order to allow the system of equations used to determine the weights to be solved by the server
in a secure manner. When used in combination with an additively homomorphic encryption
scheme, this allows for the weights to be applied to the encrypted measurement values, and
for the sum to be computed securely. Finally, the sensitive parameters are re-applied on the
client-side, to allow for the interpolation value to be determined.
7.2 Future Work
In this section we conclude this thesis with some comments on potential future work.
7.2.1 Security
Cryptanalysis of lattice-based cryptography is a fast-moving field. Further work is required
to accurately estimate the cost of the hybrid-decoding attack, and this includes verification of
the various heuristics considered in the hybrid-decoding attack. Future areas to explore also
includes considering the impact of quantum enumeration algorithms on the concrete running
time of the hybrid-decoding attack, and studying sieving-based BDD solvers in more detail.
Moreover, an accurate analysis of the meet-in-the-middle probability for the g-v decoding
approach would allow for a direct comparison with the hybrid-decoding attack. Further work





As the NIST standardisation process continues into the final rounds, it is important for the
literature to attempt to converge onto BKZ cost models for both the enumeration and sieving
cases. Once this has been achieved, estimating attack complexities becomes a more simple
process. Moreover, it is also important for the memory cost of cryptanalytic attacks to
be considered, as the majority of cryptanalytic arguments in the submissions to the NIST
standardisation process focus solely on the time cost of attacks. As an example, we have seen
that hybrid-decoding attacks, as outlined in Chapter 3, can outperform the dual and uSVP
attacks. However, these attacks require exponential memory.
In terms of homomorphic encryption standardisation, the methodology in the current variant
of the HE Standard relies on the LWE Estimator. However we note that the LWE Estimator
has a number of limitations, including outdated decoding estimates and lack of support for
hybrid attacks. Moreover, the attack landscape for sparse-secret LWE is fast moving, with
several new contributions emerging in recent years. Further work is needed to ensure that any
parameter sets standardised for homomorphic encryption schemes are analysed under hybrid
attacks.
7.2.3 Applications
Our proposed construction for the private outsourcing of Kriging interpolation may be extended
in several ways. For example, we could consider extending our protocol to protect the
locations of the query points. This can be achieved by increasing interactivity, communication
complexity, and client computation in the query process. However, this approach requires the
server to compute square roots and natural exponentials over encrypted data (in an efficient
manner) which remains an open problem.
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